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The International Criminal Court (ICC) faces serious challenges in the delivery of its 
mandate including legal and procedural challenges, political challenges as well as 
challenges relating to the victim participation and reparation regime. Therefore, this 
dissertation examines the question of whether the ICC should implement a plea 
negotiation policy to mitigate some of the challenges it faces. In order to answer this 
question, three sub-questions are set out as follows: which of the challenges facing the 
ICC might be mitigated by the implementation of a plea negotiation policy; whether 
plea negotiation would fit into the legal and procedural framework of the ICC; and, 
which lessons might be learned from the practice of plea negotiations in national 
jurisdictions on one hand, and in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the other hand. 
The dissertation concludes that the ICC should implement a policy of plea negotiation 
because it fits in the ICC’s legal and procedural framework and it can help mitigate 
some of the legal, procedural and political challenges facing the ICC. Be that as it may, 
the limitations of the practice of plea negotiation are fully acknowledged. However, it is 
argued that, these limitations can be mitigated by paying attention to lessons learned 
from the law, policy and jurisprudence relating to plea negotiations in national 
jurisdictions and the preceding international criminal tribunals. All in all, the dissertation 
concludes that plea negotiation could be an important tool to increase the efficiency of 
trials and increase conviction rates while saving judicial resources at the ICC. Appendix 
A and B of this dissertation contain texts of proposed provisions on plea negotiation to 
be included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, respectively.  
 
 
Key phrases: International Criminal Court (ICC), Article 65 of the Rome Statute, 
challenges facing the ICC, plea bargaining, plea negotiation, guilty plea, plea 
agreement, admission of guilt, remorse, cooperation, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal from Rwanda (ICTR) 
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Die Internasionale Strafhof (ICC) staar ernstige uitdagings in die lewering van sy 
mandaat in die gesig. Dit sluit in regs- en prosedurele uitdagings, politieke uitdagings 
sowel as uitdagings met betrekking tot die deelname van slagoffers en vergoeding aan 
slagoffers. Daarom ondersoek hierdie proefskrif die vraag of die ICC 'n 
pleitonderhandelingsbeleid moet implementeer om sommige van die uitdagings wat dit 
in die gesig staar, aan te spreek. Ten einde hierdie vraag te beantwoord, word drie 
subvrae soos volg uiteengesit: wat is die uitdagings wat die ICC in die gesig staar en 
wat met behulp van 'n pleitonderhandelingsbeleid aangespreek kan word; sal 
pleitonderhandeling in die wetlike en prosedurele raamwerk van die ICC inpas; en 
watter lesse kan geleer word uit die praktyk van pleitonderhandelinge in nasionale 
jurisdiksies aan die een kant, en in die Internasionale Strafregtelike Tribunale vir die 
voormalige Joego-Slawië en Rwanda, aan die ander kant. 
Die proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ICC 'n beleid van pleitonderhandeling 
moet implementeer omdat dit inpas by die ICC se wetlike en prosedurele raamwerk. 
Dit kan help om sommige van die wetlike, prosedurele en politieke uitdagings wat die 
ICC in die gesig staar, te versag. Hoe dit ook al sy, die beperkings van die praktyk van 
pleitonderhandeling word ten volle erken. Daar word egter aangevoer dat hierdie 
beperkings versag kan word deur aandag te gee aan lesse uit die regsraamwerke, 
beleide, en regspraak rakende pleitonderhandelinge in nasionale jurisdiksies en die 
genoemde internasionale strafregtelike tribunale. Die proefskrif kom dus tot die 
gevolgtrekking dat pleitonderhandeling 'n belangrike instrument kan wees om die 
doeltreffendheid van verhore te verhoog. Skuldigbevindings sal verhoog word terwyl 
die hulpbronne by die ICC meer ekonomies aangewend word. 'n Konsepteks oor 
pleitonderhandeling wat by die Statuut van Rome van die Internasionale Strafhof en 
die reëls van prosedure en bewysreg opgeneem moet word, is onderskeidelik in bylaes 
A en B tot hierdie proefskrif geformuleer. 
 
 
Sleutelfrases: Internasionale Strafhof (ICC), Artikel 65 van die Statuut van Rome, 
uitdagings wat die ICC in die gesig staar, pleitonderhandeling, pleitverduideliking, 
pleitooreenkoms, skuldigpleit, berou, samewerking, Internasionale Strafregtelike 
Tribunaal vir die voormalige Joego-Slawië ( ICTY), Internasionale Strafregtelike 
Tribunaal vir Rwanda (ICTR) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
1.1 Background 
The choice of this research topic was informed by a number of factors among them – 
my Master of Laws (LLM) research, the failure of the Kenyan cases at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), as well as my work and experience at the ICC. The complexity 
of the proceedings at the ICC first became evident to me during my LLM research 
which examined inter alia the challenge the ICC faces with regard to international 
cooperation and judicial assistance under part 9 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). The ICC has no enforcement mechanism 
of its own and therefore has to rely on the cooperation and assistance of states parties 
and international organisations in the collection of evidence and the arrest and 
surrender of suspects to the Court. My LLM research focused on some states parties’ 
refusal to comply with the ICC request to arrest and surrender former President Omar 
al-Bashir of Sudan to the Court. Even though the ICC first issued a warrant of arrest 
against him in 2005, to date states have refused/neglected or were unable to surrender 
him to the ICC and the case against him has therefore hibernated.  
Secondly, the challenges the ICC faced in the Kenyan cases regarding the collection 
of evidence, alleged political interference, and lack of state cooperation among others, 
also played a role in informing the choice of topic. Being Kenyan myself, and being an 
international lawyer with a specific interest and expertise in international criminal law, 
I closely followed the cases against the Kenyan President and Deputy President at the 
ICC. Because the Prosecutor was unable to present sufficient evidence, both Kenyan 
cases ended in a lose-lose situation. The ICC was unable to establish the historical 
truth behind the post-election violence or enforce international justice in fulfilment of its 
mandate; the accused persons still have the suspicion of crimes against humanity 
hanging over their heads and the possibility of being prosecuted afresh; and the victims 
received neither closure nor reparations. This lose-lose situation raises the question of 
whether it could have been remedied through compromise. I argued elsewhere that 
perhaps if the Prosecutor had entered into negotiation with the accused persons; 
where the accused persons would cooperate with the ICC and set aside funds for 
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reparation of victims in exchange for a deal consisting of charge or sentence reduction, 
the situation may have resulted in a win-win situation.1 
Thirdly, during my work at the ICC I started considering plea negotiation as a potential 
remedy to some of the challenges facing the ICC. Since January 2015 till February 
2018, I was part of the defence team of Mr Charles Blé Goudé at the ICC. During this 
time, I experienced first-hand how the proceedings are made lengthy by various 
procedural issues such as admissibility of evidence and complex disclosure 
procedures, just to mention a few hurdles, which increase the length of proceedings at 
the ICC. For this reason, I have come to appreciate how plea bargaining could be an 
instrumental tool for the ICC to address most procedural hurdles. During my work at 
the ICC, I also had the occasion to discuss the issue at length with experienced 
professionals, like Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, formerly at the ICC (Trial 
Chamber and later also Appeals Chamber), and Professor Geert-Jan Knoops, lead 
counsel for Mr Blé Goudé. Judge van den Wyngaert also has experience dealing with 
plea negotiation at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
where she was a judge before her tenure at the ICC.  
We discussed whether plea negotiation could be a useful tool at the ICC to save time 
and resources and to advance the truth-seeking mission of the Court. During these 
discussions, it became clear to me that plea negotiation may do away with, for 
example, the pre-trial phase of proceedings at the ICC, which can take a considerably 
long period of time. For instance, in the case of former President Laurent Gbagbo, the 
co-accused in the case I worked on, the pre-trial phase alone lasted 925 days, all of 
which former President Gbagbo spent in detention at the ICC.2 We also discussed the 
case of Mr Momir Nicolić at the ICTY who entered a guilty plea and provided useful 
evidence which helped the ICTY establish the truth behind the Srebrenica massacre. 
                                            
1 Phoebe Oyugi, ‘Exploring the Concept of Plea Bargaining as a Potential Solution at the International 
Criminal Court: The Kenyan Cases’ (Culture and Human Rights, 8 August 2016) <http://culture-human-
rights.blogspot.nl/2016/08/phoebe-oyugi-case-manager-ble-goude.html>.  
2 See The Prosecutor V. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on Mr Gbagbo’s Detention-
Dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ICC-02/11-01/15-846-Anx, 10 March 2017. In para 10 of 
this decision, the dissenting judge argued that the accused ought to be provisionally released inter alia 
because his pre-trial detention had lasted much longer than that of other accused persons in the history 
of the ICC. 
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However, the judge in that case did not agree with the concept of plea negotiation and 
the accused was awarded a punitive sentence of 27 years in prison. During this 
discussion, I appreciated the limitations of plea negotiation, but nevertheless thought 
that its introduction at the ICC could be a necessary addition considering the 
complexity and length of the trials. 
The second notable discussion I had on this topic was with Professor Geert-Jan 
Knoops, lead counsel for Blé Goudé who participated in plea negotiation at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Professor Knoops was the Counsel 
for Mr Michael Baragaraza, a former Rwandan official who was accused of complicity 
in the crime of genocide in Rwanda. Mr Baragaraza pleaded guilty, and with the 
assistance of his counsel, Professor Knoops, entered into a plea deal with the 
prosecution. The accused aided the prosecution by providing useful information and in 
return he received a reduced sentence of 8 years’ imprisonment. Mr Baragaraza was 
later released in 2011 after having served three-quarters of his sentence, making him 
the first convicted person at the ICTR to benefit from an early release. One of the 
factors the President of the ICTR took into account in his decision for early release was 
the fact that Mr Baragaraza had entered a guilty plea.3 From this discussion I 
appreciated how plea negotiation may accelerate proceedings, increase efficiency as 
well as save time and resources at an international criminal tribunal. I thought the ICC 
could benefit from the implementation of a similar procedural tool. 
Lastly, from April – October 2019, I worked as a consultant for the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime and part of my task in this capacity involved providing technical 
and expert support to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) in Kenya 
in developing Plea Bargaining Guidelines.4 As discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation, plea bargaining has a long history in Kenya but was previously not 
properly regulated. Therefore, these Guidelines were enacted to inform both internal 
and external stakeholders on the principles of plea bargaining and to guide 
practitioners in concluding plea agreements. Furthermore, these Guidelines were 
                                            
3 The Prosecutor v Michel Baragaraza (Decision on the Early Release of Michel Bagaragaza) ICTR-15-
86-5 (24 October 2011) [15].  
4 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Plea Bargaining Guidelines’ 
<http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2018/47-
CriminalProcedure_PleaBargaining_Rules_2018.pdf> accessed 29 March 2019. 
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developed to mitigate some of the challenges facing the criminal justice system in 
Kenya such as case backlog, overcrowded prisons, as well as the shortage of both 
human and financial resources, among others. The overall goal was to ensure criminal 
justice was dispensed in a quick and efficient manner and the ODPP decided that plea 
bargaining was one of the tools through which this goal would be achieved. This 
experience buttressed my research on this topic and informed my conclusion that plea 
negotiation may mitigate some of the challenges facing the ICC, in a similar fashion as 
in national jurisdictions such as Kenya. 
Having worked at the ICC and experienced the considerable delays, procedural and 
other challenges the Court faces and having discussed the issue at length with 
professionals who have themselves been involved in plea negotiation, both at the bar 
and the bench, at the ICTY and ICTR, I believe that examining plea negotiation at the 
ICC is a research-worthy topic. Implementation of a plea negotiation policy at the ICC 
might be instrumental in mitigating some of the procedural challenges facing the Court 
as discussed below. For this reason, it is necessary to investigate not only the legal 
framework of the ICC but also the lessons learnt from the ICTY and ICTR as well as in 
national jurisdictions where plea negotiation is practised. This would be with a view to 
determining whether plea negotiation should be introduced at the ICC, and if so, how 
it should be implemented. Examining plea negotiation at the ICC will also be a 
continuation of my interest in exploring solutions to the general challenges facing 
international criminal justice. 
1.2 Introduction to the research problem 
1.2.1 Procedural law at the international criminal tribunals 
As mentioned above, international criminal tribunals face various and significant 
challenges such as: complex and lengthy trials, expensive proceedings, difficulty in the 
collection of evidence, insufficient state cooperation, lack of effective participation in 
the proceedings by the affected communities, political interference, and interference 
with witnesses, among others.5 Because of the important role played by international 
                                            
5 See generally Andraz Zidar and Olympia Bekou (eds), Contemporary Challenges for the International 
Criminal Court (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2014); Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Failings 
of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 541; Theodor Meron, 
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tribunals in the international justice arena,6 the international community is 
understandably invested in attempts to mitigate these problems in the interest of 
international criminal justice. International criminal law is a dynamic, complex and 
interdisciplinary field of study and practice which requires continued research, 
especially focusing on international criminal procedural law – an aspect of international 
criminal law that often stands in the shadow of more prominent aspects such as the 
study of the core crimes,7 or institutional and political developments affecting 
international tribunals.8  
The aim of this doctoral research is to contribute to the body of knowledge in 
international criminal procedural law, in particular by exploring the concept of plea 
                                            
The Making of International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench: Selected Speeches (OUP Oxford 
2011) Chapter 11. 
6 Since 1919 to date, a number of international criminal tribunals have been established whose role has 
been to try perpetrators of international crime and to participate in peace building and reconciliation. 
See generally M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to 
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 11. In 
2002 the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established, after many years of negotiations, as a 
permanent international criminal tribunal. Despite the controversies that surround the ICC, the fact that 
it has 122 states parties who continually contribute to its work in one way or another shows a high level 
of consensus on the contribution of international tribunals to the peace and justice agenda. See for 
example Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court That Africa Wants (Institute for Security 
Studies 2010). 
7 Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. 
8 See for example the “Expediting proceedings at the international Criminal Court” A report produced by 
an Advisory Committee comprised of the experts in international criminal and humanitarian law under 
the auspices of the War Crimes Research Office in June 2011 available at 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/1106report.pdf (accessed 27 May 2016); Roza 
Pati, ‘ICC and the Case of Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a Valid Option,’ (2008) 15 
University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 265; Hakan Friman, ‘Cooperation 
with the International Criminal Court: Some Thoughts on Improvements under the Current Regime’ in 
Federica Gioia and Mauro Politi (eds), The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions 
(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd 2008); Antoine Garapon, ‘Three Challenges for International Criminal Justice’ 
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 716; Vladimir Tochilovsky, ‘Globalizing Criminal 
Justice: Challenges for the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 9 Global Governance 291. 
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negotiation as a potential solution to some of the pertinent challenges facing 
international tribunals, particularly the ICC.  
1.2.2 The genesis and architecture of the international criminal procedure of 
the ICC 
The international criminal procedure of the ICC consists of a set of rules, principles and 
norms of unprecedented vertical and horizontal complexity.9 “Vertical” in this context 
refers to the relationship between the ICC and states, whereas “horizontal” refers to 
the relationship between states. Due to this complexity, it is necessary to contextualise 
and to situate the issue of possible plea negotiation at the ICC within the relevant legal 
architecture.  
The foundational documents, legal practice and jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, from the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(Nuremberg Tribunal) to the ICTY and the ICTR, provided the drafters of the Rome 
Statute with valuable lessons and best practices to apply in the drafting process. This 
vast historical record, as well as the intricacies and complexities inherent in negotiating 
an international treaty to establish the world’s first permanent international criminal 
court, informed the process of assembling the international criminal procedure of the 
ICC; a process that took more than ten years to complete.10 
One of the unfortunate features of the ICTY and ICTR was the fragmented nature of 
their procedural laws. Indeed, lawyers practising at these tribunals have had to 
navigate a plethora of sources in order to gather the applicable law. In order to bring 
some order to the fragmented nature of the procedural law, and in order to fill any 
procedural gaps, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions11 that 
                                            
9 Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 537, 543. 
10 Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (n 9) 537. 
11 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 827 (1993) [International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f21b1c.html [accessed 20 March 2017] and UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 955 (1994) [Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda], 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 (1994), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2742c.html [accessed 20 March 2017]. 
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established the ICTY and the ICTR provided for considerable judicial leeway to 
promulgate what would become the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the 
two ad hoc tribunals. A number of Practice Directives supplemented the RPE. The 
RPE were amended on many occasions due to the dynamic nature of the ad hoc 
procedural regime. As Kress noted, such a practice “yields the advantage of quick 
adjustments to the often-novel intricacies of international criminal procedure” but, on 
the other hand, “to give such wide-ranging powers to participants in the proceedings, 
even if impartial, seems contestable as a matter of principle”.12 
The drafters of the Rome Statute thus wanted to avoid the fragmented and judge-made 
nature of the procedural law of the ad hoc tribunals. Of course, the Rome Statute, being 
a multilateral treaty dealing with a topic fraught with policy and legal complexities, 
contains many compromises, but the end-result is a much more conclusive procedural 
law.13 The Rome Statute itself, however, is not the only source for the international 
criminal procedure applicable to the ICC. The other sources are:  The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE), the Regulations of the Court, the Regulations of the 
Registry, and further ancillary instruments on criminal procedure, drafted by the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), including international agreements with procedural 
elements. It is appropriate to briefly note the most important features of each of these 
sources, before returning to the topic at hand, namely the possible role of plea 
negotiation in the international criminal procedure of the ICC. 
1.3 The sources of international criminal procedure of the ICC 
1.3.1 The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) is the treaty 
establishing the ICC and is therefore the primary legal text applicable at the Court. As 
mentioned above, the Rome Statute is a more comprehensive source of procedural 
law than the instruments establishing the ad hoc tribunals.14 The Rome Statute 
establishes the Court, defines its relationship with the United Nations and outlines the 
legal status and the powers of the Court. Part two of the Rome Statute outlines the 
                                            
12 Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (n 9) 538. 
13 Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (n 9) 539. 
14 Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (n 9). 
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crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, (which are war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression) as well as the admissibility criteria 
and the applicable law. Furthermore, part three outlines the general principles of 
criminal law applicable at the Court which are also applicable in international tribunals 
as well as in most national jurisdictions around the world. The Rome Statute also 
provides for the composition and administration of the Court as well as the procedure 
to be followed during investigation and prosecution. Additionally, parts six and seven 
provide for the procedure to be followed at trial, the penalties that may be imposed by 
the Court upon conviction, as well as the appeal and revision procedure. Moreover, 
the Rome Statute provides for international cooperation and judicial assistance which 
states parties are under obligation to provide to the Court upon request. Cooperation 
of states also extends to the enforcement of sentences where the states parties play 
the role of accepting sentenced persons to serve their sentences within the territories 
of the states parties.15 Cooperation and judicial assistance is vital to the proper 
functioning of the Court because the Court does not have enforcement mechanisms 
and relies entirely on the cooperation by states parties. 
1.3.2 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), adopted under Article 51 of the Rome 
Statute, is an instrument for the application of the Rome Statute and is adopted by two-
thirds majority of the ASP. The RPE is read in conjunction with the Rome Statute and 
is subject to it. Amendments to the RPE can be proposed by States parties, judges 
acting by an absolute majority, or the Prosecutor. In case of urgent situations which 
are not provided for, Article 51 of the Rome Statute permits the judges by a two-thirds 
majority to draw up provisional rules which are applied until adopted, amended or 
rejected by the ASP. The RPE expound on the provisions of the Rome Statute and this 
is especially useful with regard to practices which were introduced for the first time at 
the ICC and which did not exist in preceding international criminal tribunals such as 
the participation of victims in the proceedings. In this regard, the RPE provides for the 
application for participation of victims, the extent of their participation at the trial, their 
                                            
15 Part 10 of the Rome Statute. 
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legal representation and reparation.16 The RPE is secondary to the Rome Statute 
therefore in case of conflict between the two, the latter is to prevail.  
1.3.3 Regulations of the Court 
The Regulations of the Court are rules made by the judges in accordance with the 
Rome Statute and the RPE. Unlike the judges at the ad hoc international tribunals who 
had wider law making powers, the judges at the ICC have narrower powers to make 
rules. Article 52 of the Rome Statute permits judges to make rules for the “routine 
functioning” of the Court. However, as Kress points out, the Regulations are not limited 
to the internal functioning of the Court17 and contain a wide range of provisions 
including the power of judges to modify the legal characterization of facts.18 The 
Regulations of the Court contain detailed provisions applicable in the day to day 
running of the Court such as: the composition of the Court, regulations relating to all 
stages of the proceedings, the creation of list of counsel and legal assistants, victim 
participation and reparations, detention matters, cooperation by states parties and 
enforcement, as well as removal from office of the ICC staff and disciplinary matters.19  
1.3.4 Regulations of the Registry 
The Regulations of the Registry (RoR) are adopted by the Registrar who is the principal 
administrative officer of the Court and in charge of non-judicial aspects of the 
administration and servicing of the Court.  The RoR are put in place in accordance with 
Rule 14 of the RPE to govern the operation of the Registry. These Regulations are 
entirely internal and deal with issues such as the storage of evidence, the recording 
and transcription of the proceedings, translations during proceedings, funding of 
defence counsel and victims’ representatives as well as the complaint procedures for 
accused persons in ICC detention. 
                                            
16 Chapter 4, Section III of the RPE. 
17 Kress, ‘The Procedural Texts of the International Criminal Court’ (n 9) 540. 
18 Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.  
19 Chapters 2-8 of the Regulations of the Court. 
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1.3.5 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 
The Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor were adopted pursuant to Article 42 
(2) of the Rome Statute and rule 9 of the RPE. They came into force on 23 April 2009 
and their purpose is to govern the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in 
relation to its management and administration. Like the Regulations of the Registry, 
the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor are internal and contain rules governing 
the conduct of the OTP during the preliminary examination and evaluation of 
information, investigations, proceedings before the Chambers as well as trials and 
appeals. 
1.3.6 Further ancillary instruments on criminal procedure, drafted by the ASP 
Some of the ancillary instruments adopted by the ASP have a bearing on the 
procedural law at the ICC. These include: first, the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the ICC which was adopted by the ASP on 9 September 2002 and came 
into force on 22 July 2014. This Agreement provides for functional immunity and 
privileges for the officials of the Court (the Prosecutor, the judges and the Registrar), 
as well as for counsel appearing before the Court (defence counsel, amici curiae, and 
counsel for victims and witnesses). Second, there is the Relationship Agreement 
between the ICC and the United Nations (UN) which defines the relationship between 
the two organizations in accordance with Article 2 of the Rome Statute. It is noteworthy 
that unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, which were part of the UN system, the Relationship 
Agreement acknowledges the ICC as an independent legal entity in a relationship with 
the UN. The Agreement provides inter alia for cooperation and judicial assistance 
which the UN may provide to the ICC, upon request, under Article 87 (6) of the Rome 
Statute.20  
Third, the Headquarters Agreement between the ICC and the Host State was adopted 
pursuant to Article 3 of the Rome Statute to ensure smooth functioning of the Court 
within The Netherlands. The Headquarters Agreement provides inter alia for 
immunities and privileges necessary for the fulfilment of the functions of the Court as 
an institution with an international legal personality, for the officials of the Court as well 
as counsels appearing before the Court. Also noteworthy in the Headquarters 
                                            
20 Articles 15-20 of the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United Nations. 
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Agreement is the role of The Netherlands in providing pre-trial and trial detention 
facilities as well as facilities for sentenced persons who have not been designated to a 
state party to serve their sentences.  
The fourth category is the Agreements on the Enforcement of Sentences with the ICC, 
which the ICC enters into with states parties pursuant to Article 103 of the Rome 
Statute. This Article states that “sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State 
designated by the Court from a list of States which have indicated to the Court their 
willingness to accept sentenced persons”. The ICC enters into such Agreements with 
states which agree that the sentenced persons may serve their sentences in the 
respective states’ territories. For example, in January 2019 the ICC and the 
government of Georgia signed an Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences which 
means that persons convicted by the ICC may serve their sentences in Georgia if so 
decided by the ICC and accepted by the Government of Georgia.  
Lastly in this category, is the agreement between the ICC and a state party for the 
interim release of accused persons undergoing trial at the ICC into the custody of that 
state. For example, Belgium has signed such an agreement which entered into force 
on 10 April 2014 and permits the Court to provisionally release persons into the territory 
of Belgium upon the fulfilment of certain conditions set by the Chamber.  
Apart from the above-mentioned agreements, there are other relevant documents 
which were adopted by the ASP such as the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel 
(Code of Conduct) and Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims (Regulations of the 
TFV). The Code of Conduct was adopted pursuant to Rule 8 of the RPE and deals with 
the professional conduct for all counsel appearing before the ICC such as defence 
counsel, counsel acting for states, amici curiae, and legal representatives for victims 
or witnesses. It provides inter alia for independence of counsel, professional secrecy 
and confidentiality as well as rules governing representation by counsel such as conflict 
of interest and counsel fees. It also sets up a disciplinary regime in case of misconduct 
by counsel. Secondly, the Regulations of the TFV are adopted pursuant to Article 79 
of the Rome Statute, an Article which attempts to reconcile elements of restorative 
justice with retributive justice. While the Court prosecutes and punishes the 
perpetrators of serious crimes, the TFV provides assistance to victims and implements 
the Court’s reparation orders - and these two processes run concurrently. The 
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Regulations of the TFV provide for the establishment of a board of directors to manage 
the trust fund, the acquisition and use of funds as well as the activities and projects of 
the TFV. 
1.3.7 Policy documents formulated by the judges 
These are documents formulated by the judges to aid in the smooth conduct of 
contentious issues, encountered during the proceedings, which are often times not 
contemplated by the core legal texts. For example: guidelines of the interaction 
between the Court’s organs and units with intermediaries21 and the Chambers Practice 
Manual.22 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the procedural law and related rules at the ICC 
are more robust, comprehensive and unprecedented in its uniqueness in comparison 
to preceding international tribunals. This is evidence of the development of a sui 
generis international criminal procedure that is different and separate from, though 
related to, national criminal procedures. This then necessitates the study of how plea 
negotiation, if introduced, would fit into this unique legal architecture at the ICC. 
1.4 The law and practice on plea negotiation at international criminal tribunals 
Plea negotiation is essentially a compromise which involves an agreement between 
the prosecution and the accused person, (and sometimes the judge or victim) where 
the accused admits wrong doing and/or provides other forms of cooperation in 
exchange for a reduced sentence or a reduced charge.23 Although a policy of plea 
negotiation was introduced in other international criminal tribunals, notably the ICTY 
and the ICTR, it has not been introduced at the ICC.24 The applicability of plea 
                                            
21 ‘Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units 
of the Court and Counsel Working with Intermediaries’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/GRCI-
Eng.pdf> accessed 16 February 2018. 
22 ‘Chambers Practice Manual, February 2016’ <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Chambers_practice_manual--FEBRUARY_2016.pdf> accessed 16 February 
2018. 
23 Albert W Alschuler, ‘The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate’ (1981) 69 California Law Review 652. 
24 Kate Kovarovic, ‘Pleading for Justice: The Availability of Plea Bargaining as a Method of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution at the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 2011 Journal of Dispute Resolution 283.  
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negotiation before the ICC is therefore a necessary research topic. This is firstly 
because plea negotiation contributed to solving some of the procedural challenges 
facing the ICTY and ICTR and therefore should be explored in the context of the ICC.  
Secondly, the ICC system is different from that of the two ad hoc tribunals in many 
ways, two of which are relevant here. The first is that the ICC, unlike the ad hoc 
tribunals, allows for the role of victims as participants in the trial.25 Secondly, unlike the 
ad hoc tribunals which found much of their procedural inspiration from the adversarial, 
Anglo-American common law system, the ICC system is by design an amalgam of 
common law and civil law attributes leading to a sui generis legal system.26 The unique 
nature of this system may either undermine or promote the use of plea negotiation at 
the ICC. For that reason, drawing from the use of plea negotiation in the two ad hoc 
tribunals and in various national jurisdictions, the research will examine whether plea 
negotiation may fit into the structure of the ICC and whether it may contribute to 
mitigating some of the legal and policy challenges as well as challenges related to 
victim participation and reparations currently facing this institution. 
The ICTY and ICTR employed plea negotiation with varying forms of complexity 
including charge bargaining and sentence bargaining, that is the reduction of charges 
and sentences respectively, by the prosecution in return for a guilty plea as well as 
cooperation by the accused persons.27 This eventually led to the inclusion of Rule 62 
ter of the ICTY RPE and Rule 62 bis of the ICTR RPE to regulate plea agreements at 
the ICTY and the ICTR respectively.28  
It is noteworthy that, at first, the ICTY judges rejected the suggestion to introduce plea 
negotiation because it seemed to contravene the ideological foundation of the Court. 
The main argument presented in this regard was that the crimes which the ICTY was 
to deal with were so heinous that it would be wrong to enter into any form of bargain 
                                            
25 See Article 68 of the Rome Statute, see also T Markus Funk, Victims’ Rights and Advocacy at the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2015).  
26 See Colin T McLaughlin, ‘The Sui Generis Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 
6 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 343.   
27 See discussions in chapter 5 of this dissertation. See also Nancy Amoury Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to 
Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes’ (2002) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1. 
28 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence IT/32/Rev. 43 as amended on 24 July 2009. 
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with the perpetrators.29 However, faced with the realities of adversarial procedures, 
such as lengthy, complex and costly proceedings, and pressure from the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to complete all their work by 2010, plea negotiation 
was introduced at the ICTY and ICTR.30 At first it was practiced in an irregular and 
inconsistent manner because at the time of introduction, and before the inclusion of 
Rule 62 ter of the ICTY, there was no established framework for the application of plea 
negotiation in either of the two tribunals.31  
The practice of plea negotiation at the ICTY and ICTR has been hailed by some as a 
practical method of increasing the speed and efficiency of proceedings, enhancing 
peace and reconciliation, and lowering the cost of proceedings, among others.32 
However, some scholars warn that if not properly applied, plea negotiation may result 
in “trading justice for efficiency,”33 or an undue interference with the historical record of 
the conflict, or a challenge of the Courts legitimacy.34 Besides, as one scholar noted, 
the claimed positive effect of plea negotiation on peace and reconciliation in post-
conflict areas is not backed by sufficient empirical research.35 
It is against the backdrop of the plea negotiation experience before the ICTY and ICTR 
that this research will focus on the possible implementation of this practice before the 
ICC. The legal experts and diplomats involved in the negotiation of the Rome Statute 
seemed to share the initial view of the ICTY judges that the crimes involved were so 
                                            
29   See the speech of President Cassese in response to the proposal by the United States in Virginia 
Morris and Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis (Hotei Publishing 1995) 652. 
30 Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 145. 
31 Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 145.. 
32 See generally Volkan Maviş, ‘Why Should the International Criminal Court Adopt Plea Bargaining’ 
(2014) 5 Inonu University Faculty of Law Journal 459. See also Janine Natalya Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining 
at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 415. 
33 Michael Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency - Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals’ (2004) 2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1070. 
34 Regina E Rauxloh, ‘Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea 
Bargaining’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 739. 
35 Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY’ (n 32) 434. 
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serious that plea negotiation should not be permitted at the ICC.36 However, the final 
version of the Rome Statute neither permits nor prohibits the exercise of plea 
negotiation. In fact, Article 65 of the Rome Statute allows “discussions between the 
Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the charges, the admission of 
guilt or the penalty to be imposed,” although such discussions are not binding on the 
Chamber. This therefore means that there is potential to introduce the concept of plea 
negotiation at the ICC without contravening the Rome Statute. 
The ICC has experienced and continues to face similar challenges as those faced by 
the ICTY and ICTR, which necessitated the introduction of plea negotiation in the latter 
two tribunals. These include, first, the difficulty in obtaining evidence, which is 
illustrated by the premature termination of the cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta 
and William Ruto (of Kenya) in December 201437 and April 2016,38 respectively. 
Second, the lack of state cooperation demonstrated by the refusal of a number of 
states parties to the Rome Statute to cooperate with the ICC by arresting and 
surrendering former President Bashir to the ICC when he visited their territories. This 
was despite the fact that the ICC issued two warrants of arrest against him and made 
numerous requests to states parties for cooperation.39 Eventually, the ICC was forced 
                                            
36 “The remark was made that, in view of the gravity of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, it 
would be inappropriate to permit plea bargaining.” Summary Of The Proceedings Of The Ad Hoc 
Committee During The Period 3-13 April 1995, Ad Hoc Committee On The Establishment Of An 
International Criminal Court 3-13 April 1995, 21 April 1995 http://www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc19093.pdf (accessed 23 May 2016) para 95.  
37 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta) 
ICC-01/09-02/11-1005 (13 March 2015). 
38 The Prosecutor v. William Ruto & Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments 
of Acquittal) ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red (5 March 2016). 
39 States Parties to the Rome Statute like Chad, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Uganda, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti just to mention a few have failed to arrest and surrender President Bashir 
to the ICC despite the requests made to these states by the ICC when President Bashir visited their 
respective countries. Chad for example has hosted President Bashir in its territory over four times while 
ignoring the cooperation requests of the Court. See for example: The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad) ICC-02/05-
01/09-109 (27 August 2010); The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the Non-
compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the 
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to hibernate the case against former President Bashir because his arrest and surrender 
to the Court could not be secured.40 Third, the length of trials which is exemplified by 
the fact that the ICC took nearly 10 years from the time it came into existence to 
complete its first case. Fourth, the cost of trials at the ICC is a contentious issue which 
is always a subject of discussion at the annual Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
meetings where the budget of the ICC is consistently reviewed and reduced because 
of enormous pressure from states parties.41 This is a non-exhaustive list of the 
challenges facing the ICC,42 which plea negotiation might help resolve. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the ICC, like the preceding international tribunals, is 
in need of “alternative methods of case disposition, and plea negotiation seems an 
attractive means of avoiding the time-consuming, costly trials that otherwise must take 
place”43 This, therefore, necessitates an exploration of plea negotiation as a potential 
solution to some of the challenges bedevilling the ICC. This discussion is especially 
relevant because the drafters of the Rome Statute contemplated discussions and 
agreements between the Prosecutor and the Defence in Article 65 of the Rome Statute.  
1.5 Research question 
The main question that the dissertation examines is: Should the ICC implement a plea 
negotiation policy to mitigate some of the (procedural and institutional) challenges 
                                            
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-151 (26 March 2013); The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute 
on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with 
respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-140 (13 
December 2011). 
40 Agence France-Presse in Khartoum, ‘Omar Al-Bashir Celebrates ICC Decision to Halt Darfur 
Investigation’ the Guardian (14 December 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/omar-al-bashir-celebrates-icc-decision-to-halt-darfur-
investigation> accessed 28 May 2016. 
41Niklas Jakobsson, ‘The 2016 ICC Budget - More Money, More Problems?’ (Justice Hub, 17 September 
2015) <https://justicehub.org/article/2016-icc-budget-more-money-more-problems> accessed 28 May 
2016; Niklas Jakobsson, ‘ICC Budget Leaves a Lot to Be Desired’ (Justice Hub, 1 December 2015) 
<https://justicehub.org/article/icc-budget-leaves-lot-be-desired> accessed 28 May 2016. 
42 For a further discussion of the challenges facing the ICC see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
43Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 102. 
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facing it? The following sub-questions are related to the main question and addressing 
them will be a step towards providing answers to the main question: 
a) Does the legal architecture of the ICC, which differentiates it from the ad hoc 
tribunals, support or undermine the introduction of plea negotiation?  
b) What are the main challenges facing the ICC which may be mitigated by plea 
negotiation?  
c) What lessons may be learnt from the application of plea negotiation in national 
jurisdictions, and how can these be applied at the ICC? 
d) What lessons may be learnt from the application of plea negotiation at the ICTY 
and ICTR and how can these be applied at the ICC as an institution with a sui 
generis system?  
1.6 Methodology 
Methodology is informed by two important considerations:  
a)  The methodology sui generis of the developing international criminal 
procedure.  
International tribunals are established either by way of UN Security Council resolutions 
or treaties, both which are products of negotiation among stakeholders, whether 
politicians, diplomats or legal experts, all from different legal backgrounds. Because of 
contributions from different criminal procedures, international criminal procedure can 
loosely be described as an amalgam of practices from, on one hand, the common-law 
system, which is adversarial in nature, and on the other hand, civil law practices which 
are inquisitorial in nature. Because of this complex melange, international criminal 
justice practitioners, who are from different legal backgrounds themselves, face 
difficulty in navigating the international criminal procedure. This gives rise to the need, 
as expressed by Groome, to “depart from a process that has been cobbled together 
from the adversarial and inquisitorial systems designed to achieve different aims,” and 
to “merge different legal traditions to develop a single international criminal process”.44  
Indeed, with the development of the Rome Statute and the RPE and the other 
                                            
44 Dermot M Groome, ‘Re-Evaluating the Theoretical Basis and Methodology of International Criminal 
Trials’ (2006) 25 Penn State International Law Review 791, 793. 
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documents forming part of the legal architecture of the ICC, which incorporate lessons 
learnt from the earlier international criminal tribunals, the development of a sui generis 
international criminal procedure is becoming evident. 
The research therefore involves a comparative study of the legal architecture of the 
preceding international tribunals, primarily the ICTY and the ICTR, on one hand; and 
that of the ICC, on the other hand with specific reference to plea negotiation. The study 
also analyses the use of plea bargaining in these international tribunals with a view to 
borrowing from the best practices and learning from the challenges. A comparative 
analysis of the systems of the two ad hoc tribunals and that of the ICC has been 
employed with a view to devising a framework of plea negotiation that suits the ICC as 
a sui generis institution.  
The research was primarily library-based. It relied on books, journal Articles, case 
reports from the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. The research also relied on core legal 
texts of the above-mentioned international criminal tribunals such as their constitutive 
statutes, the RPE, the Regulations of the Court and their travaux preparatoires, as well 
as treaties, historical records, reports among other sources. The research entailed the 
collection and analysis of relevant material from the indicated sources in order to 
arrive at a deeper understanding of how plea negotiation may fit into the international 
criminal procedure, with a specific focus on the ICC. 
b) Legal comparative method  
Even though international criminal procedure is a sui generis system, it continues to 
develop as it is informed by both adversarial and inquisitorial procedures from national 
jurisdictions. For this reason, the legal comparative method is still important, since 
lessons from national legal systems are still informing the development of international 
criminal law and procedure. The legal comparative method is vital as it permits scholars 
to immerse themselves in different legal regimes, compare and contrast the benefits 
and limitations of the various systems in order to gain a wholesome perspective on 
law.45 The legal comparative method was used in order to learn from best practices 
                                            
45 Edward J Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2008) 8 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 451, 471. 
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from national jurisdictions where plea negotiation is used to varying degrees, namely: 
Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany. 
The choice of these jurisdictions is justified by the fact that: one, the four jurisdictions 
have different legal cultures and are representative of the major legal systems globally; 
in that South Africa and Kenya are common law countries while France and Germany 
are civil law countries. This is particularly relevant because as stated above, procedural 
and substantive law at the ICC borrows from both the common law and civil law 
systems. This necessitates a study of plea negotiation and its variations in jurisdictions 
which practice the two legal systems. Secondly, Kenya, South Africa, France and 
Germany are all states parties to the Rome Statute, and therefore they are 
representative of the legal systems at the ASP. Furthermore, South Africa and 
Germany both played important roles in the drafting of the Rome Statute as members 
of the Like-Minded Group.  
It is noteworthy that the dissertation also refers to literature involving plea bargaining 
in the United States of America (US), since it is widely recognised as the “home of plea 
bargaining.”46 It is so referred because the vast majority of cases in the US do not go 
to trial but are concluded through guilty pleas of the accused and cooperation with the 
prosecutor. Plea bargaining plays a prominent role in the criminal procedure of the US 
where it has been entrenched since the 1800s.47 It has been the subject of numerous 
judicial opinions and scholarly debates, a study of which informed the introduction of 
the practice at the ICTY and ICTR.48 Nevertheless, this dissertation did not study plea 
bargaining in the US in the comparative study since the US is not a state party to the 
Rome Statute, not a member of the ASP and the position taken in this dissertation is 
that the national drivers of procedural developments at the ICC should, as a matter of 
principle, mainly come from ICC states parties. 
                                            
46 Gerhard Kemp, ‘Alternative Measures to Reduce Trial Cases, Private Autonomy and “Public Interest”: 
Come Observations with Specific Reference to Plea Bargaining and Economic Crimes’ (2014) 25 
Stellenbosch Law Review 425, 431. 
47 Kenneth Jost, ‘Plea Bargaining: Does It Promote Justice?’ (The Plea Agreement Project, 12 February 
1999) <http://legaltechdesign.com/ThePleaAgreementProject/2014/03/31/plea-bargaining-does-it-
promote-justice/> accessed 21 March 2017. 
48 Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 1–57. 
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Since the normative and policy considerations underlying the practice at the national 
level could inform the introduction of plea negotiation at the ICC, comparative analysis 
is vital to this research. The methodological framework thus consists of international 
and comparative components. On the one hand, a comparative analysis of the ICTY, 
ICTR and the ICC; and on the other hand, an analysis of the national criminal 
procedures of Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany as they inform the 
development of procedural and substantive law at the ICC. The research draws from 
the lessons learnt from the practice of plea bargaining not only in the ad hoc tribunals, 
but also in above-mentioned national jurisdictions where plea negotiation is practised 
with relative frequency. 
1.7 Chapter outline 
The challenges facing the ICC, some of which are explained above, give rise to the 
need to provide practical and workable solutions. Following the use of plea negotiation 
at the ICTY and ICTR, it is highly likely that the ICC may turn towards the practice with 
a view to remedying some of the problems it faces.49 However, as stated by Rauxloh: 
“The ICC must not wait until an overwhelming caseload forces the courtroom 
actors to informally develop a practice of plea bargaining based on 
considerations of efficiency. Instead the Court should reflect now on the 
advantages and dangers of plea bargaining and design a procedure that 
safeguards not only the interest of defendants, victims and the international 
community but also the legitimacy of the Court itself.”50 
Indeed, it is ill-advised for the ICC to wait until the realities of international criminal trials 
and/or the pressure from the international community force it into adopting plea 
negotiation as was the case with the ICTY and ICTR. This, as has been seen in the ad 
hoc tribunals, leads to the application of this practice in a way that is uncertain and 
irregular. The foregoing therefore necessitates the urgent conduct of research on the 
                                            
49 See for example Scharf (n 33) 1080. In this article, Scharf, a severe critic of the use of plea bargaining 
at the ICTY, stated as follows “Yet, regardless of the validity of the justifications for its adoption, now 
that plea-bargaining has been employed by the ad hoc Tribunals, the precedent will undoubtedly prompt 
the permanent international criminal court and hybrid tribunals to adopt the practice as well.” 
50 Rauxloh (n 34) 767. 
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use of plea negotiation in order to answer the questions of whether it should be adopted 
at the ICC, and if so, using what framework.  
This dissertation is divided into six chapters as follows: 
1.7.1 Chapter one 
This Chapter is the introductory section of the dissertation and contains the background 
information to the study, the research questions and objectives, the methodology and 
the chapter breakdown. 
1.7.2 Chapter two 
Chapter 2 contains an in-depth analysis of the legal architecture of the ICC. This 
includes an analysis of the Rome Statute, the RPE, the Regulations of the Court, the 
Regulations of the Registry, and further ancillary instruments on criminal procedure, 
drafted by the ASP, including international agreements with procedural elements which 
have a bearing on the structure and criminal procedure at the ICC. The objective of 
this analysis is two-pronged: the first is to demonstrate the development of a sui 
generis international criminal procedure which is unique to the ICC; and the second is 
to aid in assessing, at the end of the dissertation, whether plea negotiation fits into the 
structural and procedural framework of the ICC. 
1.7.3 Chapter three 
This chapter discusses the main challenges facing the ICC which necessitates a study 
of plea negotiation as a potential solution. These challenges are divided into three main 
themes: one, the legal and procedural challenges, such as complexity of proceedings, 
disclosure issues, and lengthy proceedings; two, political challenges such as apparent 
bias against Africa, lack of state cooperation and political instrumentalization of the 
Court; and three, challenges relating to the victim participation and reparations regime 
at the ICC. The aim of this discussion is to examine some of the challenges facing the 
Court with a view to determining whether any of them may be remedied by the adoption 
of plea negotiation. 
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1.7.4 Chapter four 
This chapter contains a comparative analysis of the practice of plea negotiation in 
national jurisdictions namely: Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany. Plea 
negotiation is generally seen as a common law practice; however, it has since been 
adopted in some civil law countries including France and Germany with modifications 
to fit the inquisitorial system. This chapter contains an analysis of the relevant criminal 
procedures of these four jurisdictions as evidenced by the relevant laws, the 
jurisprudence and academic literature. The justifications underpinning plea negotiation 
in the four justice systems are analysed as well as how plea negotiation is conducted 
in each of them. Since the ICC procedural law borrows from both civil law and common 
law practices, the goal of this analysis is to learn from the best practices and limitations 
in both systems and how these could inform the introduction of plea negotiation at the 
ICC. 
1.7.5 Chapter five 
This chapter contains a comparative analysis of the use of plea negotiation at the ICTY 
and the ICTR with the view to understanding whether/how this could be applicable at 
the ICC. As briefly discussed above, lessons from the ICTY show that plea negotiation, 
if properly applied, may shorten the length of trials, increase efficiency of proceedings 
and reduce costs. Furthermore, they may also contribute to the promotion of peace, 
justice and reconciliation in post-conflict zones. However, if not applied properly it may 
hinder reconciliation, and interfere with peace and justice processes, and it may lead 
to inaccurate historical record, among other challenges. The aim of this analysis, 
therefore, is to flesh out the best practices at the ICTY and ICTR which would be 
instructive to the ICC should it decide to adopt plea negotiation as a matter of policy 
and practice. 
1.7.6 Chapter six 
Chapter six answers the main research question: Should the ICC implement a plea 
negotiation policy to mitigate some of the (procedural and institutional) challenges 
facing it? This is answered in the affirmative. Drawing from the research conducted in 
the preceding chapters, this chapter finds that ICC should implement policy of plea 
negotiation for two reasons: that plea negotiation would mitigate some of the 
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challenges the ICC faces; and, the Court can learn from and adopt best practices from 
the ICTY and the ICTR as well as national jurisdictions.  The chapter also concludes 
that plea negotiation is compatible with the legal framework of the ICC and that it is 
desirable to introduce it as a matter of law, policy and practice. However, it is noted 
that there is need for specific and more detailed provisions in order to sufficiently 
provide for plea negotiation. Therefore, the chapter draws from the lessons learnt at 
the ad hoc tribunals and national jurisdictions, to propose amendments to the Rome 
Statue and the RPE which would enable plea negotiation to fit into the sui generis legal 
framework of the ICC. 
1.7.7 Chapter seven 
Chapter seven contains the concluding remarks of the dissertation. 
1.7.8 Appendices 
At the end of the dissertation there are Appendices A and B which contains the text of 
draft provision on plea negotiation to be included in the Rome Statute and in the RPE, 
respectively. 
This research contributes to the agenda of the ICC to deliver international criminal 
justice in a manner that is more efficient, speedy, cost-effective and which contributes 
to peace, justice and reconciliation. Furthermore, the research aims to spark debate 
around the topic and provide practical information to scholars, ICC practitioners as well 
as other stakeholders, to assist in the decision of whether/how to introduce plea 
negotiation at the ICC as a potential remedy to some of the challenges it faces. Should 
the ICC decide to incorporate the concept of plea negotiation, the research would 
contribute towards proposing a suitable framework which may cater to the unique 








CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ICC: DEVELOPMENT OF 
A SUI GENERIS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The road leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Rome Statute) was long and arduous. The desire for the international 
prosecution of crimes under international law and against the international order can 
be traced back to the 15th Century.51 However, the initial conceptualisation of individual 
criminal responsibility was only expressed in 1919 in the Versailles Peace Treaty 
(Versailles Treaty) which was signed by the Allied Powers52 to, inter alia, try the leaders 
of the Central Powers53 who had lost World War I (WWI).54 Article 227 of the Versailles 
Treaty provided for the public arraignment of “William II of Hohenzollern, formerly 
German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity 
of treaties”. However, the trial did not occur because the Emperor went into exile in the 
Netherlands which refused to extradite him.55  
Later, in 1945, after World War II (WWII) the victorious powers56 signed the Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
(London Agreement) which established the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (Nuremberg Tribunal). 57 The purpose of the Nuremberg tribunal was to try 
the political and military leaders of Nazi Germany. The Charter of the International 
                                            
51 Robert Christensen, ‘Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of 
Considering Discrepancies between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2001) 6 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 391, 395. 
52 These were predominantly Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy. 
53 Germany, Austria-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. 
54 See articles 227-230 of Peace Treaty of Versailles 
<http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa6.html> accessed 8 November 2017. 
55 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law: 2nd Edition (TMC Asser Press 2009) 1–4. 
56 United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, the United States of America, France 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
57 ‘Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945’ (8 August 1945) 
<http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.2_Charter%20of%20IMT%201945.pdf> accessed 31 January 2018.  
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Military Tribunal, annexed to the London Agreement, inter alia defined crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity); provided for legal principles such as individual criminal responsibility and 
fair trial rights of defendants; and gave the Nuremberg Tribunal power to formulate its 
rules of procedure.58 One of the London Agreement’s most significant contributions to 
international criminal law was the principle of individual criminal responsibility - where 
apart from states, individuals can also be held liable for violations of international law.59  
The second important post-war tribunal was the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (Tokyo Tribunal)  of 1946, which was established to try Japanese leaders 
involved in WWII.60 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East 
was modelled after the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.61 The Charter of the Tokyo 
Tribunal repeats almost verbatim most of the provisions of the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal especially with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal, 
individual criminal responsibility, fair trial rights and the power of the Tokyo Tribunal to 
formulate procedural rules. The judgments of the Tokyo Tribunal further codified the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility which had been introduced by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.62  
However, both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals have been criticised for meting 
victor’s justice because the victorious states in both WWI and WWII presided over the 
trials of the nationals of the losing states.63 Despite this criticism, the Nuremberg 
                                            
58 'London Agreement' (n 57). 
59 David Weissbrodt, Joan Fitzpatrick and Frank C Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, 
and Process (LexisNexis 2009) 507–518; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg’ (2006) 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 830. 
60 Special proclamation by the Supreme Commander tor the Allied Powers at Tokyo and International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East January 19, 1946 
<http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.3_1946%20Tokyo%20Charter.pdf> accessed 8 November 2017. 
61 Weissbrodt, Fitzpatrick and Newman (n 59) 508. 
62 See discussion of this in William A Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ 
(2007) 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 953, 982. 
63 For a comprehensive analysis of the trials and judgments of these two tribunals see Neil Boister and 
Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford University Press 2008); 
Guénaël Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford University Press 2008). 
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Principles, which were also enforced at the Tokyo Tribunal, were codified by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in 195064 and are now considered to be part of 
customary international law.65 
Between 1948 to the early 1990s, although a number of treaties were adopted defining 
and prohibiting international crimes,66 there was limited implementation of the same 
due to lack of political will resulting from the Cold War.67 After the end of the Cold War, 
in 1993, the UNSC adopted Resolution 827 establishing the ICTY to try the crimes 
committed during the war in the Former Yugoslavia.68 The Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) contained a 
comprehensive set of substantive and procedural provisions, for example: the 
definition of the core crimes, composition and jurisdiction of the ICTY, sentences and 
enforcement as well as cooperation and judicial assistance of states.69 There was also 
a separate document on the rules of procedure and evidence.70 The provisions in the 
ICTY documents confirmed the development of international criminal law and were a 
step forward from the preceding Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals’ Charters, which 
contained rudimentary and even legally questionable provisions.71 Nevertheless, the 
                                            
64 ‘Summary Records of the Second Session’ (1950) 1 Yearbook of the International law Commission 
30–64 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1950_v1.pdf> accessed 31 January 
2018. 
65 Werle (n 55) 7–9. 
66 For example the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide adopted on 9 December 
1948 and entered into force on 12 January 1951; the The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; The 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977; and Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977. 
67 Werle (n 55) 14. 
68 Resolution 827 of 1993 < 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf>.  
69 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) 
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf> accessed 8 November 
2017. 
70 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia < 
http://www.icty.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-evidence> accessed 8 November 2017. 
71 Werle (n 55) 17. 
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ICTY framework gave judges wide law making powers, especially in relation to 
procedural aspects.72 
Subsequently, in 1994, the UNSC established the ICTR, through Resolution 955, to try 
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and other crimes under international law 
committed in 1994 in Rwanda. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR Statute) adopted the rules of procedure and evidence in force at the 
ICTY.73 Therefore, the ICTY and the ICTR were similar in many ways – for example, 
both had jurisdiction over the core crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity 
and violations of the Geneva Conventions.74 Similarly, they had the same structure and 
procedure as well as the same Appeals Chamber.75 Both tribunals were ad hoc, 
therefore, the ICTR closed on 31 December 201576 while the ICTY closed on 21 
December 2017 after delivering the judgment in the Mladic case.77 Foreseeing the 
closure of these ad hoc tribunals, the UN set up the Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT) on 22 December 2010 to perform the residual functions of 
both the ICTR and the ICTY, including supervision of enforcement of sentences, 
appeals, and the protection of victims and witnesses.78  
                                            
72 Article 15 of the ICTY Statute provides that the judges of the ICTY shall have the power to formulate 
the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and 
appeals, the admission of evidence, and the protection of victims and witnesses. 
73 Article 14 of ICTR Statute. 
74 It is noteworthy that while the ICTR had jurisdiction over violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, the ICTY had jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and the violations of the laws or customs of war. See article 4 of the ICTR Statute and 
articles 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute respectively. 
75 For a comparison of these tribunals see Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, ‘How Effective Are 
International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR’ (2005) 9 The International 
Journal of Human Rights 349. 
76 ‘ICTR Hosts Closing Events | United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ 
<http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/ictr-hosts-closing-events> accessed 9 November 2017. 
77 ‘ICTY Closing Ceremony - 21 December 2017, The Hague | International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ <http://www.icty.org/en/features/icty-legacy-dialogues/icty-closing-ceremony-21-
december-2017-the-hague> accessed 31 January 2018. 
78 ‘About the MICT’ (United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, 22 August 2013) 
<http://www.unmict.org/en/about> accessed 31 January 2018. 
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Apart from these ad hoc international tribunals, there are also hybrid tribunals, which 
have both international and national features, and which are typically established by 
the United Nations in collaboration with the relevant states. These include, Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office,79 the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,80 Special Tribunal for Lebanon,81 the Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction 
over Serious Criminal Offences in East Timor,82 the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia,83 and the Extraordinary African Chambers.84 These tribunals 
were established to try crimes within a limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction.85 
These tribunals have however, not had much influence on the procedure and 
jurisprudence at the International Criminal Court (ICC), perhaps due to their peculiar 
hybrid nature.86 
The ad hoc tribunals with limited jurisdiction demonstrated the necessity of establishing 
a permanent international criminal court with global reach to try international crimes.87 
This culminated in the establishment of the ICC through the adoption of the Rome 
                                            
79 ‘Law on Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office’ 
<http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/05-L-053%20a.pdf> accessed 31 January 2018. 
80 ‘Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone’ <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-agreement.pdf> accessed 31 
January 2018. 
81 ‘Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ <https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/statute-of-the-
tribunal/223-statute-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon> accessed 31 January 2018. 
82 ‘Regulation No. 2000/15 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences of 6 June 2000’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf> accessed 31 
January 2018. 
83 ‘Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea’ 
<https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf> accessed 31 January 2018. 
84 ‘Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers’ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/02/statute-
extraordinary-african-chambers> accessed 31 January 2018. 
85 See Linda E Carter and Fausto Pocar (eds), International Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil 
Law and Common Law Legal Systems (Edward Elgar 2013) 1–6. 
86 Werle (n 55) 26–27. 
87 See discussion of this in Bassiouni (n 6). 
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Statute on 17 July 1998 which entered into force on 1 July 2002.88 The drafters of the 
Rome Statute took from the major legal systems of the world as well as best practices 
from the ad hoc international tribunals to formulate the structure and procedural law of 
the ICC. The result of this has been the development of a sui generis international 
criminal procedure which is the focus of this chapter. This chapter provides the 
foundation to one of the key research questions of this dissertation, namely whether 
plea negotiation would fit into the philosophical, structural and procedural framework 
of the ICC.  
This chapter consists of five parts including this introduction. Part two deals with the 
philosophical underpinning of the ICC – why was established and what is its mission? 
It discusses the negotiating and drafting history of the Rome Statute which 
demonstrates that the Rome Statute was a result of both political and legal 
compromises. Part two concludes that, apart from trying the persons most responsible 
for the most serious international crimes, the ICC was also established to foster 
international peace, and to give a voice and reparations for victims. Furthermore, the 
ICC embodies universal values shared by all of humanity. Part three deals with the 
structure of the ICC; that is, the organs of the Court and their respective roles as well 
as the parties and participants in proceedings at the ICC. This part puts emphasis on 
the sui generis role of victims as participants in proceedings at the ICC. Part four 
examines the procedural law at various stages of the proceedings at the ICC, for 
example: investigation, pre-trial, trial, sentencing enforcement and victim reparation. 
Part five contains the concluding remarks for this chapter.  
The objective of this analysis is two-pronged: the first is to demonstrate the 
development of a sui generis international criminal procedure which is unique to the 
ICC. The second is to aid in assessing whether plea negotiation fits into the structural, 
procedural and philosophical framework of the ICC. 
2.2 Philosophical underpinning of the ICC 
The ICC was established to foster international peace and justice (with the primary 
focus on justice), to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of international crimes, 
                                            
88 The Rome Statute was open for signature on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2002 after 
the ratification by 60 States parties as stipulated in article 126 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
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to help end conflicts (for example via the deferment mechanism), to mitigate the 
insufficiency of the ad hoc tribunals and to deter future perpetrators of international 
crime.89  In this regard, it was meant to be more than a judicial institution but one which 
embodies the values shared by all humanity. While adopting the Rome Statute, the 
States Parties to the Rome Statute (States parties) were “conscious that all peoples 
are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and 
concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.”90 The ICC was 
therefore established to help prevent this “delicate mosaic” from shattering and to 
contribute to the “humanization of our civilization.”91  
Cherif Bassiouni recounts that at one of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome 
Conference) sessions, the delegates “burst into a spontaneous standing ovation, which 
turned into rhythmic applause that lasted close to ten minutes. Some delegates 
embraced one another, and others had tears in their eyes.”92 He added that it was “one 
of the most extraordinary emotional scenes ever to take place at a diplomatic 
conference”.93 The Rome Conference had the highest number of state participation of 
all United Nations codification conferences which shows the importance of the subject 
matter and the support it enjoyed from the international community.94 Furthermore, the 
                                            
89 See also ‘Establishment of an International Criminal Court - Overview’ 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> accessed 24 October 2017. 
90 Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
91 ‘Cherif Bassiouni, Speech at Rome Ceremony July 18, 1998’ <http://mcherifbassiouni.com/wp-
content/uploads/MCB-Rome-Speech-18_July_1998.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
92 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 443, 459. 
93 Bassiouni (n 92) 459; see also John Washburn, ‘The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court and International Law Making in the 21st Century’ (1999) 11 Pace 
International Law Review 361, 361. He says there was an “international epiphany” on the day the Rome 
Statute was adopted and describes a similar emotional reaction of the delegates at the Rome 
Conference” 
94 Roy Lee, ‘The Rome Conference and Its Contribution to International Law’ in Roy Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute: issues, negotiations and results (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 9. 
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delegates of the Diplomatic Conference overwhelmingly voted for the adoption of the 
Rome Statute.95    
2.2.1 The negotiating and drafting history of the Rome Statute 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) through Resolution 260 invited 
the International Law Commission (ILC) to study: 
“[T]he desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for 
the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction 
will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions.”96 
The ILC determined that the establishment of such a judicial organ was both desirable 
and possible.97 The UNGA then appointed a Committee which prepared a draft in 1951 
and a revised draft in 1953 but this was never adopted. The issue continued pending 
with periodic discussions until 1993 when it was revived with the establishment of the 
ICTY. 
In 1994, the ILC presented to the UNGA a draft statute establishing an international 
criminal court. Subsequently, the UNGA established an Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court (Ad Hoc Committee) to review the 
draft and consider the substantive and administrative issues arising therefrom. The Ad 
hoc Committee met twice in 1995, and in 1996 the UNGA established the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (Preparatory 
Committee) whose mandate was to produce a consolidated draft statute.98 The 
Preparatory Committee met from 1996 to 1998 and prepared a draft which was 
submitted to the Rome Conference which occurred in June-July 1998. The Rome 
Statute was finalised and adopted on 17 July 1998. This was a significant step in the 
long journey, described above, towards prosecuting the perpetrators of international 
                                            
95 The vote was won 121 to 7 with 21 states abstaining. 
96 ‘A/RES/3/260 - Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 260 (III) Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide’ <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r260.htm> accessed 24 October 2017. 
97 ‘Establishment of an International Criminal Court - Overview’ (n 89). 
98 ‘Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court’ <http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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crimes and fostering international peace and justice.99  The Rome Statute came into 
force on 1 July 2002 after ratification by 60 States Parties, a number that has doubled 
up to 123 states at the time of writing.100 
2.2.2 The Rome Statute as a political compromise 
Generally, negotiations on multilateral treaties on various subjects are often conducted 
by diplomats with no technical knowledge or experience in the specific subject matter 
of the treaty.101 Therefore, many of the delegates who negotiated the Draft Rome 
Statute lacked technical knowledge or expertise in international criminal law, 
comparative criminal law, or comparative criminal procedure; and some delegates had 
no legal training whatsoever.102 Besides, critical issues such as the trigger mechanism, 
the jurisdiction of the Court, the independence and role of the Prosecutor, as well as 
the role of the UNSC were discussed along political lines among states.103 The views 
expressed during these discussions may be divided into two groups – on one hand, a 
group of states (which formed a coalition called the “like-minded states”) pushed for a 
strong Court, with a broad and automatic jurisdiction on the territories of states parties, 
as well as an independent and powerful prosecutor who could initiate cases proprio 
motu, and a limited role of the UNSC.104 On the other hand, a second group of states, 
the major one being the United States, wanted a weaker Court, with a prosecutor who 
had no independent powers to initiate investigations but had to rely on either UNSC or 
state recommendation.105 The latter group also wanted a provision that a state had to 
consent on a case-by-case basis before the ICC could exercise jurisdiction on its 
territory.106  
                                            
99 Bassiouni (n 6).  
100 ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute’ <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20st
atute.aspx> accessed 24 October 2019.  
101 Bassiouni (n 92) 460. 
102 Bassiouni (n 92) 460. 
103 Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins, ‘A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining 
International Criminal Court Negotiations’ (2009) 71 The Journal of Politics 977, 979. 
104 Bassiouni (n 92) 457. 
105 Bassiouni (n 92) 457. 
106 Bassiouni (n 92) 457. 
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There were back-and-forth debates between these two groups of states based on their 
respective power relations leading to several political bargains.107 In this regard, 
Goodliffe and Hawkins noted that during the Rome Statute negotiation “governments 
adopted the positions of the international partners on whom they depend for a diverse 
set of goods that includes trade, security, and foreign policy success in international 
organizations.”108 They describe a system where economically stronger states reward 
or punish economically weaker states which are dependent on them, based on the 
positions adopted by the latter towards a particular topic under discussion. Therefore, 
“leaders watch closely how other governments behave within their dependence 
network and alter their own actions accordingly.”109 
The signing of the Rome Statute was also marred with politics. Two examples suffice. 
The first being the Cotonou Agreement, signed between the European Union (EU) and 
the African Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP). 110 The Cotonou Agreement 
includes an ICC related provision requiring states to inter alia “take steps towards 
ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute and related instruments”.111 With this 
provision, the signing of the Rome Statute is tied to trade, cooperation, aid and 
development between the EU and the ACP countries. The result is that the ACP states 
which fail to sign and ratify the Rome Statute would, for example, lose millions of Euros 
in development funds and aid, among other consequences.112 This was a significant 
monetary incentive for the ACP states to sign and ratify the Rome Statute.113  
                                            
107 Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara Mitchell, ‘The Creation and Expansion of the International Criminal 
Court: A Legal Explanation’, Midwest Political Science Association Conference (2008) 6–7 
<http://ir.uiowa.edu/polisci_pubs/3/>. 
108 Goodliffe and Hawkins (n 103) 977. 
109 Goodliffe and Hawkins (n 103) 977. 
110 The Cotonou Agreement signed on 23 June 2000 and revised on 23 June 2010 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf>accessed 15 October 
2017.  
111 Article 11 (7) of the Cotonou Agreement. 
112 See discussion in David Hoile, Justice Denied: The Reality of the International Criminal Court (The 
Africa Research Centre 2014) 39–41. He discusses, for example, how Sudan failed to comply with this 
provision and the EU declined to release money meant for post- war development. 
113 Hoile (n 112) 39–41. 
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The second example is the bilateral agreements signed between the US and other 
states, including States Parties to the Rome Statute, obligating these states to refuse 
cooperation with the ICC in matters concerning the US, for example, the arrest and 
surrender of US citizens to the ICC.114 These bilateral agreements contravene the 
obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court under part 9 of the Rome 
Statute. However, many States Parties signed these bilateral agreements with the US 
because, just like the Cotonou Agreement, there were incentives attached to it in terms 
of monetary or military aid.115  
As shown above, States Parties made various political compromises during the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute so that whether a state supported a certain provision 
was sometimes based on politics rather than principle. Similar factors influenced and 
continue to influence states’ decisions to sign and ratify the Rome Statute or States 
Parties’ decisions to cooperate with the ICC.116  
                                            
114 For example, ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ (30 July 2003) <https://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm> accessed 1 February 2018. See also the ‘Nethercutt 
Amendment to the Foreign Appropriations Bill’ (2004) 
<https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ447/PLAW-108publ447.pdf.> accessed 1 February 2018  
115 Hoile (n 112) 40. 
116 This is illustrated, for example, by States Parties’ response to the ICC request for the arrest and 
surrender of former President Bashir of Sudan to the ICC. Chad, for example, has been a State Party 
to the Rome Statute since 2007 and yet hosted former president Bashir in its territory five times after 
the ICC’s request for his arrest and surrender. Interestingly in July 2009, when the African Union (AU) 
first made the decision not to cooperate with the ICC, Chad was the only country which entered a 
reservation to the decision, vowing to arrest former President Bashir in fulfilment of its Rome Statute 
obligations. At that time, however, there was political strife between President Déby of Chad and the 
then President Bashir. The conflict commenced in 2005 when the Chadian town of Adre was attacked, 
followed by an attempt to oust President Déby in 2006 both which former President Bashir was blamed 
for. Between the years 2005 to 2009 there was increased violence between Chad and Sudan, and many 
failed attempts to sign peace accords. It was in this context that Chad entered the reservation to the AU 
decision and indicated its intention to arrest former President Bashir. A final peace accord was signed 
in 2010 which saw the cessation of violence between the two countries. Subsequently, Chad 
disregarded its cooperation obligation to the ICC and invited and hosted former President Bashir five 
times despite repeated calls for cooperation from the ICC. This illustrates the influence of politics on 
States Parties’ decision whether to cooperate with the ICC.  For a detailed discussion of the influence 
of politics on African States Parties’ cooperation with the ICC see Phoebe Oyugi, ‘Head of State 
Immunity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Contemporary 
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2.2.3 The Rome Statute as a legal compromise  
Apart from the above-mentioned political aspects, there were also legal compromises 
adopted during the negotiation and drafting of the Rome Statute. To begin with, many 
of the states’ representatives at the Ad hoc and Preparatory Committees were lawyers 
or persons with legal training. Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi (later a judge at the ICC) 
explains that while the Committee of the Whole dealt with “highly political issues” in 
one room, the Working Group on Procedural Matters, which she chaired, met in a 
separate room to discuss complex procedural issues such as investigation, trial and 
appeals.117 She further adds that: 
“It was easy to agree in principle that a universal Court could not be perceived 
as favouring one legal system over the other and that it was therefore essential 
to find suitable compromises between the main criminal justice systems. This 
proved to be extremely difficult in practice. Suitable compromises required the 
willingness to make concessions in combining elements of different criminal 
justice systems. It was also necessary to ensure, at the same time, that the 
resulting procedural mechanisms and hybrid institutions would enable the Court 
to discharge its international functions effectively” (emphasis added).118 
This was made worse by the fact that many of the delegates favoured their respective 
national legal systems and had not interacted with other systems.119 Therefore, many 
delegations wrote lengthy proposals from their respective national criminal procedure 
viewpoints which the Working Group had to synthesise and consolidate. Many 
                                            
Legal Issues and the African Union’s Response to the Prosecution of African Heads of State’ (LLM Full 





117 Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, ‘The Negotiating Process’ in Roy Lee (ed), The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute--Issues, Negotiations, and Results (1 edition, Springer 1999) 
217. 
118 Fernandez de Gurmendi (n 117) 220. 
119 Fernandez de Gurmendi (n 117) 220; William A Schabas, ‘An Introduction to the International 
Criminal Court’ (Cambridge Core, February 2011) 249. 
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delegates saw only the advantages in the system in which they were trained and were, 
at first, not willing to compromise to allow the inclusion of other legal systems which 
were foreign to them.120 After lengthy discussions and compromises, the result was a 
blend of the major criminal procedures of the world, mainly common and civil law; 
Islamic law, which is the third major legal system in the world, was ignored.121 The 
Rome Statute is therefore made up of a sui generis procedure formed by blending 
common law and civil law procedures with best practices from the ad hoc tribunals and 
new innovative additions.122  
2.2.4 Blend of civil law and common law in the Rome Statute 
Civil law is traditionally based on a system of written codes which stems from the 
Roman Empire,123 and later also heavily influenced by the unifying force of the Code 
Napoleon. It is now dominant in most of continental Western Europe, for example, 
France, Germany and Italy; and because of colonialism, it also spread to parts of Africa 
and Asia, and the whole of Central and South America as well as in some mixed 
common law/civil law enclaves such as Puerto Rico, Quebec, and Louisiana.124 
Common law, on the other hand, is traditionally made of royal decrees issued on a 
case-by-case basis which were applied to other cases under the principle of stare 
decisis (precedent).125 It originated from the British Isles and, through colonialism, 
spread to parts of Africa, Asia, the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand 
among others.126 Over the years, a bridge has been established between the two 
                                            
120 Fernandez de Gurmendi (n 117) 217–226. 
121 For a discussion of why Islamic law was ignored see Powell and Mitchell (n 107) 16–18. They argue 
that this was because: first, there is an acute difference between Islamic law and the law practiced in 
western states and this reduced the impact of Islamic law on the ICC. Secondly, during Rome Statute 
negotiations there were fewer delegates from Islamic states compared to civil and common law states 
therefore the later had lower bargaining power. Thirdly, Islamic states have always had a shaky 
relationship with international institutions especially international courts. Furthermore, Islamic law 
cannot be separated from Islam as a religion and therefore might create a problem for non-Muslim 
judges for example, strict Islamic law prohibits the judging of Muslims by non-Muslims.  
122 Carter and Pocar (n 85) 13. 
123 Powell and Mitchell (n 107) 9. 
124 Christensen (n 51) 399. 
125 Powell and Mitchell (n 107) 9. 
126 Christensen (n 51) 399. 
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systems and the differences are no-longer stark; for example, many common law 
countries now have written codes while civil law countries often rely on the principle of 
precedent.127  
Despite this blend, the philosophical and practical differences between these systems 
persist. For example: the interpretative techniques applied to statutes or treaties; the 
role of judges in the proceedings; the rules of procedure and evidence; and criminal 
procedure - whether adversarial or inquisitorial, are all very different between the two 
legal systems. Examining the relationship between these legal systems, Christie 
concludes that: 
“Courts operating in different legal cultures can reach different conclusions on 
the same issue, not necessarily because they take a different view of the merits 
of the issue involved, but because they have a different view of the judicial 
function and/or utilize different judicial techniques.”128 
These two legal systems approach the fundamentals of the legal process differently 
and this is illustrated by the following two examples:129  
First, in relation to the goal of proceedings, generally, in civil law systems the 
underlying justification of the trial is to find the ultimate truth, while common law is 
based more on resolution of conflict between the parties. This determines and explains 
the procedures adopted, for example in civil law systems the truth is arrived at by 
allowing the admissibility of all evidence available, while in common law systems, 
admissibility of evidence is tightly controlled to ensure fairness to the two opposing 
parties.130  
Secondly, in relation to the control of proceedings, civil law proceedings are controlled 
by the judge and have been termed as “judge-centric”, while common law proceedings 
are controlled by the parties, thus “party-centric”.131 This means that in civil law 
                                            
127 Christensen (n 51) 400; Carter and Pocar (n 85) 17. 
128 George C Christie, ‘Some Key Jurisprudential Issues of the Twenty-First Century Essay’ (2000) 8 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 217, 224. 
129 Christensen (n 51) 401. 
130 Carter and Pocar (n 85). 
131 Carter and Pocar (n 85) 20. 
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jurisdictions, there is judicial involvement in investigations, a judge determines which 
witnesses to call, and a judge questions witnesses extensively while the prosecutor 
and defence may ask additional questions. On the other hand, in the common law 
systems, the parties conduct their own separate investigations, separately determine 
which witnesses to call to support their case and the judge is more of a passive decision 
maker or umpire.132 
Despite the philosophical differences between these two systems, the ICC procedure 
is made up of a complex blend of civil and common law principles as well as customary 
international law and sui generis principles to form an unprecedented legal system.133 
After the drafting process, a lot of the provisions resulting from this amalgamation were 
unclear or sometimes contradictory and these were left to be clarified by the ICC’s 
emerging jurisprudence.134  Many aspects of the ICC procedural law illustrate this 
compromise therefore it is impractical to discuss all of them in this dissertation.135 This 
chapter focuses on the major aspects of the key stages of the ICC procedural law, 
namely: investigations, pre-trial, trial, sentencing, appeal, sentence enforcement and 
victim reparation. To put the ICC procedural law in context, it is important to briefly 
discuss the structure of the Court, meaning the organs of the Court, the parties and 
participants as well as their respective roles.  
                                            
132 Carter and Pocar (n 85). 
133 Michael A Newton, ‘How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms’ (2016) 49 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 371, 374. 
134 See Shabtai Rosenne, ‘Poor Drafting and Imperfect Organization: Flaws to Overcome in RS 40th 
Anniversary Conference Panel’ (2000) 41 Virginia Journal of International Law 164. See also Bassiouni 
(n 6) 464–466. For example, while referring to part 3 of the Rome Statute which deals with the general 
principles of law, Bassiouni opines that: 
“Because common law, civil law, and other legal systems approach the mental element of 
crimes very differently, the drafters of Part 3 faced a significant challenge. While the drafters 
resolved some of the differences, in the interest of diplomatic compromise they left many others 
for ICC jurisprudence to settle.” 
135 See for example Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: 
Anatomy of a Unique Compromise’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 603. 
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2.3 The structure of the ICC  
The ICC has four organs: The Presidency, the Chamber (Pre-Trial, Trial and the 
Appeals divisions), Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Registry.136 The Defence, 
which is formed by legal representatives of the accused, is a party to the proceedings, 
while the victims through their legal representatives are participants. 
2.3.1 Organs of the Court 
Presidency 
The Presidency consists of the President, the First-Vice President and the Second Vice 
President who are appointed by an absolute majority of the judges.137 They serve for 
terms of three years or until the end of their terms as judges, whichever comes first 
and are eligible for re-election once. The function of the Presidency is to deal with the 
proper administration of the Court, such as constituting Chambers and reviewing 
administrative decisions of the Registrar, but not those of the OTP.138 
Chamber 
The Chamber, which is responsible for the judicial functions of the ICC, is made up of 
18 judges who are elected through secret ballot by the ASP from nominations 
presented by States Parties. The nomination and election of ICC judges is a very 
political and controversial process as explained below. 
 Article 36 (3) provides inter alia that: 
“The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, 
impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices. 
(b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall: 
                                            
136 See part IV of RS on the composition and administration of the Court. 
137 Article 38 of RS. 
138 Article 38 (3) of RS. 
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(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the 
necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in 
other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or 
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive 
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial 
work of the Court.” 
Two lists are made during elections: list A consisting of candidates qualified under 
paragraph 3 (b) (i), and list B consisting of those qualified under paragraph 3 (b) (ii). 
During the elections process States Parties are to ensure that there are at least nine 
judges from list A and at least five from list B.139 The voting of the judges at the ASP is 
by secret ballot. The persons elected are the 18 candidates, from lists A and B, who 
obtain the highest votes as well as a two-third majority of States Parties present and 
voting.140 While electing judges, States Parties are required to take into account the 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world, equitable geographical 
representation and fair representation of men and women.141 
Professors Ruth Mackenzie and Philippe Sands conducted a qualitative and 
quantitative study on the selection of judges to international criminal tribunals, including 
the ICC, and concluded that the process is often “strongly influenced by domestic and 
international political considerations and controlled by a small group of diplomats, civil 
servants, lawyers and academics.”142  Furthermore, this process is often marred with 
diplomatic “back-scratching”, “canvassing” and “bargaining”.143 Mackenzie and Sands 
concluded that “vote-trading, campaigning, and regional politicking invariably play a 
                                            
139 Article 36 (5) of RS. 
140 Article 36 (6) of RS. 
141 Article 36 (8) of RS. 
142 Ruth Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics (OUP 
Oxford 2010) 65.  
143 Hoile (n 112) 99–114; ‘Cosy Club or Sword of Righteousness?’ [2011] The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21540230>; Afua Hirsch and legal affairs correspondent, ‘System for 
Appointing Judges “Undermining International Courts”’ The Guardian (8 September 2010) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/08/law-international-court-justice-legal> accessed 1 
November 2017. 
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great part in candidates’ chance of being elected than considerations of individual 
merit.”144 Some critics have gone so far as to say that “with a few exceptions the judges 
at the ICC have been lacklustre political appointees.”145  
There has been evidence of some States Parties putting pressure on other states, or 
providing “mutual support” or doing personal favours to the ASP delegates to secure 
votes for their nominees.146 Many commentators, including scholars, 147 the ASP 
President,148 as well as NGOs such as Human Rights Watch149, Amnesty International 
and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC)150 have strongly 
discouraged the practice of vote-trading during the election of judges. The type of 
political appointment which occurs in practice can interfere with the independence of 
the judges since their appointment is based on many political factors unrelated to their 
merit.151  
Besides, it is noteworthy that Article 36(3)(b)(i) allows for the appointment of persons 
without prior judicial experience, while Article 36(3)(b)(ii) permits the appointment of 
persons not trained in law. This has led to the appointment of career diplomats, 
politicians, academics and activists, an issue which some scholars think has had 
devastating consequences for the development of the ICC procedural law.152 This 
might cause an extra layer of complexity since the ICC procedural law is not only sui 
                                            
144 Mackenzie and others (n 142) 172.  
145 Hoile (n 112) 99. 
146 Mackenzie and others (n 142). 
147 See discussion in Hoile (n 112) 99–114.  
148 ‘The International Criminal Court: A Scandal Worse than FIFA’ Pressreader (14 December 2015) 
<https://www.pressreader.com/swaziland/swazi-observer/20151214/281973196599407> accessed 1 
November 2017. 
149 Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Memorandum for the Thirteenth Session of the 
International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties’ (Human Rights Watch, 25 November 2014) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/25/human-rights-watch-memorandum-thirteenth-session-
international-criminal-court> accessed 1 November 2017. 
150 ‘The Nomination and Election of the ICC Registrar’ (Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
2017)<http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/sites/default/files/cicc_documents/cicc_registrar_election_me
mo_2017_final.pdf> accessed 1 November 2017. 
151 Sylvia de Bertodano, ‘Judicial Independence in the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 409. 
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generis, but the drafters left the task of clarification of the Rome Statute to the 
judges.153  
The Chamber is made up of the judges of Pre-Trial and Trial divisions which consist of 
not less than 6 judges each as well as the Appeals Division consisting of the President 
and four other judges.154 The assignment of judges to the divisions is based on the 
specific functions of the respective divisions as well as the qualifications and 
experience of the judges. Each division should contain: “an appropriate combination of 
expertise in criminal law and procedure and in international law”.155 However, the Trial 
and Pre-Trial Divisions are composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial 
experience.156 
The functions of the Trial-Chamber are carried out by three judges, while those of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber are carried out by three judges or a single judge depending on the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and the RPE.157 The judges in the Trial and Pre-Trial 
Divisions serve in the respective divisions for three years and thereafter until the 
completion of a case which had already commenced in the division they are in.158 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute allows for the temporary attachment of the judges in 
the Pre-Trial Division to the Trial Division and vice versa, however a judge cannot be 
involved in both the trial and pre-trial stages of the same case. On the other hand, the 
judges in the Appeals Division serve only within the Division until the end of their 
term.159 
The office of the Prosecutor 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is a separate and independent organ of the Court 
which is responsible for receiving referrals and information about crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, examining them and conducting investigations and 
                                            
153 Vladimir Tochilovsky, ‘Proceedings in the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons to Learn from 
ICTY Experience’ (2002) 10 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 268, 268. 
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prosecutions.160 The OTP is headed by a Prosecutor who oversees the management 
and administration of the Office and who is assisted by one or more Deputy 
Prosecutors. The Prosecutor is elected by secret ballot by the ASP and by an absolute 
majority. Similarly, the Deputy Prosecutors are elected by the ASP from a list of 
candidates provided by the Prosecutor. Both the Prosecutor and the Deputies hold 
office for nine years without the possibility of re-election. 161 The process of electing the 
Prosecutor faces similar political challenges as the election of judges explained above. 
Apart from being the organ in charge of prosecutions and investigations, unofficially, 
the OTP is also considered “the face of the Court”, meaning the decisions and 
utterances of the Prosecutor are often the first contact of the public with the Court.162 
Registry 
The Registry is the organ responsible for the non-judicial administration and servicing 
of the Court. It is headed by the Registrar who is the principal administrative officer of 
the Court and who exercises his/her functions under the authority of the Presidency.163 
The Registrar is elected by the judges, by secret ballot and by absolute majority. 
Should the need arise and upon the recommendation of the Registrar, the judges also 
elect the Deputy Registrar in the same manner. Both the Registrar and Deputy 
Registrar hold office for a period of 5 years and are liable for re-election once.164 
One of the notable responsibilities of the Registrar is to establish the Victims and 
Witnesses’ Unit (VWU). The purpose of the VWU is, in consultation with the OTP, to 
provide: 
“[P]rotective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other 
appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and 
others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”165 
                                            
160 Article 42 (1) of RS. 
161 Article 42 (4) of RS. 
162 The Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Decision on the Request for 
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The Defence is not an organ of the Court, but the term is used in the Legal Texts of 
the ICC to refer to the accused/convicted person and their legal representatives. 
According to Article 67 of the Rome Statute, every accused person has the right to be 
represented by counsel of his own choosing. Accused persons, either on their own, or 
through their representatives have a right to participate in the proceedings before the 
Court. 166 For accused persons who cannot afford counsel, one is appointed by the 
Court with the accused person’s involvement and approval.167 The Defence is a party 
to the proceedings and the Prosecutor is obliged to disclose to the Defence any 
exculpatory evidence in his/her possession, or evidence which mitigate the guilt of the 
accused, or affect the credibility of the Prosecutor’s case.168 
2.3.3 Victims  
The Rome Statute envisages the participation of victims of crime in the proceedings 
before the ICC. In this context “victim” refers to natural persons, organisations, or 
institutions who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of a crime under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.169 Article 68 permits the expression of the “views and concerns” 
of victims during the proceedings which is often done through the Legal Representative 
of Victims (LRV). Victims can also participate in proceedings as witnesses. However, 
unlike the OTP and Defence, victims are not parties but are participants in the 
proceedings. This terminology distinguishes between the role played by the OTP and 
Defence, who automatically take active part in the proceedings, and the role of the 
victims which is dependent on the permission of the Chamber to be granted, on a case-
by-case basis, when the interests of the victims are affected. The interests of victims 
are also to be considered by the Prosecutor when determining whether to initiate 
investigations into a certain situation.170 
                                            
166 For a comprehensive analysis of the role of the defence at the ICC see Kenneth S Gallant, ‘The Role 
and Powers of Defense Counsel in RS of the International Criminal Court’ (2000) 34 The International 
Lawyer 21. 
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168 Article 67 (7) of RS. 
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2.4 The sui generis nature of the ICC Procedure  
2.4.1 The ICC trigger mechanisms 
For a situation to come under the jurisdiction of the Court it has to be triggered through 
referral by a State Party, referral by the UNSC or the OTP’s proprio motu decision.171 
Referral by a State Party 
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC appear to have been committed.172 Four of the situations which 
have resulted in prosecutions at the ICC (the situations in Uganda, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali) were a result of 
self-referral by States Parties.173 Self-referral has however been riddled with politics as 
States parties appear to use it to attain political ends as exemplified by the Ugandan 
Situation. From 1986, there was a protracted armed conflict between the government 
forces, Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), and members of the Lord Resistance 
Army (LRA), a rebel group based in Northern Uganda.174 In 2004, the Ugandan 
government referred the situation of Northern Uganda to the ICC and only the 
members of the LRA, not the government forces, have been under investigation and 
Prosecution by the ICC.175 Many commentators have seen this as a one-sided case 
which has politicised the Court.176   
UNSC referral 
Secondly, the UNSC has the power to refer a situation to the ICC under Chapter VI of 
the United Nations Charter.177 The UNSC is a political body in the sense that it consists 
of 5 permanent members (China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
                                            
171 Article 13 of RS. 
172 Article 14 of RS. 
173 ‘Situations’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx> accessed 5 February 2018. 
174 ‘Situation in Uganda’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda> accessed 5 February 2018. 
175 ‘Situation in Uganda’ (n 174). 
176 See for example discussion in Payam Akhavan, ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s 
Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court.(Developments at the 
International Criminal Court)’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 403. 
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France), essentially victorious powers of WWII, all who have veto powers; and 10 non-
permanent members who are elected for two-year terms by the UNGA.178 The political 
nature of the UNSC membership has been the subject of debate at the UNGA for many 
years, with many states objecting inter alia to the veto powers of the 5 permanent 
members, and the lack of regional representation.179 The politics of the UNSC are 
imported to the ICC by Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute which empower the 
UNSC to refer a case to the ICC and to defer cases for a period of 12 months, 
respectively. It therefore provides an avenue for the Rome Statute, a treaty, to apply 
to non-party states through the referral of the UNSC, which is a delicate exception to 
the law of treaties.180 This is further complicated by the fact that three of the five 
permanent members (China, the US and Russia) are not States Parties to the Rome 
Statute. China and the US, for example, have often refused to cooperate with the ICC 
and/or thwarted efforts by States Parties to cooperate with the Court.181 The question 
therefore arises of how these states can justify their exceptionalism: that is how do 
they subject other non-party states to the jurisdiction of the ICC which they are not 
subject to?182  
                                            
178 ‘Permanent and Non-Permanent Members’ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/> accessed 05 
February 2018. 
179 ‘Updated Security Council Must Reflect Changing Global Reality, Member States Say, as General 
Assembly Debates Ways to Advance Progress on Reform | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases’ 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11854.doc.htm> accessed 6 February 2018. 
180 See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties < 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf> 
accessed 6 February 2018.  
181 The first example is the US entering bilateral agreements with States Parties to the Rome Statute 
which are in violation of their cooperation obligations under Part IX of the Rome Statute. See the 
‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ (n 114). A second example is China inviting and hosting 
former President Bashir when the ICC had issued a warrant of arrest against him and requested states 
to cooperate by arresting him and surrendering him to the ICC. Admittedly, China as a non-party state 
is not bound by the Rome Statute but the obligation to apprehend former President Bashir could be 
drawn from UNSC Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC and urging states to 
cooperate with investigations and prosecutions. See  ‘China: Do Not Host Sudanese President’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 20 June 2011) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/20/china-do-not-host-sudanese-
president> accessed 6 February 2018.  
182 Hemi Mistry and Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, ‘The UN Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court’ (London: Chatham House (Retrieved from) < www chathamhouse 
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So far, the UNSC has referred two situations, Libya and Darfur (Sudan), to the ICC.183 
This gives rise to questions relating to both the criteria and consistency of the UNSC 
decisions – for example, why refer Libya and not Syria? The process through which 
the UNSC designates a situation as a threat to international peace and security is a 
political rather than judicial process which takes into account political preferences and 
interests of various stake holders.184 This can be seen, for example, in the failure to 
refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, resulting from the veto power exercised by China 
and Russia, which has been seen as a move protecting the political and economic 
interests of these two states.185 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers 
The Prosecutor has the power to initiate investigations proprio motu based on 
information received of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.186 The Prosecutor 
has exercised this power to commence investigations in Burundi, Georgia, Kenya and 
Côte d’Ivoire.187 The Ivorian situation is an example of how the exercise of proprio motu 
powers by the prosecution sometimes appears to be politicised. The background is as 
follows: on 4 May 2011, President Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire wrote a letter to the ICC 
Prosecutor stating that Côte d’Ivoire was not able to prosecute the crimes committed 
during the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire and urging the Prosecutor to conduct 
investigations.188 The conflict followed the 2010 elections occurring  between the 
supporters of President Ouattara and Former President Gbagbo, both who claimed to 
                                            
org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International% 20Law/160312summary pdf 2012) 2 accessed 6 
February 2018. 
183 ‘Situations’ (n 173). 
184 Mistry and Verduzco (n 182) 4. 
185 For an illustration of the political interests of Russia and China in relation to Syria see Amanda 
Kramer, ‘Deconstructing the Security Council’s Failure to Refer the Conflict in Syria to the International 
Criminal Court’ <https://queenspoliticalreview.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/qpr-kramer.pdf> accessed 
6 February 2018. 
186 Article 15 of RS. 
187 ‘Situations’ (n 173). 
188 ‘Office of the Prosecutor Weekly Briefing 11-16 May 2011’ <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3836B9AF-B0DC-4F94-A4A8-
4115E95AE76E/283329/OTPWeeklyBriefing_1116May201187.pdf> accessed 5 February 2018. 
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have won the election.189 It ended with the arrest of Former President Gbagbo on 11 
April 2011190  after which President Ouattara sent the above-mentioned letter to the 
ICC.191 Subsequently, the Prosecutor sought permission from the PTC and launched 
investigations in Côte d’Ivoire which resulted in the prosecution of Former President 
Laurent Gbagbo and Former Youth Minister Charles Blé Goudé.192 No person allied to 
President Ouattara during the conflict has been investigated or prosecuted by the ICC. 
The ICC Prosecutor has continually expressed the intention to continue with 
investigations touching both sides of the conflict.193 However, nine years down the line, 
this has not occurred leading to the ICC being accused of engaging in one sided politics 
and victor’s justice.194  
                                            
189 War began in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, between government forces under the command of Former 
President Laurent Gbagbo, and rebels later known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire (FNCI) 
allied to President Ouattara. The FNCI ended up occupying around half of the territory of Côte d’Ivoire. 
It was in this context that elections were held in 2010 resulting in violent clashes between the 
government-commanded forces and the FNCI. See ‘Ivory Coast Profile’ BBC News (10 January 2018) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13287585> accessed 6 February 2018. 
190 ‘Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Captured at Presidential Compound’ (VOA) 
<https://www.voanews.com/a/fresh-clashes-erupt-in-ivory-coast-after-un-french-attacks-
119588724/137817.html> accessed 5 February 2018. 
191 Côte d’Ivoire had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in April 2003 and only ratified the Rome 
Statute on 15 February 2013. See ‘Côte d’Ivoire’ <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/Cote_d_Ivoire.aspx> accessed 6 
February 2018. 
192 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude> accessed 05 February 2018. It is noteworthy that a case was also instituted 
against Ms Simone Gbagbo, the former First lady of Cote d’Ivoire and Vice-President of the Ivorian 
Popular Front (FPI). However, Côte d’Ivoire chose to prosecute her domestically instead of transferring 
her to the ICC. See the Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo (Warrant of Arrest for Simone Gbagbo) ICC-
02/11-01/12 (29 February 2012). 
193 ‘ICC Prosecutor Vows to Investigate Both Sides in Ivory Coast’ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
icc-ivorycoast/icc-prosecutor-vows-to-investigate-both-sides-in-ivory-coast-idUSKCN0YP24B> 
accessed 6 February 2018. 
194 See for example  ‘Making Justice Count | Lessons from the ICC’s Work in Côte d’Ivoire’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 4 August 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04/making-justice-count/lessons-
iccs-work-cote-divoire> accessed 6 February 2018; Luis Santos Soberon, ‘Victor’s Justice : Assessing 
the Impact of One-Sided International Prosecutions on Grave Crimes in Côte d’Ivoire’ (Thesis, 2016) 
<https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/45782> accessed 6 February 2018; Yao Nikez Adu, 
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2.4.2 Procedural law at the ICC 
Investigation 
The drafters of the Rome Statute faced the difficulty of balancing the common law 
concept of prosecutorial discretion and independence and the civil law concept of 
judicial involvement in investigations.195 On the one hand, delegates with common law 
backgrounds insisted that the investigation process should be free from judicial 
intervention, except at the level of issuance of warrants, to preserve the independence 
of the Prosecutor.196 On the other hand, their civil law counterparts argued for the 
involvement of the judges at the investigation level to prevent possible abuse of 
prosecutorial powers, to provide judicial supervision and to protect the rights of the 
persons under investigation.197 
Eventually, because of the complex crimes involved, both sides agreed that there was 
need for both prosecutorial discretion as well as judicial review and supervision to 
ensure due process.198 The result of the negotiation was an innovative introduction of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) which is a “hybrid institution based on civil law proposals 
that would ensure the efficiency and the integrity of the proceedings and protect the 
rights of the Defence.”199  
In the final text of the Rome Statute, after a situation has been triggered, the 
Prosecutor’s decision to commence investigations is governed by three factors: 
whether there is reason to believe that a crime has been committed which falls under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC; the admissibility of the situation under Article 17 of the Rome 
                                            
‘International Criminal Law and Victor’s Justice: The Case of Côte d’Ivoire’ (2016) 20 American Scientific 
Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) 129. 
195 Fabricio Guariglia, ‘Investigation and Prosecution’ in, Roy Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of the Rome Statute--Issues, Negotiations, and Results (1 edition, Springer 1999) 228–230. 
196 Schabas (n 119) 249. 
197 Guariglia (n 195) 228. 
198 Guariglia (n 195) 228. 
199 Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, ‘The Negotiating Process’ in Roy Lee (ed), The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute--Issues, Negotiations, and Results (1 edition, Springer 1999) 
223. 
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Statute; as well as the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.200 The PTC may 
review the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with investigation and may request 
the Prosecutor to reconsider. The Prosecutor can reconsider a decision not to proceed 
with investigation upon the availability of new facts or information.201   
Should the Prosecutor determine that there is reason to conduct investigations, s/he 
submits a request to the PTC seeking authorization to conduct investigation and 
includes the supporting material collected.202 The PTC then determines whether there 
is a reasonable basis to proceed with investigation and whether the crimes fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, upon which the PTC may authorize the commencement of 
investigations. If the PTC denies the request, the OTP may reapply if new facts or 
information emerge.203 The UNSC has powers to pause an investigation for a 
renewable period of 12 months through a resolution passed under Chapter IV of the 
UN Charter.204 
While conducting investigations, the Prosecutor shall consider both exonerating and 
incriminating factors equally to establish the truth.205 This is unlike the role of the 
prosecutor in civil law and even in many common law systems. On one hand, in civil 
law systems, the judge conducts investigations and prepares a dossier which is 
available to both the prosecutor and defence counsel. On the other hand, in common 
law systems, the prosecutor does not investigate, but considers the evidence received 
from the police or investigating agencies.  Prosecutors in many common law systems 
also have a duty to consider exculpatory evidence together with incriminating evidence 
when exercising the prosecutorial discretion.206  
During the investigation process, the ICC Prosecutor may collect and examine 
evidence, request the presence of and question the persons being investigated, as 
                                            
200 Article 53 of RS. 
201 Article 53 (4) of RS. 
202 Article 15 (3) of RS.  
203 Article 15 of RS. 
204 Article 16 of RS. 
205 Article 54 of RS. See also Fatou Bensouda, ‘The ICC Statute - An Insider’s Perspective on a Sui 
Generis System for Global Justice’ (2010) 36 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 277, 280. 
206 Carter and Pocar (n 85) 16–24; Schabas (n 119) 250. 
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well as victims and witnesses. The Prosecutor may also seek the cooperation of a state 
or inter-governmental organisation and enter into agreements or arrangements with 
such state, inter-governmental organisation or person to secure cooperation. When 
making such arrangements or entering such agreements the Prosecutor may 
undertake not to reveal information received based on confidentiality and take 
necessary measures to keep such confidentiality. However, confidentiality applies 
solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.207  
At this stage the PTC has the power, upon request by the Prosecutor, to issue orders 
and warrants to aid the investigation process as well as to provide for: “the protection 
and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of 
persons who have been arrested or have appeared in response to a summons, and 
the protection of national security information.” 208 The PTC also has the power to seek 
cooperation of a state for the purpose of forfeiture of the assets of a suspect for the 
ultimate benefit of victims. 
The PTC, after reviewing the available evidence, may issue a warrant of arrest if the 
judges are satisfied that such arrest is necessary: to ensure the person attends trial 
and does not hinder the investigations or the proceedings, as well as to prevent the 
person from continuing to commit crimes which arise from similar circumstances and 
which are under the jurisdiction of the Court.209 The Prosecutor may request the PTC 
to amend the warrant of arrest and the PTC may do so if it is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the modified or added 
crimes. As an alternative to an arrest warrant the Prosecutor may request the PTC to 
issue summons to appear if such summons would be sufficient to ensure the person’s 
presence at trial.210 
Based on the warrant, the Court, through the Registry, may request a State Party to 
provisionally arrest or to arrest and surrender the person to the ICC.211 Upon receipt of 
such request, the State Party should take immediate steps to arrest the person in 
                                            
207 Article 54 (3) of RS. 
208 Article 57 of RS. 
209 Article 58 of RS. 
210 Article 58 of RS. 
211 Article 58 (5) of RS. 
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question in accordance with its laws and the cooperation procedure of the ICC.212 The 
arrested person is then brought before the judicial organ of the custodial state which 
determines that the warrant applies to the person and that the person’s rights are 
respected. However, the Rome Statute prohibits such domestic judicial organ from 
determining whether the warrant was properly issued by the ICC.213 The custodial state 
is to surrender the person to the ICC as soon as it is so ordered.214 
Pre-trial 
Upon the person’s arrival at the ICC, s/he is to be informed of the charges against them 
and their rights. The PTC may review the arrest warrant and decide to release the 
person with or without conditions.215 The PTC then conducts proceedings to confirm 
the charges against the person, which are held in the presence of the person charged 
and his/her counsel as well as the Prosecutor.216 However, under exceptional 
circumstances, these proceedings may be held in the absence of the person charged 
if such person has waived his/her rights or has fled and reasonable steps have been 
taken to locate him/her. Such person must however be represented by counsel. Before 
the hearing the Prosecutor may continue with investigations and amend or withdraw 
charges. At the hearing, the Prosecutor presents sufficient evidence to “establish 
                                            
212 The cooperation procedure is provided for in Part IX of the RS.  The ICC has made several requests 
to States parties (including Chad, Malawi, Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan) to arrest and surrender former President Bashir to the Court, however none of these states has 
complied. The ICC has issued several decisions stating that these States Parties had the obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC by arresting former President Bashir which they had failed to perform. See for 
example: The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender 
of Omar Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09 (6 July 2017). The ICC further referred the non-cooperation of some 
of these States, (for example Chad, Malawi, Kenya, and Jordan) to the UNSC and the ASP as stipulated 
by the Rome Statute. See for example: The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision 
under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court 
for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09 (11 December 2017). 
213 Article 59 (4) of RS. 
214 Article 59 (7) of RS. 
215 Article 60 of RS. 
216 Article 61 of RS. 
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substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged”.217 The 
person charged may object to the charges, challenge the evidence, and present 
evidence. 
Based on the confirmation hearing, the PTC may “determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each 
of the crimes charged.”218 Subsequently, the PTC may confirm the charges, decline 
confirmation or order the Prosecutor to conduct further investigations or to amend a 
charge. If the charges are confirmed the PTC then commits the person charged to a 
Trial Chamber (TC) for trial on the basis of the charges confirmed.219 After the charges 
are confirmed and before the trial begins, the Prosecutor may, with authorisation of the 
PTC and notice to the accused, amend charges. However, if the Prosecutor seeks to 
add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing is held to 
confirm the additional or amended charges. After confirmation, the Prosecutor may 
withdraw the charges, with the authorisation of the PTC.220 If the charges are not 
withdrawn, the Presidency then constitutes a TC to try the accused person. 
Trial 
Trials are to be held at the seat of the Court, in The Hague, The Netherlands, unless a 
contrary decision is made.221 So far, all the trials at the ICC have been held at The 
Hague. The defence team of former President Gbagbo requested that the opening of 
the trial be held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire or alternatively in Arusha, Tanzania, but the 
Chamber rejected this request citing security and logistical reasons.222  
The accused has a right to be present at trial except when their presence continuously 
disrupts trial, in which case the TC may order them removed and they shall be 
represented by counsel. Such measures are to be employed under very exceptional 
                                            
217 Article 61 (5) of RS. 
218 Article 61 (7) of RS. 
219 Article 61 (7) (a) of RS. 
220 Article 61 (9) of RS. 
221 Article 62 of RS. 
222 Deji Badmus, ‘ICC Declines Gbagbo’s Request to Have Trial Held in Abidjan’ (CGTN Africa) 
<https://africa.cgtn.com/2015/10/27/icc-declines-gbagbos-request-to-have-trial-held-in-abidjan/> 
accessed 31 October 2019. 
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circumstances and only during the duration necessary, after all attempts have been 
made to find alternative measures.223 The TCs have so far not had to resort to 
excluding an accused person from trial due to disruptive behaviour.  
The right to be present at trial was extensively debated in the cases of President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto of Kenya. Upon request, first by Ruto and 
then Kenyatta, the TC in both cases held that they were excused from continuous 
presence at trial, except on exceptional mentioned instances, to allow them to perform 
state duties.224 However, the Ruto decision, which the Kenyatta one had been based 
on, was overturned by the Appeals Chamber which held that the general rule was that 
the accused had to be present at trial and excusal was a remedy to be resorted to 
under limited circumstances.225 Subsequently, the TC reconsidered its decision on 
Kenyatta’s excusal in light of the Appeals Chamber’s decision.226 This resulted in a 
diplomatic storm which culminated in the ASP’s adoption of Rules 134 bis, 134 ter, and 
134 quater, which amended the RPE allowing accused persons not to be continuously 
present at trial.227 This is another example, in addition to the discussion in part 2.2.2 of 
politics influencing critical legal issues at the ICC.  
The TC has the responsibility to ensure that the trial is conducted in a fair and 
expeditious manner while balancing the rights of the accused and the protection of the 
victims and witnesses.228 After conferring with parties, the TC may order the joinder or 
                                            
223 Article 63 of RS. 
224 The Prosecutor v William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal 
from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09/01/11 (18 June 2013) and; The Prosecutor v Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at 
Trial) ICC-01/09-02/11 (18 October 2013). 
225 The Prosecutor v William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor 
Against the Decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for 
Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09/01/11 OA 5 (25 October 2013). 
226 The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration 
of the Decision Excusing Mr Kenyatta from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-02/11 (26 
November 2013). 
227 See discussion in Steven A Koh, ‘Presence and Politics at the International Criminal Court’ (American 
Society on International Law, 1 June 2015) <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/11/presence-
and-politics-international-criminal-court> accessed 17 November 2017. 
228 Article 64 (2) of RS. 
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severance of charges in cases involving multiple accused persons.229 The TC has 
employed this power to sever the charges against Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo230 and to join the charges against former president Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé.231  
During trial the TC also has power to: order the presentation of evidence or the 
attendance of witnesses by seeking the assistance of states; protect confidential 
information; protect witnesses, the accused person and victims; and to order the 
production of further evidence apart from that provided at trial by the parties; as well 
as to rule on admissibility of evidence and to take measures to maintain order during 
the hearing.232  As a rule, the trials are held in public. However, under exceptional 
circumstances the TC may order a closed session to protect witnesses, victims or the 
accused; or to protect sensitive and confidential information.233 
Admission of guilt 
At the commencement of trial, the charges are read to the accused in a language s/he 
understands, and the accused is afforded the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty.234 
Dealing with a guilty plea “was the ‘test case’ for the Preparatory Committee’s ability 
and willingness to arrive at solutions which accommodated concepts from both 
common law and civil law legal systems.”235 This is evident first on the level of 
terminology – common law jurisdictions tend to use the term “guilty plea” while civil law 
                                            
229 Article 64 (5) of RS. 
230The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the implementation of 
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) 
ICC-01/04-01/07 (21 November 2012). 
231The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Decision on Prosecution requests to join 
the cases of The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and The Prosecutor v Charles Blé Goudé and related 
matters) ICC-02/11-01/15 (11 March 2015). 
232 Article 64 of RS. 
233 Article 64 (7) of RS. 
234 Article 64 (8) (a) of RS. 
235 Hans-Jörg Behrens, ‘The Trial Proceedings’ in Roy Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: The 
Making of the Rome Statute-Issues, Negotiations, and Results (1 edition, Springer 1999) 241. 
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jurisdictions generally use “confessions” or “admission of guilt”.236 The drafters 
therefore attempted to find terms that were not leaning towards either legal system.237 
On a procedural level, the drafters also had to balance between the effects of 
admission of guilt in the two legal systems. Behrens explains that the problems 
encountered by the ICTY, which had followed a common law approach, in the 
Erdemović case 238 prompted the drafters of the Rome Statute to desire alternative 
solutions by blending the two systems.239 
Article 65 of the Rome Statute therefore provides that if an accused admits guilt, the 
TC will determine whether: the accused understands the nature and the consequences 
of the admission of guilt; the admission is made voluntarily after consultation with the 
defence counsel; and that the admission is consistent with the facts of the case as per 
the charges presented by the Prosecutor, any other material brought by the Prosecutor 
as well as evidence presented by witnesses.240 Once the TC is satisfied of the above 
it may consider the admission of guilt as “establishing all the essential facts that are 
required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates” and proceed to 
convict the accused.241 If the TC is not convinced of the above, it will consider the 
admission of guilt as invalid and proceed to order a trial and may remit the case to 
another TC.242 In this regard, the Rome Statute provides that: “any discussions 
between the Prosecutor and the Defence regarding modification of the charges, the 
admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.”243 
                                            
236 Behrens (n 235) 241; see also Caslav Pejovic, ‘Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths 
Leading to the Same Goal’ (2001) 32 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 817. 
237 Behrens (n 235) 241. 
238 See The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997). In this 
case the accused entered a guilty plea and was convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. He 
appealed against the conviction and sentencing, this appeal was dismissed but the Appeal’s Chamber 
remitted the case to a different TC and ordered that the accused re-plead on the basis that his initial 
guilty plea had not been properly informed. See further discussion of this case in part 5.3.1 of this 
dissertation. 
239 Behrens (n 235) 241. 
240 Article 65 (1) of RS. 
241 Article 65 (2) of RS. 
242 Article 65 (3) of RS. 
243 Article 65 (5) of RS. 
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Article 65 of the Rome Statute was applicable in the Al Mahdi case.244 In this case, the 
accused pleaded guilty to the war crime of destruction of cultural and historical 
monuments in Timbuktu, Mali. Furthermore, the Prosecutor and the Defence entered 
into a plea agreement in which Mr Al Mahdi took responsibility for the crimes charged 
and provided a detailed account of his actions. In the judgment, the TC held that the 
guilty plea and the fact that it was entered in a timely manner was a mitigating factor. 
The TC held inter alia that: 
“The Chamber considers that an admission of guilt is undoubtedly a mitigating 
circumstance and gives it substantial weight. In this regard, the Chamber notes 
that the admission was made early, fully and appears to be genuine, led by the 
real desire to take responsibility for the acts he committed and showing honest 
repentance. This admission of guilt undoubtedly contributed to the rapid 
resolution of this case, thus saving the Court’s time and resources and relieving 
witnesses and victims of what can be a stressful burden of giving evidence in 
Court. Moreover, this admission may also further peace and reconciliation in 
Northern Mali by alleviating the victims’ moral suffering through 
acknowledgement of the significance of the destruction. Lastly, such an 
admission may have a deterrent effect on others tempted to commit similar acts 
in Mali and elsewhere” (emphasis added).245 
Mr Al Mahdi was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, including the time he had spent 
in pre-trial detention. The Al Mahdi case is proof that admission of guilt and agreements 
between the Defence and the Prosecutor fit in the legal framework of the ICC and may 
be used to not only terminate cases expeditiously, but also serve other aims of the ICC 
such as fostering peace and setting a historical record. 
When an accused person pleads guilty, s/he forfeits fundamental trial rights provided 
for in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute provides for the presumption of innocence 
and the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt.246 During trial the accused person has rights similar to those provided for in the 
                                            
244 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Sentence and Judgment) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 December 
2016).  
245 Al Mahdi (Sentence and Judgment) (n 244) para 100. 
246 Article 66 of RS. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).247 The accused is entitled 
to a public, fair and impartial hearing with certain minimum guarantees: to be informed 
of the charges against him/her in a language s/he understands; to have adequate time 
and facilities to prepare for the trial; to be present at trial and to conduct defence in 
person or through counsel of one’s choosing; and indigent accused persons have a 
right to have legal counsel appointed for them at the Court’s expense. Accused 
persons also have a right to examine witnesses against them and the right to call 
witnesses; as well as the right to interpretation of proceedings and translation of key 
documents into a language the accused fully understands. Furthermore, there is the 
right to remain silent, the right “not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the 
burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal”, as well as the right to have the Prosecutor 
disclose to him/her evidence that proves his/her innocence or undermines the 
Prosecutor’s case.248 The rights forfeited by the accused person upon pleading guilty 
is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
When the personal interests of victims are affected, the TC is to allow them to present 
their views and concerns, balancing these with the right of the accused to a fair and 
impartial trial. These views are often presented by the Legal Representative of Victims 
(LRV) after the authorisation of the Chamber on a case-by-case basis. The TC is also 
to ensure the protection of the security, privacy and dignity of victims and witnesses, 
following the advice of the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) by putting in place 
measures such as closed in camera proceedings, or video link as appropriate.249 
Sentencing 
Upon conviction, the TC orders a further hearing to determine the sentencing, except 
where there is a valid admission of guilt as discussed above. During the sentence 
hearing the TC takes into account evidence relevant to the sentencing presented at 
trial and may admit other relevant evidence. The sentence is pronounced in public in 
the presence of the accused.250 The TC can either sentence a convicted person to 
imprisonment for a period of not more than 30 years, or to life imprisonment depending 
                                            
247 Article 67 of RS. See discussion in Carter and Pocar (n 85) 18. 
248 Article 67 of RS. 
249 Article 68 of RS. 
250 Article 76 of RS. 
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on the gravity of the crime and the personal circumstances of the person.251 In addition, 
the TC may impose a fine or forfeiture of assets and proceeds derived from the crime 
for which the person is convicted. In imposing the sentence, the Court deducts the time 
spent by the accused in pre-trial and trial detention.252 For example, Mr Germain 
Katanga was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment but after deduction of time spent in 
pre-trial and trial detention, he was released about a year after his conviction.253 
Appeals 
The procedure on appeals was also an issue which required a blend of civil law and 
common law during the drafting of the Rome Statute. Generally, in civil law systems, 
an appeal can be a trial de novo, meaning the appeal may be conducted by way of 
fresh proceedings in spite of the record from the lower courts; while in common law 
systems an appeal is normally based on the record of the trial and is limited to errors 
of facts or law; some countries allow admission of new evidence under limited 
circumstances.254 The other issue is that in most civil law countries, both the defence 
and prosecution can appeal against both convictions and acquittals which means that 
there can be a conviction after an acquittal and vice versa. On the other hand, in many 
common law countries only the accused may appeal against a conviction, and an 
acquittal cannot be reversed on appeal.255   
The Rome Statute attempts to find a middle ground and provides that in case of a 
conviction or acquittal the Prosecutor and Defence may appeal based on procedural 
error, error of law and error of fact. 256 The Defence may also appeal based on any 
other grounds that affect the fairness and reliability of the decision. Both parties may 
also appeal against the sentence on grounds that is it not proportionate to the gravity 
                                            
251 Articles 77 and 78 of RS. 
252 Article 78 (2) of RS. 
253 ‘Congolese Warlord Katanga First ICC Convict Released’ 
<https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0T21RR20151113> accessed 17 November 2017. 
254 Carter and Pocar (n 85) 31. 
255 Carter and Pocar (n 85) 30. 
256 Article 81 of RS. See the interpretation of this standard of review in the Appeals Chamber decision 
in the Bemba case: The Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”)   ICC-
01/05-01/08-3636-Red (8 June 2018) [35–69]. 
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of the crime. As a rule, after a conviction, the convicted person remains in custody 
during the appeal while after an acquittal the person is to be released immediately. 
However, under exceptional circumstances, at the request of the Prosecutor, the TC 
may order that the person remain detained after an acquittal, pending the appeal, 
considering the gravity of the crime, the likelihood of success in appeal and flight risk 
of the person.257 
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber may reverse or amend the decision or sentence or 
order a new trial before a different TC. The Appeals Chamber may remit a factual issue 
to the original TC for consideration. Alternatively, the Appeals Chamber may order the 
presentation of new evidence before it, in which case it will have the powers of the TC. 
If the appeal against the decision or sentencing is made by the accused person, the 
decision may not be to the detriment of that person. The appeal might be rendered in 
the absence of the convicted or acquitted person.258 
Enforcement of sentence 
The sentence is served in a state designated by the Court from a list of States which 
have expressed their willingness to accept sentenced persons through signing of an 
Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences with the International Criminal Court. The 
placement is done taking into consideration inter alia: the principle that states shall 
share responsibility in enforcement of sentencing, the views of the accused, and 
nationality of the accused. If there is no state willing to accept the sentenced person, 
the sentence is to be served in the host state, the Netherlands, in line with the Host 
State Agreement.259 
Victim Reparations  
Reparation proceedings begin upon conviction. If the convicted person appeals against 
the conviction, the reparation and appeal proceedings run concurrently. 260 During 
                                            
257 Article 81 (3) of RS. 
258 Article 83 of RS. 
259 Article 103 of RS. 
260 See for example The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on the Defence request for 
an extension of time to file additional observations for reparations) ICC-01/05-01/08 (08 November 
2017). 
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reparation proceedings, the Court determines “the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims” after which the Court may make a direct 
order against the convicted person, or order that the award be made through the Trust 
Fund for Victims.261 Before making an order for reparations, the Court takes 
submissions from the convicted person, the victims and other interested parties like 
states. The reparations may be individual or collective but have so far been collective 
and symbolic.262  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began by discussing how international consensus on the need for 
prosecution of international crimes culminated in the establishment of the ICC. 
Although a significant segment of the international community agreed that there 
needed to be a permanent international criminal court, the nature of the court, its 
jurisdiction, its organs, its relationship with the UNSC and its procedure were highly 
contentious and heavily politicised. States Parties therefore made both political and 
legal compromises to establish the ICC which attempts to accommodate the wishes of 
all States Parties. On a procedural level, the result of this compromise was the creation 
of a new model, based on principles from civil law and common law systems as well 
as best practices from preceding ad hoc international criminal tribunals. The result is 
the establishment of a new procedural law at the ICC on all levels from investigation to 
appeals with the additional features of active victim participation and reparation.  
Regarding admission of guilt, the Rome Statute combines civil law and common law 
best practices as well as lessons from the ICTY, for example the Erdemović case 
mentioned above. Article 65 of the Rome Statute was utilised in the Al Mahdi case 
where a plea agreement entered between the Defence and the Prosecutor was 
accepted by the Chamber and a conviction was entered on that basis. The Chamber 
considered the guilty plea to be a mitigating factor because it had helped to 
expeditiously resolve the case thereby saving the Court’s time and resources. This 
shows that plea agreements fit into the ideological, structural and procedural 
                                            
261 Article 75 of RS. 
262 See for example, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Information regarding Collective 
Reparations) ICC-01/04-01/06 (13 February 2017) where of the Court ordered collective symbolic 
reparations .  
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framework of the ICC and a plea negotiation regime may be a beneficial addition to the 
Court’s framework.   
The next chapter will deal with the problems facing the ICC; problems which inform the 
question of whether plea negotiation may be a potential procedural solution. The sui 
generis nature of the ICC procedure discussed in this chapter makes the proceedings 
very complex, lengthy, and expensive. Also, as has been shown, politics influence 
critical issues at the ICC and this is a challenge since the ICC depends on the 
cooperation of States Parties for the collection of evidence, the arrest and surrender of 








CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
 3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two discussed procedural law at the ICC which is a sui generis international 
criminal procedure with unique characteristics; differing significantly from the criminal 
procedure in national jurisdictions and that of preceding international criminal tribunals. 
This chapter discusses the challenges facing the ICC, many of which arise from the 
unique nature of the procedural law. The challenges faced at the ICC may be classified 
into at least three categories: legal and procedural challenges, challenges of a political 
nature, and difficulties in implementing the victim participation and reparation regime.  
These challenges will be discussed in this chapter as follows: part 2 deals with the 
legal and procedural challenges such as the complexity of ICC proceedings, lengthy 
trials and the technical disclosure regime. Part 3, discusses political challenges such 
as the Africa-ICC problem, state cooperation with the ICC, and political 
instrumentalization of the Court. Part 4 of this chapter discusses the challenges faced 
in the implementation of the new victim participation and reparation regime. The 
objective of this chapter is to assist in answering the main question of the dissertation, 
that is whether plea negotiation may be a potential solution to the challenges facing 
the ICC. 
3.2 Legal and procedural challenges 
3.2.1 Complexity of proceedings 
Most of the literature in existence concerning complexity of proceedings relates to civil 
trials in the USA263 and are not necessarily applicable to international criminal trials. 
However, there are three forms of complexity emerging from literature which are also 
applicable to the ICC and these are: legal complexity, factual complexity and 
                                            
263 See for example Jay Tidmarsh, ‘Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits 
of Judicial Power’ (1992) 60 The George Washington Law Review 1683 and Jeffrey W Stempel, ‘A More 
Complete Look at Complexity’ (1998) 40 Arizona Law Review 781. 
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participant complexity.264 First, legal complexity arises from the law which the court has 
to rely on to reach a decision.265 The law is considered complex if: for example, it is 
dense (marked by the presence of many overlapping rules);266 difficult to ascertain (has 
numerous sources therefore it is difficult to ascertain which laws to apply); and is very 
technical (requires special expertise).267 Secondly, factual complexity arises where the 
information required to arrive at a decision is voluminous, technical, layered or difficult 
to determine.268 Finally, participant complexity refers to the complication introduced by 
the participants in the proceedings such as judges, the Prosecutor, defence lawyers, 
the accused person, witnesses, and victims among others.269 Considering the above 
definition of complexity, the ICC system is complex on all three levels, legal, factual, 
and participant complexity, as illustrated below. 
 Legal complexity 
First, the ICC is legally complex since the applicable law is dense and consists of a 
plethora of norms found in numerous sources. In the first place, the Court applies the 
Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the RPE.270 These mandatory sources are 
supplemented by other guidelines found in the Regulations of the Court, Regulations 
of the Registry, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, as well as other ancillary 
instruments such as treaties drafted by the ASP.271 In the second place, the Court 
applies applicable treaties as well as rules and principles of international law including 
the principles of international law of armed conflict.272 In the third place, the Court may 
also apply general principles of law from national jurisdictions including the laws of the 
state that would normally have jurisdiction over the crimes in question.273 Furthermore, 
                                            
264 Stuart Ford, ‘Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts’ (2014) 29 Emory 
International Law Review 2. (He discusses the application of these three types of complexity to the 
ICTY). 
265 Ford (n 264) 13. 
266 Ford (n 264) 13. 
267 Ford (n 264) 13. 
268 Ford (n 264) 13. 
269 Ford (n 264) 13. 
270 Article 21 (1) (a) of RS. 
271 See discussion of these instruments in part 1.3 of this dissertation. 
272 Article 21 (1) (b) of RS. 
273 Article 21 (1) (c) of RS. 
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the Court may also apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions.274 
Apart from the fact that the applicable law at the ICC is contained in numerous sources, 
it is also very technical. This is because it is a sui generis body of law; consisting of a 
blend of civil and common law norms, as well as norms formulated from best practices 
at the ad hoc tribunals, and innovative provisions resulting from the negotiation 
between states.275 Another layer of complexity is added by the somewhat uncertain 
nature of the law at the ICC created by the fact that the drafters of the Rome Statute 
left many aspects of the procedural law for the ICC judges to clarify.276 For example, 
Kress argues that the drafters used the diplomatic concept of constructive ambiguity 
on “strategically important points”. This means that “the shaping of the overall 
architecture of the ICC proceedings has been left to the judges.”277 Since its 
establishment the judges have refined the procedure at the ICC and established 
guidelines to make the procedure more streamlined.278 However, there are still many 
aspects of the law that needs clarification for example the victim participation and 
reparation regime, discussed below.279 
 
 
                                            
274 Article 21 (2) of RS. 
275 See discussion in part 2.2.4 of this dissertation. 
276 See discussion in part 2.2.4 of this dissertation. 
277 Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique 
Compromise Symposium: On Some of the Legal Problems the ICC Is Currently Facing’ (2003) 1 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 603, 605–606. 
278 See for example the ‘Chambers Practice Manual, February 2016’ (n 22). It is a document that was 
first formulated by PTC judges reflecting on the best practices during the pre-trial stage of proceedings 
at the ICC. It was later updated to include other stages of the proceedings with the aim of improving the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Court. See also ‘Guidelines Governing the Relations between 
the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units of the Court and Counsel Working with 
Intermediaries’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/GRCI-Eng.pdf> accessed 16 February 2018. This was 
passed after the many challenges experienced by the Chamber with regard to the participation of 
intermediaries in the proceedings since the use of intermediaries was neither provided for the Rome 
Statute nor in the RPE. 
279 See discussion in part 3.4 below. 
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Legal and factual complexity 
Charges, which are the basis of ICC cases, are governed by rules which are both 
legally and factually complex. A charge, in the ICC context, comprises of facts and 
legal characterization of those facts.280 Before the pre-trial hearing, the Prosecutor is 
obligated to provide the person charged with the document containing the charges 
(DCC) upon which the prosecution intends to rely.281 The DCC contains (i) the name 
of the person and other identifying information, (ii) a statement of the facts which 
provide a legal and factual basis to bring the person to trial, and (iii) the legal 
characterisation of the facts according to the definition of the crimes and the modes of 
liability in the Rome Statute.282 Before confirmation of charges, the Prosecutor may 
amend the charges with authorisation of the PTC after having informed the person 
charged.283 Technically, after the charges are confirmed and the case is transferred to 
a TC, the TC cannot amend the charges. 
However, according to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, the TC may 
amend the legal characterisation of the facts “without exceeding the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.”284 If, at 
any time during the trial, it appears to the TC that it might be necessary to change the 
characterisation of the facts, the TC is required to give notice to the participants.285 The 
TC is also required, after hearing the evidence and at an appropriate stage, to allow 
the participants to make submissions on the proposed re-characterization of the facts. 
If necessary, the TC may suspend the proceedings to allow the participants adequate 
time and facilities to prepare and may also order a hearing to consider all arguments 
related to the proposed change.286 
Regulation 55 is a novel provision in international criminal law, which did not exist in 
the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, therefore its interpretation is a source of continuous 
                                            
280 Regulation 52 of the Regulations of the Court (RoC). 
281 Article 61 of RS. 
282 Regulation 52 of the ROC. 
283 Article 61 (9) of RS. 
284 Regulation 55 of the RoC. 
285 Regulation 55 (2) of the RoC 
286 Regulation 55 (2-3) of the RoC. 
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controversy leading to lengthy litigation at the ICC.287 For example, in the Lubanga 
case TC I, by majority, gave notice of the likelihood to re-characterize the facts of the 
case.288 In the decision giving notice, the Majority in TC I, held that regulation 55 
provides for two distinct procedures for the change of the legal characterization of facts 
which apply at two different stages of the proceedings: during the final judgment under 
Article 74 of the Rome Statute and at any time during the trial. In this regard, the 
Majority argued that when re-characterization was done during the issuance of an 
Article 74 judgment, the Chamber was obliged not to exceed the facts and 
circumstances of the charges. However, they continued, if re-characterization occurred 
during the trial, the Chamber could exceed the facts and circumstances of the charges; 
so long as the rights of the accused person were respected.289  
Both the defence and prosecution sought leave to appeal against the decision; TC I 
granted leave and adjourned the submission of evidence pending the determination of 
the matter on appeal.290 The Appeals Chamber rejected the interpretation of TC I and 
held that, while the TC had the authority to change the legal characterization of the 
facts, Regulation 55 did not allow for the change to exceed the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges.291 In other words, while the TC interpreted Regulation 55 to 
contain two distinct procedures, with different requirements, the Appeals Chamber 
determined that it contained a single unified procedure.  
                                            
287 Joyce Aluoch, ‘Ten Years of Trial Proceedings at the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 12 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 433, 440. 
288 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the 
legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court) ICC-01/04-01/06-2049 (14 July 2009) [35]. 
289 Lubanga (Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the 
facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court) (n 
288) paras 27–29.  
290 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision adjourning the evidence in the case and 
consideration of Regulation 55) ICC-01/04-01/06-2143 (2 October 2009) [22].  
291The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled ‘Decision giving notice to the 
parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in 
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court’) 8 December 2009 [88]. 
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Secondly, on one hand, TC I held that if the change occurred during the trial, a TC had 
the power to change the legal characterisation of the facts in a manner that exceeded 
the facts and circumstances of the confirmed charges. On the other hand, the Appeals 
Chamber held that under no circumstances could a TC change the legal 
characterisation of the facts to exceed the facts and circumstances of the charges. The 
fact that the Appeals Chamber’s decision was significantly different from that of the 
Majority in TC 1 shows how complex and controversial this issue is. 
A further example of the complexity of Regulation 55 is demonstrated by its application 
in the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo.292 In this case TC II by majority, judge Van den 
Wyngaert dissenting, issued a notice to the participants of its intention to change the 
legal characterization of the charges with regard to the modes of liability of Mr Katanga. 
The notice was issued at the deliberation stage of the case when all the evidence had 
been heard and the presentation of evidence was closed. Both Mr Katanga and Mr 
Ngudjolo had given evidence in support of their respective cases. While deliberating 
on the evidence given by Mr Katanga, the Majority in TC II decided that the mode of 
participation of Mr Katanga could be classified differently, to include Article 25 (3) (d) 
(ii), in addition to Article 25 (3) (a),293 the latter which had been confirmed by the 
PTC.294 
Since this re-characterization did not affect Mr Ngudjolo, TC II by the same decision 
severed the cases against the two accused persons and scheduled a date for the 
                                            
292 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the implementation of 
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA (21 November 2012).  
293 Article 25 of RS provides for the modes of liability for crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Article 
25 (3) (a) provides that a person shall be liable if the s/he: “[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an 
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible”. While articles 25 (3) (d) provides that a person shall be liable if s/he: “In any 
other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with 
the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge 
of the intention of the group to commit the crime.” 
294 Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (n 292) para 9. 
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issuance of the Article 74 judgment against Mr Ngudjolo.295 The Majority 
acknowledged that changing the legal characterization of the charges at the 
deliberation stage might call into question the impartiality of the judges; since it 
appeared like they were already convinced of Mr Katanga’s guilt and were therefore 
seeking to convict him at all costs.296 They also admitted that the deliberation regarding 
Mr Katanga’s liability under Article 25 (3) (a) was “already well under way”; but stressed 
that the decision to re-characterize his liability to include Article 25 (3) (d) (ii)  was 
reached after a careful consideration of the evidence.297  
Judge Van den Wyngaert dissented to the Majority decision and held inter alia that the 
change proposed by the Majority exceeded the facts and circumstances of the charges 
thereby contravening regulation 55.298 She further held that the change violated the 
fair trial rights of Mr Katanga since the mode of liability under Article 25 (3) (d) (ii), 
which the Majority sought to introduce, is very different from the one under Article 25 
(3) (a) which had been confirmed by the PTC.299 Furthermore, she held that the 
decision further infringed the right of the accused person because of the appearance 
of partiality and bias arising from the fact that the notice was given at such a late stage 
after TC II had examined the evidence.300 This, she argued, gave the impression that 
the Majority would have acquitted Mr Katanga with regard to liability under Article 25 
(3) (a), and therefore decided to change the mode liability to Article 25 (3) (d) (ii) to 
enable a conviction.301 
                                            
295 Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (n 292) para 63. 
296 Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (n 292) para 19. 
297 Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (n 292) para 19. 
298 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the implementation of 
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA (21 November 
2012). 
299 Katanga and Ngudjolo (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) (n 298) para 1. 
300 Katanga and Ngudjolo (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) (n 298) para 30. 
301  Katanga and Ngudjolo (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) (n 298) para 31.  
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On appeal, there were three major questions before the Appeals Chamber: one, 
whether the timing of the notice, being that it was given at the deliberation stage, was 
in line with regulation 55; two, whether the notice of the TC was within the scope of 
regulation 55 in other words whether the facts and circumstances of the charges had 
been exceeded; and, three, whether the fair trial rights of Mr Katanga had been 
violated.302 On the issue of the timing, the Appeals Chamber unanimously held that the 
phrase “at any time during the trial” in regulation 55 (2) meant that notice could indeed 
be given at any time, including at the deliberation stage.303 The Appeal’s Chamber, 
however, pointed out that it would be preferable to give notice as early as possible.304  
On the question of the scope of the notice, the Majority held that it was not immediately 
apparent that the proposed re-characterization exceeded the facts and circumstances 
of the charges.305 They concluded, in this regard, that the question could only be 
conclusively determined after the TC had issued the final judgment under Article 74 of 
the Rome Statute.306 Lastly, on the issue of the fair trial rights, the Majority held that 
the question was premature since at that moment the Appeals Chamber was not in a 
position to determine whether the proposed re-characterization would lead to a 
violation of Mr Katanga’s right to fair trial.307 The Majority dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the TC II’s decision.308  
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Cuno Tarfusser agreed with the Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber on the issue of the timing of the notice.309 However, he strongly disagreed 
                                            
302 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the 
decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled ‘Decision on the implementation of regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) ICC-01/04-
01/07-3363 (21 March 2013) [10]. 
303 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) para 17.  
304 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) para 24. 
305 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) para 54. 
306 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) paras 44–47. 
307 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) para 91. 
308 Katanga (Regulation 55 Appeals Chamber decision) (n 302) para 106. 
309 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the 
decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled ‘Decision on the implementation of regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (Dissenting 
opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) ICC-01/04-01/07-3363 (21 March 2013) [10]. 
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with the Majority on the scope of the application of regulation 55 and stated that the 
TC II had interpreted regulation 55 in a manner that was too broad.310 In his opinion, 
regulation 55 could only be applied to re-characterize modes of  liability from Article 25 
to Article 28,311 and vice versa, but could not be applied to change from one form of 
participation to another listed within Article 25.312 He added that the application of the 
modes of liability under Article 25 was a contentious issue, and the fact that TC II 
sought to change from one form of participation to another, within Article 25, added a 
layer of unpredictability and uncertainty to the proceedings.313 
On the issue of the right to fair trial, Judge Tarfusser held that the right of Mr Katanga 
to be informed in detail of the nature, cause, and content of the charges had been 
infringed.314 In his opinion this was because the Majority in TC II failed to provide 
sufficient detail upon which the re-characterization would be based to enable Mr 
Katanga sufficiently prepare his defence.315 He concluded that, unlike the Majority of 
the Appeals Chamber which had upheld the TC II decision, he would have reversed it 
and ordered TC II to enter an Article 74 judgment against Mr Katanga at the same time 
as Mr Ngudjolo, on the basis of the evidence heard.316 
In the final judgment, the Majority in TC II, Judge van den Wyngaert dissenting, indeed 
modified the charges against Mr Katanga as earlier notified and found him guilty under 
Article 25 (3) (d) (ii), a mode which had been introduced via regulation 55.317 It is 
noteworthy that the Chamber unanimously held that the OTP had not established Mr 
Katanga’s guilt under Article 25 (3) (a) as confirmed by the PTC.318 It can, therefore, 
be argued that without the re-characterization of charges at the deliberation stage, 
                                            
310 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) para 19. 
311 Articles 25 and 28 provide for different forms of liability - article 25 which provides for individual 
criminal responsibility while article 28 provides for command responsibility. 
312 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) paras 10–11. 
313 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) paras 15–16. 
314 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) para 22. 
315 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) para 27. 
316 Katanga (dissenting opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser) (n 309) para 28. 
317 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-
01/07-3436-tENG (7 March 2014) [1696]. 
318 Katanga (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute) (n 317) para 1421. 
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through which the Majority in TC II introduced mode of liability under Article 25 (3) (d) 
(ii), Mr Katanga would have been acquitted.  
The above discussion demonstrates how the regime governing re-characterization of 
charges at the ICC is not only important but also factually and legally complex. TC II 
could not reach an agreement on the application of regulation 55 to Katanga and Judge 
Van den Wyngaert, while dissenting, expressed the view that the Majority in TC II had 
violated the fair trial rights of Mr Katanga. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber failed to 
reach consensus, with Judge Cuno Tarfusser dissenting and opining that the 
application of regulation 55 by TC II, which was upheld by the Appeals Chamber, had 
violated Mr Katanga’s right to be informed of the charges. The controversy surrounding 
this regulation continues as evidenced by its application in Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo 
(Bemba) where the TC gave notice of the likelihood to re-characterize the charges to 
include an additional form of liability under Article 28 (a) (i).319 The Trial Chamber 
indeed re-characterized the charges as notified, and Mr Bemba was eventually found 
guilty by the Trial Chamber under Article 28 (a) (i) as modified. However, this decision 
was later reversed by the Appeals Chamber.320 
The Chamber has also given notice of the possibility of re-characterization of the 
charges against Mr Gbagbo.321 However, this did not materialise and Mr Gbagbo was 
eventually acquitted by the TC, a decision which has been appealed against by the 
Prosecutor. 
                                            
319The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision giving notice to the parties and participants 
that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) 
of the Regulations of the Court) ICC-01/05-01/08-2324 (21 September 2012) [5]. The modification 
introduced the “ought to have known” requirement; meaning that Mr Bemba ought to have known that 
the forces in his command were committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
320 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”)   ICC-01/05-01/08-
3636-Red (8 June 2018). 
321 The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Decision Giving Notice Pursuant to 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court) ICC-02/11-01/15-185 (19 August 2015). 
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Regulation 55 remains a hotly contested provision not only among judges, as seen in 
the differing opinions above,322 but also among scholars.323 This further shows how the 
both legally and factually complex the law and procedure at the ICC are. 
Participant complexity 
The term “parties” is generally used at the ICC to refer to the prosecution and the 
defence while “participants” is used to refer to the victims authorised to participate 
through their legal representatives.324 The term “participants” is sometimes also used 
to refer to the prosecution, the defence and the victims participating in the 
proceedings.325 In this section, however, a wider meaning of the term participant is 
taken and this includes intermediaries, since they sometimes act on behalf of organs 
of the Court or counsel, as illustrated below. The core legal texts of the Court do not 
provide for the participation of intermediaries but in practice the organs of the Court 
and Counsel often rely on intermediaries’ assistance in the field.326 This prompted the 
Court to establish Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and 
Intermediaries to regulate such interactions.327 These guidelines define an 
                                            
322 See also the opinion of Judge Joyce Alouch on this issue at Aluoch (n 287) 437. 
323 Göran Sluiter and others, International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (OUP Oxford 2013) 
433. 
324 See Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge - Presented by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’ (2011) 
44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475, 483. (while discussing the participatory 
regime of victims at the ICC, she states that article 68 of the Rome Statute implies that victims are 
“participants” and not “parties”) 
325 See, for example, regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court which stipulates that: “if it appears to 
the Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give 
notice to the participants of such a possibility and having heard the evidence, shall, at an appropriate 
stage of the proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make oral or written submissions” 
[emphasis added]. Generally, regulation 55 notices are given to the defence, prosecution, and victims 
as seen for example in Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) (n 292).  
326 Aluoch (n 287) 443. (She explains how the ICC, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, often operates in regions 
where conflict is ongoing which necessitates the use of intermediaries to locate and contact witnesses 
and to improve the security of staff).   
327 ‘Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units 
of the Court and Counsel Working with Intermediaries’ (n 278). 
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intermediary as a person who, or organisation which: “facilitates contact or provides a 
link between one of the organs or units of the Court or Counsel on the one hand, and 
victims, witnesses, beneficiaries of reparations and/or affected communities more 
broadly on the other.”328 
These guidelines were adopted in line with the challenges faced by the Court regarding 
the role and supervision of intermediaries and were later revised in line with the 
concerns raised in the final judgment in Lubanga.329 In this case, the defence 
requested a permanent termination of the case and the immediate release of the 
accused based on an alleged grave misconduct by the Prosecutor and the 
intermediaries acting on behalf to the Prosecutor.330 The defence alleged that: 1) 
intermediaries working on behalf of the prosecution had intentionally solicited false 
information aimed at the conviction of the accused; 2) the prosecution submitted the 
erroneous statements produced by said intermediaries without properly investigating 
to confirm veracity and reliability; 3) the prosecution deliberately concealed from the 
defence information which  could seriously undermine the credibility of the 
intermediaries or the reliability of their testimony.331 
In response to the defence’s allegations, the prosecution admitted to having used 
intermediaries in the “hostile environments” within the DRC to improve the security of 
witnesses and staff.332 However, the prosecution insisted that the intermediaries were 
only used to locate and contact witnesses and did not otherwise play a decisive role in 
the investigation process.333 The prosecution denied all the allegations of the defence 
                                            
328 ‘Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units 
of the Court and Counsel Working with Intermediaries’ (n 278) 5. 
329 See The Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) [101–215]. (where the Chamber discusses the creditability of the 
intermediaries and the issues arising therefrom). 
330 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the 
Proceedings) ICC-01/04-01/06--2657-tENG-Red (10 December 2010). 
331 Lubanga (Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings) (n 330) paras 20–23. 
332 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s « Requête de 
la Défense aux fins d’arrêt définitif des procédures ») ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-Red (31 January 2011) 
[14]. 
333 Lubanga (Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s « Requête de la Défense aux fins d’arrêt définitif 
des procédures ») (n 332) paras 16–17. 
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asserting that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and that the question of credibility 
of witnesses, or reliability of evidence was an issue to be decided by the Chamber in 
the final judgment.334  
The Chamber dismissed the defence’s request for permanent termination of the case 
holding that the defence’s allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, “even taken at its 
highest, would not justify staying the case”.335 The Chamber stated that it would decide 
on the impact of the involvement of the intermediaries and the allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct in due course.336 In the final judgment, the Chamber held that 
the prosecution had delegated its investigative duties to intermediaries in a manner 
that was inappropriate.337 Three of the intermediaries acting on behalf of the 
prosecution were not sufficiently supervised and therefore the testimony of the 
witnesses who had been contacted by these intermediaries could not be “safely relied 
on”.338  
Similarly, the Chamber found that the prosecution had been negligent in failing to verify 
evidence produced through the involvement of these intermediaries before presenting 
the same before the Chamber. As a result of this negligence, the Chamber had spent 
a significant amount of time “investigating the circumstances of a substantial number 
of individuals whose evidence was, at least in part, inaccurate or dishonest.”339 
Moreover, the Chamber found that due to the negligence of the prosecution, it was 
likely that the intermediaries took advantage of the witnesses they contacted who, 
because of their youth and exposure to conflict, were susceptible to manipulation.340 
This is merely one example among others where the use of intermediaries has been 
contentious. In Bemba, for example, the extent to which intermediaries had assisted in 
the applications for victims seeking to participate in trial was the subject of litigation 
                                            
334 Lubanga (Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s « Requête de la Défense aux fins d’arrêt définitif 
des procédures ») (n 332) para 183. 
335 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Redacted Decision on the Public ‘Defence Application 
Proceedings’) ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 (7 March 2011) [197]. 
336 Lubanga (Redacted Decision on the Public ‘Defence Application Proceedings’) (n 335) para 197. 
337 Lubanga (article 74 judgment) (n 329) para 482. 
338 Lubanga (article 74 judgment) (n 329) para 482. 
339 Lubanga (article 74 judgment) (n 329) para 482. 
340 Lubanga (article 74 judgment) (n 329) para 482. 
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between the parties.341 This led the Chamber to order the Victims Participation and 
Reparations Section to re-interview all the victims seeking to participate, who had been 
interviewed by questionable intermediaries, in order to verify the information 
provided.342 These examples demonstrate the complexity of the challenges facing the 
Court as a result of the involvement of intermediaries in the proceedings. 
3.2.2 Disclosure 
The Prosecutor has the duty to disclose to the defence all the material in his/her 
possession which is relevant to the preparation of the defence case and/or which tend 
to prove the innocence of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the 
credibility of the prosecution’s evidence.343 Besides, the prosecution is required to 
perform its disclosure obligations as soon as practical and on a continuous basis.344 
Disclosure in one of the sources of continuous litigation between parties at the ICC.345 
This occurs on at least three areas: the first is the timeliness of the disclosure, where 
the defence often contends that the disclosure is not timely. This occurred for example 
in the Kenyatta case where a late addition of five witnesses resulted in a stay of the 
proceedings.346  
The second scenario occurs when the prosecution withholds or otherwise delays the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence, that is material which prove the innocence of the 
accused or weaken the prosecution’s case. For example, in Kenyatta, following the 
defence’s application, the Chamber reprimanded the prosecution for its failure to timely 
disclose to the defence an affidavit produced by a prosecution witness which contained 
                                            
341 The Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo (Public redacted version of “Decision on the tenth and 
seventeenth transmissions of applications by victims to participate in the proceedings”) ICC-01/05-
01/08-2247-Red (19 July 2011) [10–21]. 
342 Bemba (Public redacted version of “Decision on the tenth and seventeenth transmissions of 
applications by victims to participate in the proceedings”) (n 341) para 28. 
343 See article 67 (2) of RS and rule 77 of the RPE. 
344 ‘Chambers Practice Manual, February 2016’ (n 22) 10. 
345 See Xavier-Jean Keïta, ‘Disclosure of Evidence in the Law and Practice of the ICC’ (2016) 16 
International Criminal Law Review 1018 (He discusses in detail the regime governing disclosures at the 
ICC and the cases to illustrate the contentious nature of this issue). 
346 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) 
and Related Requests) ICC-01/09-02/11-728 (26 April 2013) [4–7]. 
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exculpatory evidence.347 Similarly in Lubanga the Prosecution entered into 
confidentiality agreements, according to Article 54 of the Rome Statute,348 with certain 
information providers and declined to disclose the information received to the defence. 
Upon an application by the defence, the Chamber held that the prosecution had 
wrongly used Article 54 and that withholding confidential information from the defence 
constituted a breach of the rights of the accused. 349 The Chamber, therefore, decided 
to stay the proceedings, a decision which was upheld by the Appeal’s Chamber.350  
The third area of contention, regarding disclosures, relates to victim participation in 
disclosure proceedings. Generally, the victim participation regime at the ICC permits 
victims to participate in trials to present their views and concerns.351 Additionally, 
according to the ICC jurisprudence, victims participating in the proceedings “may be 
permitted to tender and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist it 
in the determination of the truth, and if in this sense the Court has ‘requested’ the 
evidence”.352  The question then arises as to whether victims, if allowed to tender 
evidence and examine witnesses, should be subject to the disclosure regime 
applicable to the parties. 353 The Appeal’s Chamber held, in this regard, that: “if the 
Trial Chamber decides that the evidence (from Victims) should be presented then it 
                                            
347 Kenyatta (Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests) (n 346) 
para 97. 
348  Article 54 (3) (e) provides that the Prosecutor may: “Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the 
proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality 
and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents.” 
349 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06 (13 June 2008) [93]. 
350 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the 
accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008’) ICC-
01/04-01/06-1486 (21 October 2008) [80]. 
351 Article 68 of RS. 
352 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on victims’ participation) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119 
(18 January 2008) [108]. 
353 See Keïta (n 345) 1044. 
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could rule on the modalities for the proper disclosure of such evidence before allowing 
it to be adduced.”354  
3.2.3 Lengthy proceedings 
As early as 1999, before the Court came into operation, there was concern about the 
complex nature of the procedural law and a prediction that this would delay the 
processes of investigation, prosecution and adjudication.355 The prediction turned out 
to be true as proceedings at the ICC take several years to be concluded. This happens 
for many reasons, for example, due to the complexity of the proceedings and 
disclosure complications which often lead to a stay in the proceedings as discussed 
above. Lengthy proceedings are also a result of the pre-trial stage conducted by the 
pre-trial chamber (PTC). As mentioned above, the drafters of the Rome Statute 
introduced the PTC, as a form of compromise, to protect the rights of the accused and 
to provide a mechanism for the judicial supervision of the Prosecutor.356 
To perform both functions, the PTC authorises the Prosecutor to conduct 
investigations, upon being convinced that there is reason to believe that crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court were committed; and confirms the charges when it is 
convinced that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person under 
investigation committed the crimes.357 In so doing, the PTC protects the rights of the 
person under investigation and supervises the exercise of prosecutorial powers. 
However, it also makes the proceedings very lengthy. For example, in the case against 
former President Laurent Gbagbo, the pre-trial phase lasted 925 days all of which he 
spent in ICC detention.358 
                                            
354 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on Appeal) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 (11 July 
2008) [100]. 
355 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 443. 
356 See part 2.4.2 of this dissertation. 
357 See part 2.4.3 of this dissertation. 
358 Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Dissenting opinion of judge Cuno Tarfusser) 
ICC-02/11-01/15-846-Anx (10 March 2017) [10]. The Dissenting judge argued that the accused ought 
to be provisionally released, inter alia, because his pre-trial detention had lasted much longer than that 
of other accused persons in the history of the ICC. 
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Another issue which contributes to lengthy proceedings is the language of the 
proceedings at the ICC. The official languages of the Court are English and French, 
but there is an additional requirement that the proceedings are conducted in a 
language which the accused fully understands.359 Therefore, after the confirmation of 
charges, the TC holds a status conference with the parties and participants to 
determine the language of the proceedings.360 If the language chosen is English or 
French, the proceedings are normally simultaneously translated to the other official 
language, for the Court’s record.361  
However, sometimes the proceedings have to be translated to two or three other 
languages apart from English and French. For example, in  the case of Banda and 
Jerbo the language most fully understood by the two accused persons was 
Zaghawa.362  This was further complicated by the fact that Zaghawa is not a written 
language and it consists of about 5000 words, therefore, many legal terms have no 
equivalents in this language.363 The judges, therefore, had to come up with innovative 
ways to attempt to balance the right of the accused persons to an expeditious trial and 
the right to be tried in a language they fully understood.364 This language complication 
adds to the length of the proceedings. 
3.3 Political challenges 
The organs of the Court often assert that the ICC is an exclusively judicial institution 
which is apolitical in nature.365 However, many commentators opine that the ICC is 
intricately linked with politics on many levels, for example: the Rome Statute was 
                                            
359 Article 67 (f) of RS. 
360 Article 64 (3) (b). 
361 Regulation 39 of the RoC. 
362 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-
03/09. 
363Aluoch (n 287) 436. 
364 See for example The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo 
Jamus (Order on translation of witness statements) ICC-02/05-03/09-199 (16 August 2011) [3]. See also 
the opinion of the presiding judge of this case in Aluoch (n 287) 436–437. 
365 ‘Understanding the International Criminal Court’ 5 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf> accessed 22 March 2018. 
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created in a process which involved political bargains and compromises;366 the Court’s 
judges and Prosecutor are elected in political processes at the ASP;367 the Court 
exercises its jurisdiction in politically charged post war situations; and, the Court 
depends on the political will of States parties for the implementation of its decisions.368 
This part deals with three of the political challenges facing the Court namely: the 
apparent African bias, problems with state cooperation and the political 
instrumentalization of the Court by States. 
3.3.1 Apparent bias against Africa 
One of the perennial criticisms against the ICC concerns the Court’s apparent bias 
against Africa. All the 11 situations under investigation are African, except Georgia, 
which was commenced in 2016 after years of repeated criticism.369 In this regard, one 
commentator made the following statement: 
“Imagine if there were a criminal court in Britain which only ever tried black 
people, which ignored crimes committed by whites and Asians and only took an 
interest in crimes committed by blacks. We would consider that racist, right? 
And yet there is an International Criminal Court which only ever tries black 
people, African black people to be precise, and it is treated as perfectly 
normal.”370 
In the same vein, since 2009 the African Union (AU) has been issuing decisions 
condemning ICC’s focus on Africa and urging States Parties not to cooperate with the 
ICC. The first AU decision on this issue called upon the UNSC to defer the case against 
former President Bashir according to Article 13 of the Rome Statute.371 The UNSC did 
                                            
366 See part 2.2.2 of this dissertation. 
367 See part 2.3.1 of this dissertation. 
368 See Sarah MH Nouwen and Wouter G Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 941, 944. (They 
discuss the effects of politics in the Uganda and Sudan situations at the ICC)  
369 The situations under investigation are Georgia, Burundi, Central African Republic I & II, Libya, Kenya, 
Darfur Sudan, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo. See ‘Situations’ (n 173). 
370 Brendan O’Neill, The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 2012 cited in Hoile (n 112) v. 
371 African Union, (AU Assembly), 'Decision on the Appointment of Members of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples' Rights'(Sirte 1-3 July 2009) Doc.EX.CL/533(XV) 
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not defer the case, and the AU reacted by issuing further decisions and resolutions, in 
January and July 2010, January and July 2011, January and July 2012; condemning 
the ICC’s involvement in Sudan and urging AU member states not to cooperate with 
the ICC. 372 
The situation exacerbated in 2013 when Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto, who at the time 
were facing trial for crimes against humanity at the ICC; were elected as President and 
Deputy President of Kenya respectively, despite the charges against them.373 The AU 
made a decision urging the ICC to withdraw the cases against the two; alternatively, 
the AU requested the UNSC to defer the cases.374 When this failed, the AU began to 
urge its members to collectively withdraw from the ICC. In October 2016, three African 
States Parties to the Rome Statute (Burundi,375 Gambia,376 and South Africa377) 
                                            
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9560-
assembly_en_1_3_july_2009_auc_thirteenth_ordinary_session_decisions_declarations_message_co
ngratulations_motion_0.pdf> accessed 21 February 2018. 
372 ‘African Union, (AU Assembly), Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and The International 
Criminal Court (ICC)1 - Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI) (Addis Ababa 26 - 27 May 2013)  
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI)’ para 4 <https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9654-
assembly_au_dec_474-489_xxi_e.pdf> accessed 21 February 2018. 
373 ‘How Kenyatta Scored Big against ICC’ (The Herald) <https://www.herald.co.zw/how-kenyatta-
scored-big-against-icc/> accessed 22 March 2018. 
374 ‘African Union, (AU Assembly), Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and The International 
Criminal Court (ICC)1 - Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI) (Addis Ababa 26 - 27 May 2013)  
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI)’ (n 371) para 5. 
375 Burundi announced its intention in October 2016 following the ICC’s decision to commence a 
preliminary examination in Burundi. Burundi’s withdrawal became effective a year later in October 2017 
see ‘Burundi’s Withdrawal from the ICC| African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice’ 
(Home | African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice) <https://www.icjafrica.com/single-
post/2017/10/27/Burundis-withdrawal-from-the-ICC> accessed 21 February 2018. 
376 Gambia announced its intention to withdraw in October 2016 during the post-election crisis in the 
country. However, in February 2017, this notice was reversed by a new president. See ‘Under New 
Leader, Gambia Cancels Withdrawal From International Criminal Court’ (NPR.org) 
<https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancels-
withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court> accessed 21 February 2018. 
377 South Africa issued a notice to withdraw in October 2016. However, the High Court held that this 
notice was unconstitutional and invalid since there had been no parliamentary approval and ordered the 
withdrawal thereof. See ‘Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and 
Others (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) (83145/2016) [2017] 
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declared their intention to withdraw from the ICC. In 2017, the AU formulated an official 
ICC Withdrawal Strategy which, inter alia, discusses the legal regime of withdrawal, 
including collective withdrawal; and examines the political and legal consequences 
thereof.378 In its January 2017 decision, the AU congratulated the African States which 
had made moves to withdraw from the ICC, while reiterating its commitment to the 
Withdrawal Strategy.379 
Whether true or not, the perception that the ICC is biased against Africa affects the 
legitimacy of the Court because justice must not only be done but it must also be seen 
to be done. As Max du Plessis and other scholars observe:  
“The perception of ICC bias against Africa and lack of consistency and fairness 
in the way the court is implementing international criminal justice may not 
correspond with the true reality, but it cannot be wished away by simply being 
ignored. There are real issues and concerns on both sides that need to be 
addressed in a serious, constructive and cooperative manner through honest 
dialogue”.380 
3.3.2 State cooperation 
States Parties have the general obligation to cooperate with the ICC in investigation 
and prosecution.381 The Court has the authority to make cooperation requests to States 
Parties and may also request non-party states to cooperate based on ad hoc 
cooperation agreements.382  The Court may also request cooperation and assistance 
                                            
ZAGPPHC 53; 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP); [2017] 2 All SA 123 (GP); 2017 (1) SACR 623 (GP) (22 February 
2017)’ para 77 <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.html> accessed 21 February 2018. 
378 African Union, (AU Assembly), 'Withdrawal Strategy Draft 2' January 2017 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf> 
accessed 20 February 2018. 
379 African Union, (AU Assembly), 'Decision on the International Criminal Court (ICC)' (Addis-Ababa 
January 2017) Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX) <https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/32520-
sc19553_e_original_-_assembly_decisions_621-641_-_xxviii.pdf> accessed 20 February 2018. 
380 Max Du Plessis, Tiyanjana Maluwa and Annie O’Reilly, ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’ 
(Chatham House 2013) <http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_3820_0.pdf>. 
381 Article 86 of RS. 
382 Article 87 (1) and (5) of RS.  
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from intergovernmental organisations.383 If a State Party to the Rome Statute fails to 
cooperate with the Court, the Court may make a finding to that effect and report the 
matter to the ASP or to the UNSC, the latter if the situation was referred to the Court 
by the UNSC.384 Because the Court has no enforcement mechanism of its own, States 
parties’ cooperation, is vital to its proper functioning.385  
However, States Parties have often refused to cooperate with the ICC based on factors 
which appear to be more political than legal. This is illustrated, for example, by States 
Parties’ response to the ICC request for the arrest and surrender of former President 
Bashir of Sudan to the ICC.386 Chad, for example, has been a State Party to the Rome 
Statute since 2007 and yet hosted (then) President Bashir in its territory five times after 
the ICC’s request for his arrest and surrender, and despite several reminders from the 
ICC.387 Interestingly, in July 2009, when the AU first made the decision not to cooperate 
with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of former President Bashir, Chad was the only 
country which entered a reservation to the decision,388 vowing to arrest him in fulfilment 
of its Rome Statute obligations.389  
At that time, however, there was political strife between President Déby of Chad and 
former President Bashir. The conflict commenced in 2005, when the Chadian town of 
Adre was attacked, followed by an attempt to oust President Déby in 2006 - he blamed 
former President Bashir for both attacks.390 Between the years 2005 to 2009 there was 
increased violence between Chad and Sudan, and many failed attempts to sign peace 
accords.391 It was in this context that Chad entered the reservation to the above-
                                            
383 Article 87 (6) of RS. 
384 Article 87 (7) of RS. 
385 Aluoch (n 287) 444. 
386 For a detailed discussion of the influence of politics on African States parties’ cooperation with the 
ICC see Oyugi (n 116). 
387 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision Requesting Observations on Omar Al-
Bashir’s Visit to the Republic of Chad) ICC-02/05-01/09-147 (22 February 2013) [10–12]. 
388 African Union, (AU Assembly) 'Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC)' (Sirte 1-3 July 2009) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) para 10. 
389 ‘Chad Urged to Execute Arrest Warrant against Sudanese Leader - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and 
Views on Sudan’ <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45845> accessed 22 March 2018. 
390 Oyugi (n 116) 113. 
391 Oyugi (n 116) 113–114. 
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mentioned AU decision and indicated its intention to arrest former President Bashir. A 
final peace accord was signed in 2010 which saw the cessation of violence between 
the two countries. Subsequently, Chad disregarded its cooperation obligation to the 
ICC and invited and hosted former President Bashir five times despite repeated calls 
for cooperation from the ICC.392 This illustrates the influence of politics on States 
Parties’ decision on whether to cooperate with the ICC.  Apart from Chad, other States 
parties to the Rome Statute, for example Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Jordan, Nigeria, and 
South Africa, among others, have refused to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and 
surrender of former President Bashir.393  
Consequently, the Prosecutor was forced to hibernate investigative activities in 
Darfur.394 In her statement to the UNSC on this issue, the Prosecutor decried the 
UNSC’s “lack of foresight” in dealing with the Darfur issue and urged for “a dramatic 
shift” in the UNSC’s approach to arresting persons accused of committing crimes in 
Darfur.395 Furthermore, the Prosecutor called upon all States and the UNSC “to find 
creative ways to support those amongst them that may be most vulnerable to planned 
visits by Mr. Omar Al Bashir or other individuals against whom warrants of arrest have 
been issued.”396 However, the Prosecutor’s plea has been in vain and the case remains 
hibernated. 
3.3.3 Political instrumentalization of the Court 
Since the coming to force of the Rome Statute, states and non-state actors have 
attempted to instrumentalise the Court to attain political ends. Commenting on this 
issue, the late ICC judge Kaul stated as follows:  
“There is a further phenomenon, a further challenging reality which can affect 
the Court’s international position or make its work the subject of international 
debate or even controversy: this concerns the temptation for some States, 
                                            
392 Oyugi (n 116) 114. 
393 See a detailed discussion of this in Oyugi (n 116) 105–116. 
394 Fatou Bensouda, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, 
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)’ (International Criminal Court 2014) para 4 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/stmt-20threport-darfur.pdf>. 
395 Bensouda (n 394) paras 4 and 13. 
396 Bensouda (n 394) para 13. 
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including powerful States and permanent members of the Security Council to 
somehow instrumentalise the Court, to use it for their political purposes and 
interests. As a former German Ambassador, who is now a Judge and Vice‐
President of the ICC I am neither blind nor naïve in this regard”397  
Furthermore, Nouwen and Werner opine that the place of the ICC as a criminal court 
with global reach, which embodies universal norms, makes it a powerful tool in 
international politics.398 They further explain that when the ICC declares that a 
person/group committed international crimes and labels the person/members of the 
group as war criminals, the group/person is generally viewed as an enemy of the 
international community or as the “enemy of humanity itself”.399 On the other hand, if a 
state or organisation cooperates with the ICC, it is seen as a friend of the ICC and 
therefore a friend of the international community by extension.400 The ICC’s 
involvement in the Northern Uganda situation illustrates the friend/enemy dichotomy. 
As discussed briefly in Chapter 2 above, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) had been involved in conflict for about 17 
years before the Government referred the situation to the ICC in 2004. Being that the 
situation in Northern Uganda was self-referred, the ICC could not be accused of 
infringing the sovereignty of Uganda; which made the situation perfect for the 
prosecution’s first investigation.401 However, the referral has been said to have been 
made as “part of a military strategy and international reputation campaign, rather than 
out of a conviction about law and justice.”402 In other words, it is widely believed that 
the referral was motivated by the desire of the Ugandan Government to intimidate the 
LRA, a rebellion which the government had not been able to quell for close to two 
                                            
397 See Hans‐Peter Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court – Current Challenges and Perspectives’ 
(Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law, 8 August 2011) 10 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740/010911salzburglawschool.pdf> 
accessed 9 February 2018. 
398 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 962. 
399 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 962. 
400 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 962. 
401 See Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 953.  
402 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 949. 
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decades; by turning the LRA into enemies, and the Ugandan government into a friend, 
of the international community.403  
In this regard, the Ugandan government seems to have been successful, because: 
one, the Prosecutor only indicted the LRA members and turned a blind eye on the 
alleged crimes of the UPDF; two, the Ugandan government secured permission to go 
into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in search of the LRA members; and, 
secured the assistance of the international community, namely the US, in looking for 
the LRA in Sudan.404 However, in 2006-2008 during the Juba talks,405 the Ugandan 
government sought to sign a peace treaty with the LRA, but the latter conditioned their 
cooperation on the withdrawal of the ICC cases.406 The Ugandan government 
attempted to resolve the stalemate by creating a domestic court to try the LRA 
members; but the ICC refused to withdraw the cases already instituted and, therefore 
both domestic and international cases continued simultaneously.407 The Ugandan 
government later withdrew its support for the ICC and has been contemplating 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute.408 This shows that Uganda supported the ICC when 
it helped solve the LRA problem, however, when the ICC cases became an impediment 
to the signing of a peace treaty, Uganda withdrew its support and has been pushing 
                                            
403 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 949; Adam Branch, ‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC 
Intervention’ 21 Ethics & International Affairs 179, 183. 
404 Nouwen and Werner (n 368) 950–951. 
405 Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA held in Juba, South Sudan aimed at 
restoring peace in Northern Uganda. 
406 Dylan Hendrickson and Kennedy Tumutegyereize, ‘Dealing with Complexity in Peace Negotiations: 
Reflections on the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Juba Talks’ (Conciliation Resources 2012) 
<http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6894~v~Dealing_with_Complexity_in_Peace_Neg
otiations__Reflections_on_the_Lord_s_Resistance_Army_and_the_Juba_Talks.pdf> accessed 22 
March 2018. 
407 Lino Owor Ogora, ‘How the Trial of Dominic Ongwen Has Shaped Attitudes toward International 
Criminal Justice in Uganda’ (Justice Hub, 18 August 2017) <https://justicehub.org/article/how-trial-
dominic-ongwen-has-shaped-attitudes-toward-international-criminal-justice-uganda> accessed 22 
March 2018. 
408 ‘Uganda’s Ambiguous Relationship with the ICC Amidst Ongwen’s Trial’ 
<https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/12/ugandas-ambiguous-relationship-with-the-icc-amidst-ongwens-
trial/> accessed 22 March 2018. 
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for withdrawal from the ICC.  This is one example of how states tend to use the ICC as 
an instrument to deal with political problems in their territories. 
3.4 Victim participation and reparation 
A victim is defined as a person who has suffered direct harm or an organisation which 
has sustained harm to its property as a result of the commission of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.409 Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute provides that victims shall 
be allowed to present their views and concerns on issues that affect their personal 
interest, while Article 75 provides that the Court shall establish a system for reparations 
which includes inter alia, compensation, restitution and rehabilitation. A number of 
sections/units have been established to deal with different aspects of victim 
participation and reparation: the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) 
which receives and processes the applications of victims who wish to participate;  the 
victims Witness Unit (VWU) which deals with the protection of victims who also appear 
as witnesses during the Court’s proceedings; the Office of Public Counsel for the 
Victims (OPCV) which provides legal counsel to victims; and, the Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV) which focuses on reparation.410 
Victims who wish to participate in the proceedings are invited to submit their 
applications through the VPRS.411 In some cases, thousands of victims make 
applications which are notified to the defence and prosecution who then present their 
views on whether these victims should be allowed to participate in the proceedings, 
according to Rule 89 of the RPE. However, most of the identifying details of the victims 
are redacted to avoid identification by the parties therefore the submissions made by 
the parties are often abstract.412 Upon receipt of the parties’ submissions, the judges 
analyse each victim application individually to determine which victims may be allowed 
to participate; they may accept or reject the applications.413  
                                            
409 Rule 85 of the RPE. 
410 ‘Victims’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/victims> accessed 22 March 2018. 
411 ‘Victims’ (n 410). 
412 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 482. 
413 The application may be rejected if the applicant does not satisfy the requirement of article 68 (3) of 
the RS. Victims whose applications are denied may apply to participate in another phase of the 
proceedings. See Rule 89 (2) of the RPE. 
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The victims permitted to participate in the proceedings are then represented by a 
common legal representative of victims (LRV).414 Since victims are only allowed to 
express their views and concerns when their personal interests are affected, the LRV 
often applies to the Chamber seeking permission to participate. The Chamber 
generally decides these issues on a case-by-case basis considering the views of the 
parties.415 Generally, the LRV makes submissions on various aspects of the trial, which 
the Chamber considers alongside those of the parties. Victims may also question the 
witnesses presented by the defence and prosecution and are also permitted to adduce 
evidence and to appear as witnesses independent of the prosecution and the 
defence.416 
The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), established under Article 79 of the Rome Statute, 
deals with issues of reparation parallel and simultaneous to the proceedings at the 
ICC. The TFV implements the reparation decisions made by the Court and offers 
physical and psychosocial rehabilitation and/or material support for the victims of 
crimes which are before the Court.417 The TFV is funded through fines and forfeitures 
of convicted persons as well as donations from states or individuals.418 In case of 
conviction, the ICC begins to consider the issues of reparation even if there is a 
pending appeal.419 There have so far been three reparation orders issued in Lubanga, 
Katanga and Al Mahdi.420 
The victim participation and reparation regime at the ICC is considered a breakthrough 
in the field of international criminal justice.421 This is because the statutes of the 
preceding international tribunals did not provide for victim participation, except as 
witnesses, nor did they provide for reparation; these regimes were believed to result in 
                                            
414 Rule 90 of the RPE. 
415 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 482. 
416 Lubanga (Decision on victims’ participation) (n 352) para 108. 
417 ‘Our Work | The Trust Fund for Victims’ <https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-
do/projects> accessed 22 March 2018. 
418 Article 79 (2) of RS; ‘Our Work | The Trust Fund for Victims’ (n 417). 
419 See for example ‘Bemba Case’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba> accessed 22 March 2018. 
420 ‘Reparation Orders | The Trust Fund for Victims’ <https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-
do/reparation-orders> accessed 22 March 2018. 
421 Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Cambridge University Press 2013) 292. 
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secondary victimization of victims.422 To remedy this deficiency, and to ensure the 
achievement of the rights of victims, the drafters of the Rome Statute incorporated the 
provisions of the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power.423 The principles incorporated in the legal texts of the ICC are 
aimed at achieving the procedural rights of victims for example – right to the truth, right 
to be informed and the right to reparations.424  
However, the challenges faced by this regime so far leads to questions whether victim 
participation and reparation at the ICC is meaningful or whether it is merely symbolic.425 
For example, in Lubanga, the Court ordered symbolic and service-based reparation 
which means that the individual victims participating in this case will not receive any 
personal reparation.426 In this regard, the TFV recommended, and the Chamber 
approved, the construction of three community centres to be used for the rehabilitation 
of former child soldiers to help with their reintegration into the society.427 The TFV is 
complimenting the reparation programme to an amount of one million euros. However, 
Mr Lubanga was declared indigent and at the time of writing, there had been no 
contributions earmarked for the reparation of victims in this case.428 The availability of 
funds could negatively affect the size and extent of a reparations award.429  
If the participation and reparation regime at the ICC turns out to be merely symbolic it 
would lead to secondary victimization of victims, which the ad hoc tribunals were 
accused of. Since the ICC has conducted extensive outreach programmes430 that may 
have raised victims’ hopes for meaningful participation and reparation, this could also 
                                            
422 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 494. 
423 UN General Assembly, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, 29 November 1985, A/RES/40/34 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm>. 
424 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 495. 
425 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 494–496.   
426 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Order for reparations) ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA  (3 
March 2015) [53]. 
427 ‘Reparation Orders | The Trust Fund for Victims’ (n 420). 
428 ‘Reparation Orders | The Trust Fund for Victims’ (n 420). 
429 ‘Reparation Orders | The Trust Fund for Victims’ (n 420). 
430 ‘Interacting with Communities Affected by Crimes’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/interacting-with-
communities> accessed 22 March 2018. 
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lead to the disillusionment of victims. To solve this problem, former ICC Judge Van den 
Wyngaert suggests that the rights of victims may be achieved better by separating 
victim participation and reparation from the criminal trial at the ICC, to be dealt with by 
a separate Trust Fund for Victims Reparations Commission.431 According to this view, 
this separation would ensure that reparations run concurrently with prosecution and 
therefore whether victims receive reparations is not determined by conviction. It would 
also save enormous resources - in terms of time and money - currently consumed by 
the attachment of victim participation and reparation regime at the ICC.432 The 
implementation of the victim participation and reparation regime in a manner which 
avoids the disillusionment of victims, while protecting the rights of the accused persons, 
is still “work in progress” at the ICC.433 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the challenges facing the ICC, most of which arise from its 
unique and novel legal structure and procedure. These challenges are varied and 
complex and have been discussed in three main categories that is: one, the legal and 
procedural challenges which include the complexity of the proceedings, the 
technicalities of disclosures and various factors leading to lengthy proceedings; two, 
political challenges such as the apparent bias against Africa, problems with state 
cooperation, as well as political instrumentalization of the Court; and three, challenges 
facing the implementation of the victim participation and reparation regime. The main 
objective of the chapter was to show an appreciation of some of the challenges facing 
the ICC, as a background to discussing whether plea negotiation may be a solution. 
The next chapter will analyse the use of plea negotiation in national jurisdictions. 
 
 
                                            
431 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 496. 
432 Van den Wyngaert (n 324) 496. 
433 Aluoch (n 287) 450. 
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CHAPTER 4: APPROACHES TO PLEA NEGOTIATION IN NATIONAL 
JURISDICTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 dealt with challenges facing the ICC as a step towards answering the main 
question of this dissertation – whether plea negotiation could be a solution to some of 
the challenges facing the Court. This chapter examines the approaches towards plea 
negotiation in selected national jurisdictions. The justification for this analysis is that 
plea negotiation, as practiced at international tribunals (the ICTY, ICTR and potentially 
the ICC), is informed by the practice of the same in national jurisdictions, where the 
practice originated.  The origins of formal plea bargaining are Anglo-American and 
therefore the practice is more prevalent in common law jurisdictions. However, as legal 
systems continue to interact and evolve, certain aspects of plea negotiation have been 
adapted by some civil law jurisdictions as discussed below.  
This chapter aims to look at plea negotiation as practiced in the selected common law 
systems and the variations of the practice which have been introduced in some civil 
law systems. The comparison between common law and civil law practices is essential, 
because, as discussed in Chapter two of this dissertation, the criminal procedure at 
the ICC is informed by practices from both legal systems, creating a sui generis 
criminal procedure. This chapter contains six parts including this introduction. Part two 
deals with the definition, origin and justification of the plea negotiation as well as the 
reason for development of plea negotiation in various jurisdictions. Part three analyses 
some of the salient features of negotiated justice in four jurisdictions: Kenya, South 
Africa, France and Germany. 
These countries were chosen because: one, even though they have separate legal 
cultures, South Africa and Kenya are both common law jurisdictions while France and 
Germany are civil law jurisdictions, they are representative of comparative legal 
systems globally; two, since they are all states parties to the Rome Statute, they are 
representative of the legal systems at the Assembly of States Parties. Furthermore, 
South Africa and Germany both played important roles in the drafting of the Rome 
Statute as members of the Like-Minded Group. Therefore, the criminal procedures of 
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these four countries are relevant to the development of ICC jurisprudence and legal 
culture. 
Part four is a comparative analysis of plea negotiation in the four jurisdictions on five 
thematic areas: prosecutorial discretion versus compulsory prosecution and how each 
impacts on plea negotiation; the role of the prosecution, defence, judges and victims 
in negotiation and entering a plea agreement; the bargain with serious crimes; the 
types of bargains in each jurisdiction – sentence bargain versus charge bargain; and, 
the effect of admission of guilt.   Part five deals with a critique of plea negotiation – 
pointing out its advantages, that is the economics of plea negotiation, on one hand; 
and its limitations on the other hand. Part six deals with the chapter conclusions. 
4.2 Development and justification of plea negotiation 
4.2.1 Definition and scope  
Plea bargaining is a controversial term and it follows that there is no universally 
accepted definition of it. In the United States of America (US),434 plea bargaining is 
understood as negotiation, between the prosecution and the defence, which lead to 
the accused person waiving the right to trial, and self-convicting via a guilty plea; in 
exchange for some concession, usually in the form of an amendment of the charge to 
a lesser one, dropping of additional charges or reduction of the sentence.435 However, 
the practice, even in common law jurisdictions, is not uniform; and there are common 
law countries which avoid the term plea bargaining altogether, preferring to use terms 
such as plea negotiation in Australia, resolution discussions in Canada, and plea 
                                            
434 About 90% of criminal cases in both state and federal courts in the US are resolved by way of plea 
bargaining, making the US an authority in the practice. See Donald J Newman, Conviction: The 
Determination of Guilt or Innocence without Trial (Little, Brown 1966) 3; see also Peet M Bekker, ‘Plea 
Bargaining in the United States of America and South Africa’ (1996) 29 Comparative and International 
Law Journal of Southern Africa 168, 169–170.  
435 See for example Albert Alschuler, ‘Plea Bargaining and Its History’ (1979) 79 Columbia Law Review 
1, 3 (the author defines plea bargaining as “the exchange of official concessions for defendant’s act of 
self-conviction.”); see also George Fisher, ‘Plea Bargaining’s Triumph’ (2000) 109 The Yale Law Journal 
857, 872.  
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discussions in England and Wales.436 This is perhaps because the term ‘bargain’ has 
a negative connotation which implies deal making or bartering with alleged criminals 
and which seems repugnant to justice and public interest.437 Besides, the perception 
and practice of plea bargaining varies from country to country even among common 
law jurisdictions.438  
This difference is starker when it comes to civil law jurisdictions which generally do not 
use the term plea bargaining. To begin with, civil law jurisdictions, for reasons which 
will be explained below, do not have the concept of a guilty plea.439 The defendant 
does not plead guilty or not guilty, instead a judge conducts investigations and collects 
evidence which is then made available to both the prosecutor and the defence. 
Therefore, in civil law jurisdictions which recognise negotiated resolutions of criminal 
cases, discussions are often held between the defendant, prosecutor and a judge 
which may or may not lead to a confession by the defendant. However, such admission 
of guilt, if it occurs, is considered as part of the evidence on the case record and does 
not lead to automatic conviction, but merely serves as evidence in the trial.440 Again, 
the practice varies from one civil law jurisdiction to another and this will be exemplified 
below by comparing the practice in France and Germany.441 
This chapter interprets the term plea negotiation very broadly to encompass varied 
forms of negotiated resolution of criminal cases with at least three essential elements: 
negotiation between parties with or without the involvement of a judge, admission of 
guilt by the defendant, and/or, benefit accruing to the offender which would otherwise 
not accrue without the admission of guilt. This includes equivalents in both civil law and 
common law jurisdictions regardless of the differences in the terms used in the various 
                                            
436 Carol A Brook and others, ‘A Comparative Look at Plea Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, 
New Zealand, and the United States’ (2016) 57 William and Mary Law Review 1147. 
437 Brook and others (n 436) 1153; Bekker (n 434) 173. 
438 See generally Brook and others (n 436) which compares plea bargaining in Australia, Canada, 
England, New Zealand, and the US. 
439 Maximo Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and The Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 
22. 
440 Langer (n 439) 22–24. 
441 See generally Langer (n 439) who compares the equivalent of plea bargaining in Germany, France, 
Italy and Argentina, all civil law jurisdictions. 
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jurisdictions, or the effect of the admission of guilt – whether it leads to conviction or is 
merely evidence at trial. The reason for considering both civil law and common law 
jurisdictions is because the procedural law, and specifically Article 65 of the Rome 
Statute which deals with the admission of guilt, is informed by practices from these two 
principal legal systems.442 
4.2.2 The development of plea negotiation 
Plea negotiation is thought to have Anglo-American origins but this is true only if one 
sticks to the formal version of it predominantly practiced in the US, meaning “the 
exchange of official concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction.”443 However, 
if one takes into consideration all forms of consensual resolution of criminal cases and 
abbreviated criminal proceedings, one finds that the practice follows a long tradition 
which is prevalent in both civil and common law jurisdictions.444 In fact, in many pre-
modern societies, in various parts of the world, criminal cases were resolved through 
the admission of guilt by the offender, expression of remorse and some form of 
compensation to the victim, 445 a method which is referred to as restorative justice. 
There are at least two theories in literature explaining why formal plea negotiation 
developed. The first, and the mainstream one, is that it developed to deal with caseload 
pressure. The second is that it developed due to the complexity of the trial process 
which itself came about due to the involvement of lawyers. 
                                            
442 See part 2.4.2 of this dissertation. 
443 Alschuler, ‘Plea Bargaining and Its History’ (n 435) 3. 
444 Robert R Strang, ‘Plea Bargaining Cooperation Agreements and Immunity Orders’ 115th 
International Training Course visiting Experts Papers 30. 
445 See for example Antony Musson, ‘Wergeld: Crime and the Compensation Culture in Medieval 
England’ (Museum of London, 5 October 2009) <https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-
events/wergeld-crime-and-the-compensation-culture-in-medieval-england> accessed 20 March 2019 
(the author discusses the concept of wergeld in Anglo-Saxon society where the offender would pay 
money to the victim in compensation for harm done) . See also Kwaku Osei-Hwedie and Morena 
Rankopo, ‘Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of Ghana and Botswana’ in Bertha Osei-
Hwedie, Treasa Galvin and Hideaki Shinoda (eds), Indigenous Methods of Peacebuilding (IPSHU 
English Research Report Series 29, 2012) 46-47 discussing dispute resolution mechanisms in 
indigenous African communities. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za





One common reason for the introduction of plea negotiation in both common law446 
and civil law447 jurisdictions, has been the need to find a practical solution to the 
problem of caseload pressure. The introduction of plea negotiation often follows an 
influx of criminal cases, arising for example, due to immigration448 or a rapid increase 
in the crime rate,449 thereby putting pressure on the justice system. Pressure on the 
justice system gives rise to the need to resolve cases in a faster and more efficient 
manner. Plea negotiation is therefore resorted to, not for ideological reasons, but rather 
for practical reasons being to ease the pressure on the justice system. Langbein states, 
regarding the US, that the raison d’etre of plea negotiation is “nothing more than simple 
expediency. We indulge in this practice of condemnation without adjudication because 
we think we have to, not because we want to.”450 This theory has been criticised by 
some scholars for lack of empirical data, nevertheless, many scholars continue to 
believe that caseload pressure is a determinant of whether plea negotiation is practised 
and on which cases.451 
Legal complexity 
The history of formal plea negotiation might be divided into at least three phases: pre-
nineteenth century, mid-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century (1960s) and 
modern practice. Before the nineteenth century, trials in England and the American 
                                            
446 Bekker (n 434) 179 (the author states that the major rationale for the introduction of plea bargaining 
in the US is to ease the caseload pressure). 
447 Langer (n 439) 37 (the author argues that despite the apparent incompatibility between plea 
bargaining and the inquisitorial system, many civil law countries have incorporated the practice to ease 
caseload pressure); see also Kyle McCleery, ‘Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: 
Lessons from Civil Law Systems’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1099, 1112; Yue 
Ma, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy: A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2002) 12 International Criminal Justice Review 22, 39.  
448 See Fisher (n 435) 865. 
449 Langer (n 439) 37. 
450 John H Langbein, ‘Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It’ (1979) 78 Michigan Law 
Review 204, 205. 
451 Bekker (n 434) 179–180. 
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colonies, were typically simple, short and quick.452 There was no involvement of 
lawyers - victims of crimes played the part of prosecutor and the defendants spoke on 
their own behalf, without legal representation. There were no elaborate rights of the 
accused person, in fact, accused persons generally did not have much say during trial 
except when pleading for leniency. There were also no complex rules of criminal 
procedure and the proceedings were dominated by the judge, who was often the only 
one in the courtroom who was trained in law. The judge asked questions to the parties 
and to witnesses and directed the jury. The judge and the jury often concluded many 
felony cases in one sitting, often without taking a break in between cases and without 
resorting to plea negotiation.453 
However, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards lawyers started becoming involved 
in criminal trials by advising and acting on behalf of both the victim and the accused. 
With the involvement of lawyers, the nature of trial changed. For example, criminal 
trials become more party dominated and the role of the judge also changed to that of 
a referee between the parties. Furthermore, there was the development of complex 
criminal procedure, introduction of stringent rules of evidence, as well as a change 
regarding the nature and types of witnesses.454 The result was that criminal trials 
became lengthier and more complex; and, as the parties were generally represented 
by lawyers the practice of guilty pleas and plea negotiation began to emerge.455  
These two theories explain the development of plea negotiation in the US and England. 
Below is a short country specific explanation of the development of plea negotiation in 
Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany. 
Kenya 
Kenya, being a former British colony, inherited most of the English criminal procedure 
practices including plea bargaining, and therefore for a long time, plea bargaining was 
                                            
452 Malcolm M Feeley, ‘Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins 
of Plea Bargaining International Conference on Rights of the Accused, Crime Control and Protection of 
Victims: II. Plea-Bargaining’ (1997) 31 Israel Law Review 183, 190. 
453 John Langbein, ‘Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining’ (1979) 261–265; Feeley (n 452) 
190. 
454 Feeley (n 452) 204. 
455 Langbein, ‘Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining’ (n 453) 265. 
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practised in Kenya without statutory guidelines. One of the earliest authorities for plea 
bargaining in Kenya is Adan v the Republic, a 1973 case where the Court of Appeal 
set out the rules and procedural guidelines for plea bargaining.456 Plea bargaining 
continued to be practiced in this manner until the Criminal Procedure Code was 
amended in 2008 and again in 2012 to include sections 137 A to 137 O which deal 
with the negotiation of a plea agreement, validity of a guilty plea, withdrawal of the 
same, as well as the procedural safeguards and sentencing among other matters.  
Furthermore, in 2018 the Attorney General made the Criminal Procedure (Plea 
Bargaining Rules), 2018 which supplement the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code.457 These rules were introduced as part of a reform to the criminal justice system 
which is characterised by huge backlog of cases in the judiciary and overcrowded 
prisons which currently house triple their capacity. Plea bargaining is therefore 
envisioned as one of the tools essential “to ensure speedy disposal of cases and 
ultimately reduce the number of remand prisoners.”458 Subsequently, in 2019, the 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) in Kenya formulated plea 
bargaining guidelines to guide the Kenyan prosecutors in the process of negotiating 
plea agreements.459  
South Africa 
Because of its colonial history, South Africa’s legal culture is influenced by both English 
law and Roman-Dutch law, and therefore, like Kenya, South Africa has a long history 
of plea bargaining, much of which was undocumented, irregularly practiced and 
unregulated by statute.460 One scholar, Bennun, recalls that plea bargaining in the 
1960s was a shameful practice in which the defendants who were mostly black, poor 
and illiterate were assisted by counsel who were generally white and inexperienced 
                                            
456 Adan Inshair Hassan v Republic 1973 EALR 445. 
457 ‘Criminal Procedure (Plea Bargaining Rules), 2018’ 
<http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2018/47-
CriminalProcedure_PleaBargaining_Rules_2018.pdf> accessed 12 May 2019. 
458 ‘The Prosecutor: A Newsletter from the Director of Public Prosecutions’ 14 
<http://www.odpp.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ODPP-Newsletter-Issue-No.-001.pdf> accessed 
12 May 2019. 
459 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (n 4). 
460 Bekker (n 434) 218. 
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and who were not paid for their services. To make things worse, there often was a 
language barrier between the accused and counsel who were unable to communicate 
with each other. He states that plea bargaining was “inadequate work done impatiently” 
and though proceedings were shortened for the convenience of counsel and judges, 
not much justice was done to the accused persons.461 Therefore, the amendment of 
the South African Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 to include rules on plea bargaining 
was a welcome occurrence.462 These provisions confirm the legality of plea bargaining 
in South Africa and regulate the practice as discussed below. 
France 
The French Criminal Procedure Code did not provide for any form of plea negotiation 
until 2004 when the concept of comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de 
culpabilité (CRPC), which translates to appearance after admission of guilt, was 
introduced.463 However, before then, prosecutors engaged in a practice known as 
correctionnalisation, a form of charge bargaining discussed below, which arose from 
practice and has never been incorporated in statute. As discussed below, some 
commentators argue that this practice is illegal since it is not provided for in written law 
but that notwithstanding, the practice continues to thrive and seems to have received 
general acceptance among legal practitioners in France. However, because of its 
informal nature, it is not clear for how long the practice of correctionnalisation has 
existed in France. 
Germany 
Traditionally, Germany did not practice any form of plea negotiation464 and therefore 
the introduction of the practice of absprachen in the 1970s was controversial because 
it lacked legal foundation. This was partly because the principle of compulsory 
                                            
461 Mervin E Bennun, ‘Negotiated Pleas : Policy and Purposes’ (2007) 20 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 17, 18. 
462 The South African Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 62 of 2001, s 1. 
463 See the French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-7 to 495-16. 
464 Langbein, ‘Land without Plea Bargaining’ (n 450) (the author refers to Germany as the ‘land without 
plea bargaining’). Although there is evidence that by 1979, when this article was published, plea 
bargaining was being practiced secretly in Germany. See for example, Joachim Herrmann, ‘Bargaining 
Justice - A Bargain for German Criminal Justice Essay’ (1991) 53 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
755, 755. 
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prosecution in Germany requires that all serious offences must be tried if there is 
sufficient evidence, therefore many perceived bargains as repugnant to criminal 
justice. In fact, the practice was so taboo that it was practised in secret, only coming to 
the limelight through an Article published under a pseudonym in a German law journal, 
which sparked controversy and debate.465 While deciding on this controversy the court 
held that agreements between the prosecutor, defence and/or judge were legal if they 
were in accordance with the principles of fair trial and the fundamentals of German 
criminal procedure, that is: compulsory prosecution, the requirement that a judge 
conduct investigations to establish the facts of the case, and that punishment should 
correspond to the accused’s guilt.466  
The practice of absprachen arose, not from the criminal procedure code, but rather as 
a matter of necessity in response to the day-to-day challenges facing the practitioners 
of criminal justice. Although there was controversy surrounding the practice, many 
German practitioners and scholars thought it was beneficial and were in favour of 
letting the practice evolve as the courts set the guidelines on a case-by-case basis.467 
One scholar explains this phenomenon by stating that judges, prosecutors and 
defence counsel began to re-conceptualize their role as one of cooperating with one 
another, and with the accused person, and using criminal law as an instrument to solve 
social problems and thereby to serve justice.468 Some of these social problems were 
white-collar crimes, tax evasion, drug offences and crimes against the environment 
which brought about complex legal and evidentiary problems and increased the 
caseload of German courts; which then gave rise to absprachen as one of the 
solutions.469 Eventually, in 2009, the German Federal government passed a Bill for the 
Regulation of Agreements in the Criminal Procedure which provided for agreements 
and codified the principles enunciated by the courts over the years.470 
                                            
465 Herrmann (n 464) 756, 766–767. 
466 Herrmann (n 464) 768. 
467 Herrmann (n 464) 771. 
468 Herrmann (n 464) 775. 
469 Ma (n 447) 36; Herrmann (n 464) 756; McCleery (n 447) 1113. 
470 These rules are incorporated in sec 257 of the German Criminal Procedure Code discussed below. 
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4.3 Salient features of plea negotiation in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions 
There are a lot of differences between common law and civil law systems, the main 
one being that common law countries generally practice the adversarial system, while 
civil law jurisdictions generally practice the inquisitorial system.471 Comparative 
literature highlights the similarities and differences between these systems and 
demonstrates that over the years there have been transplants between the two 
systems and therefore no system is purely adversarial or inquisitorial.472 This section 
will highlight a few of the differences which persist between these systems and which 
impact on plea negotiation.  
The main difference between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems is that the 
adversarial system focuses on resolution of disputes between two opposing parties, 
the prosecution and the defence, before an impartial decision maker - usually a judge 
and a jury, or before a presiding judicial officer without lay participation. On the other 
hand, an inquisitorial system focuses on the conduct of investigation by an impartial 
agent of the state with a view to arriving at the material truth. 473 This legal-cultural 
difference affects their perception of justice, as well as the procedure they adopt to 
arrive at justice. This, therefore, affects the parties who play a role in plea negotiation 
in common law and civil law countries; that is whether the judge or victims are involved 
in negotiation, and to what extent. This also determines the effect of an accused 
person’s admission of guilt: that is whether it leads to automatic conviction which 
occurs in common law countries, or whether the judge is obligated to find more 
evidence as in civil law countries. These factors are discussed in more detail below.474  
There are also procedural differences between the two systems, for example, at the 
commencement of trial in inquisitorial systems, the defendant is called upon to give 
evidence first. On the other hand, in adversarial systems, the prosecution case is 
presented first followed by the defence case. Similarly, in civil law jurisdictions 
                                            
471 Martin Kerscher, ‘Plea Bargaining in South Africa and in Germany’ (LLM Thesis, Stellenbosch 
Univeristy 2013) 20–21 (the author discusses in what regions the two systems arose and how) . 
472 See for example Langer (n 439). 
473 Langer (n 439) 4; McCleery (n 447) 1110. 
474 See parts 4.4.1 and 4.4.4 below. 
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investigations are conducted by the prosecutor and/or an investigating judge, who 
investigates both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and all the findings are 
compiled in a dossier which is then made accessible to all parties.475  On the other 
hand, in common law jurisdictions investigations are conducted by the police or 
investigative agencies and presented to the prosecutor for review. The prosecutor is 
obligated to consider both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence but often times leans 
more towards inculpatory evidence, as this goes to prove the prosecution case; only 
aspects of this evidence is disclosed to the defence which generally conducts its own 
investigations and builds a defence case.476  
Furthermore, in civil law jurisdictions witnesses belong to the court, and therefore there 
are no defence or prosecution witnesses. Generally, the judge poses the most 
questions to witnesses and to the accused, while the prosecution and defence counsel 
only ask supplementary questions. For this reason, inquisitorial proceedings are 
generally referred to as judge-centred. On the other hand, in adversarial proceedings, 
witnesses are either prosecution witnesses, who are expected to give inculpatory 
evidence against the accused person; and defence witnesses who are expected to 
give exculpatory evidence. Therefore, there is usually examination-in-chief conducted 
by the calling party, followed by cross-examination conducted by the non-calling party, 
and concluded by re-examination by the calling party. Proceedings in adversarial 
proceedings are therefore party centric.477  
It is noteworthy that no system is entirely adversarial or inquisitorial and most systems 
have elements of both to some or other degree. For ease of discussion, this chapter 
refers to the practices of Kenya and South Africa, both which are majorly adversarial 
on the one hand; and Germany and France, both of which are largely inquisitorial.  
4.3.1 Kenya 
When an accused person appears before the court for the first time, an official of the 
court reads the charges against him/her in a language they fully understand, and the 
essential elements of the crimes are explained to the accused by the court. The 
                                            
475 Langer (n 439) 14–15. 
476 See generally Ma (n 447). 
477 See generally Langer (n 439). 
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accused is then asked to plead, and in this regard, an accused may enter a plea of: 
guilty, not guilty, or guilty subject to a plea agreement.478 If the accused admits to the 
elements of the crime, without a plea agreement, the court is required to record the 
response of the accused, as closely as possible in the words used by the accused. 
The prosecutor is then required to state the facts of the case and then the accused is 
given an opportunity to respond to them – s/he can admit the facts, dispute them or 
add relevant facts. If the accused disputes the facts or provides an explanation which 
renders the plea equivocal, the court is to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial. 
However, if the accused does not dispute the facts in any material way, the court enters 
a plea of guilty and convicts the accused, and thereafter the statement of facts and the 
response of the accused is recorded. The statement of facts is important because it 
enables the court to ascertain whether the plea is unequivocal meaning that the 
accused has no valid defence; and enables the court to assess the sentence.479 
After an accused person has been charged, and at any time before the judgment, the 
accused person and the Prosecutor may enter into a plea agreement in which the 
prosecutor agrees to reduce, withdraw, or stay the charge; or promises not to proceed 
with other possible charges. As part of this agreement the accused person may be 
required to pay compensation or restitution to the victim. The amount of the 
compensation is arrived at following negotiation between the victim and the accused, 
which are subject to the approval of the prosecutor, in the interest of justice. Either 
party, prosecution or accused person/legal representative, may commence plea 
negotiation. The negotiation is generally between the prosecutor and the accused 
person though the victim may make representations to the Prosecutor on the content 
of the agreement. However, the judge does not participate in the negotiation and is 
merely notified of the parties’ intent to negotiate an agreement.480 
                                            
478 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 207. The accused can also plead that s/he has been previously 
convicted of the same offence and the same facts, or that s/he has received a presidential pardon. 
479 Adan Inshair Hassan v Republic (n 455) [1973] EALR 445 reproduced in 18 (1974) African Law 
Journal 224. 
480 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137A-E and the Criminal Procedure (Plea Bargaining) Rules, 
2018, s 8 - 12. 
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An agreement is made in a prescribed written form481 and is reviewed by or explained 
to the accused in a language s/he fully understands after which it is signed by the 
accused and the prosecutor. The complainant may also sign the agreement if it 
contains a clause on compensation and restitution of the complainant. The agreement 
contains all the terms agreed on between the prosecutor and defence, the substantial 
facts of the matter as well as the admissions made by the accused. The agreement 
may also contain a specific sentence recommendation agreed on between the accused 
person and the prosecutor.482 
The court takes certain safeguards to protect the rights of the accused. In this regard, 
before a court accepts and records a guilty plea, it informs the accused of his/her fair 
trial rights which include: the right to a full trial, the right to plead not guilty and persist 
in that plea, the right not to give self-incriminating evidence, the right to be presumed 
innocent, the right to remain silent, the right to be represented by a legal representative 
of the accused’s choice, the right to examine or have examined by his/her legal 
representatives all the prosecution witnesses, as well as the right to present witnesses 
in his/her defence. The court also explains to the accused person that by pleading 
guilty s/he waives the right to trial as well as the right to appeal the conviction arising 
from the guilty plea. Furthermore, the court also explains to the accused the nature of 
the charge which the accused is pleading to as well as the risk incurred by entering a 
guilty plea. In this regard, the court explains the following to the accused: the maximum 
possible penalty as well as the minimum mandatory penalty; any forfeiture of property 
involved; compensation and restitution orders involved; and, that in case the accused 
is prosecuted for perjury arising from a false statement, the prosecutor has the right to 
use, against the accused, any statements given by the accused in the agreement.483  
After informing the accused of his/her rights, and the risks associated with a guilty plea, 
the next step is for the court to satisfy itself that the plea is supported by sufficient 
factual basis and that the accused was legally competent, of sound mind and that s/he 
voluntarily entered the agreement. After the court is satisfied of all the above, it accepts 
                                            
481 A template of the agreements is annexed to the Criminal Procedure (Plea Bargaining) Rules, 2018. 
482 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137A-E and the Criminal Procedure (Plea Bargaining) Rules, 
2018, s 8 - 12. 
483 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137 F-G. 
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the plea and enters the factual basis of the same into the record at which point the 
agreement is binding on both the accused and the prosecutor. The court then convicts 
the accused person and invites submissions on matters relating to sentencing.  In 
making the sentencing decision, the court considers at what point in the proceedings 
the accused gave the indication to enter into a plea agreement, that is whether the 
accused gave an indication at the beginning or towards the end of the proceedings. 
More sentencing concessions go to accused persons who enter agreements at the 
early stages of the trial. The court also considers the circumstances surrounding the 
accused’s indication to enter into a plea agreement, as well as restitution and 
compensation agreed to be paid by the accused person, among other factors.484  
However, the court has the option of rejecting the plea agreement upon which, the 
court informs the parties of its decision to reject the agreement and the reasons for the 
rejection is entered on the record. The decision of the court rejecting a plea agreement 
is final and there can be no application for appeal or review by either party. Upon 
rejection by the court, the agreement becomes void and no other negotiation may take 
place in relation to the same facts. Subsequently, a plea of not guilty is entered on 
behalf of the accused and the proceedings leading to the agreement are inadmissible 
in a subsequent or future trial relating to the same facts.485 
An accused person may withdraw the guilty plea made pursuant to a plea agreement, 
for any reason, before it is accepted by the court. Similarly, the accused person may 
also withdraw the guilty plea, and set aside the agreement if the sentence 
recommended by the prosecutor to the court is higher than that agreed on in the plea 
agreement. However, after the court accepts the plea agreement, the accused person 
may only withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing is passed and having convinced 
the court of a fair ground for withdrawal. The decision on conviction and sentencing is 
final and can only be appealed in terms of the extent and legality of the sentence. The 
court, that issued the conviction and passed the sentence, may set both decisions 
aside on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation by either party to the agreement.486 
                                            
484 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137 H-J 
485 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137 H-J. 
486 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137 K-L and the Criminal Procedure (Plea Bargaining) Rules, 
2018, s 12. 
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4.3.2 South Africa 
Like in Kenya, at the commencement of trial, the charge levied against the accused is 
presented to the accused whereupon the accused may plead guilty or not guilty.487 
However, before the accused pleads to the charge there may be negotiation between 
the prosecutor and the accused in which the accused may agree to plead guilty in 
exchange for a just sentence, a postponement of the sentence and/or compensation 
to be paid by the accused to the victim. While negotiating, the prosecutor may consult 
with the investigating officer and should have regard for the nature and circumstances 
of the offence, the personal circumstances of the accused, previous convictions if any, 
as well as the interests of the community affected by the offence. The prosecutor may 
also take into consideration the views of the complainant or his/her representative, 
where it is reasonable to do so, and this may include views on compensation or a 
specific benefit or rendering of a service in lieu of compensation.488  
The agreement entered pursuant to this negotiation must be in writing, like in Kenya, 
and must indicate that the accused, before entering the agreement, understood his/her 
fair trial rights including the rights to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to 
be compelled to produce self-incriminating evidence. The agreement also includes the 
full terms of the agreement, the factual basis of the guilty plea as well as the sentence 
agreement and any admissions made by the accused. The agreement is signed by the 
accused and the prosecutor as well as the complainant, in the latter case, only where 
the agreement contains a clause relating to compensation of the victim. Like in Kenya, 
a plea agreement in South Africa is entered between the accused and the prosecutor 
and the judge does not take part in it.489 
Before the accused enters a plea, the prosecutor informs the court that a plea 
agreement has been reached where upon the court seeks confirmation from the 
accused that an agreement has indeed been reached. The court has the power to 
                                            
487 There are other options that the accused may plead including that s/he has previously been 
convicted, acquitted, discharged or pardoned of the same offence. The accused may also plead that the 
court lacks jurisdiction or that the prosecution lacks title to prosecute the offence. See South African 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (as amended in 2001), s 106.  
488 South African Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (as amended in 2001), s 105 A (1). 
489 South African Criminal Procedure Act, s 105 A (1) and (2). 
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order that the accused and prosecutor modify the agreement to comply with certain 
formal requirements. If the court is satisfied with the agreement, it enters a guilty plea 
on behalf of the accused and orders that the content of the agreement be disclosed in 
court. After the agreement is disclosed in court, the court confirms with the accused 
whether he/she entered the agreement freely and voluntarily without being unduly 
influenced and whether the accused stands by the admissions in the agreement and 
the statement of facts. If the court is not convinced of the accused’s guilt, or the 
accused has not admitted to an aspect of the charge, or the accused has a valid 
defence, or for any other reason the court considers that the guilty plea should not 
stand, the court may reject the guilty plea, enter a plea of not guilty so that the trial 
commences de novo before another presiding officer. However, if the court is satisfied 
that the accused has fully admitted the allegations in the charge and that s/he is guilty 
of the offence charged, the court enters a guilty plea, and proceeds to consider the 
sentencing agreement.490 
If the court finds that the sentencing agreement is just, the court convicts the accused 
and imposes the sentence proposed in the agreement. However, if the court considers 
that the sentence agreement is unjust, it informs the parties of the sentence it considers 
just whereupon the parties have two options: the first is to comply with the charge 
agreement and reserve the right to lead evidence regarding sentencing. If the parties 
choose this option, the court convicts the accused person and imposes the sentence 
it considers just. The second option is for the parties to vacate the agreement, whereby 
the court enters a plea of not guilty and orders a new trial before another presiding 
officer. However, if a new trial is ordered, the agreement is voided and neither the 
negotiation preceding the agreement nor the agreement itself and the record thereof 
can be referred to as evidence. Besides, no further agreement can be entered into by 
the parties relating to the same facts, and the prosecutor may proceed against the 
accused on any charge.491 
                                            
490 South African Criminal Procedure Act, s 105 A (3) to (7). 
491 South African Criminal Procedure Act, s 105 A (8) to (10). 
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Offences in France are categorised according to their level of seriousness and the 
punishment ascribed to them: contravention (minor offences), délit (intermediate 
offences) and crime (serious offences);492 which are all dealt with by different first 
instance courts, following different procedures. A contravention is tried at the police 
court, a délit in a correctional court while a crime is tried in an Assize Court. 493 
Investigations are generally conducted by the prosecutor, who has the discretion to 
decide how to handle complaints and denunciations.494 However, where the offence 
meets the criteria of a crime, the prosecutor is obligated to refer the matter to an 
investigating judge who conducts judicial investigations and who generally has broader 
investigative powers than the prosecutor. Similarly, if the matter concerns certain types 
of délit the prosecutor may refer the case to an investigating judge who would carry 
out the investigations for the purpose of trial in the Assize Court. The procedural rules 
applicable in an Assize Court are more stringent than in the two lower courts.495 
There are two different practices in France which are equated to plea negotiation in 
common law countries. The first is known as correctionnalisation, and occurs when the 
prosecutor classifies as a délit, an offence which would ordinarily qualify to be a crime, 
and therefore prosecutes it in the Correctional Court instead of the Assize Court. 
However, correctionnalisation is not provided for in the French Code of Criminal 
Procedure and has for a long time been a controversial practice, with many 
commentators considering it illegal.496 Nevertheless, correctionnalisation continues to 
be practiced in France and seems to be generally accepted by legal practitioners. 
                                            
492 Some scholars use the terms misdemeanour and felony to refer to délit and crime respectively, 
however upon close examination these English phrases, as often used in common law jurisdictions, do 
not properly capture the scope of these categories of offences in France. Therefore, the French terms 
will be maintained throughout the chapter. See Edwin R Keedy, ‘The Preliminary Investigation of Crime 
in France’ (1940) 88 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 385, 389–392 
(the author explains the categorization of offences in France). 
493 Keedy (n 492) 389–397 (the author explains the classification of the three types of offences and the 
composition, structure and jurisdiction of the courts they are tried in). 
494 French Code of Criminal Procedure 2006 s 40. 
495 Keedy (n 492) 422. 
496 Keedy (n 492) 422. 
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Correctionnalisation is often likened to charge bargaining in the common law systems. 
Indeed, is some similarity with charge bargaining in the sense that an accused person 
is charged with a lesser offence which attracts a lower sentence upon conviction, 
however, the similarity seems to end there. For starters, although charge bargaining is 
often done as part of an agreement between the prosecution and the accused person, 
like in Kenya and South Africa discussed above, correctionnalisation is a unilateral 
decision on the part of the prosecutor.497 Here it is worth noting that a prosecutor in 
France, unlike in Kenya and South Africa, is a member of the judiciary who is “not 
entrusted with the task of securing convictions in all cases. Prosecutors' obligation is 
rather to determine a just solution to the case and present it to the judge”.498  
An accused person has the right to oppose the reduction of a charge to délit or 
contravention and therefore trial in a Correctional Court or Police Court instead of in 
the Assize Court. This objection could be founded on the fact that an Assize Court has 
a robust screening process before a case is admitted to it and provides for wider 
procedural rights and higher evidentiary standards for the accused as compared to a 
Correctional Court or Police Court.499 However, the catch is that by opposing the 
correctionnalisation, the accused would be charged with a more serious offence and 
exposed to a harsher sentence upon conviction. Therefore, in practice most accused 
persons do not object to being charged with a less serious offence.500 
Secondly, while a charge reduction in Kenya and South Africa is often accompanied 
by an admission of guilt by the accused person, this is not a requirement in France. 
Even if the accused admits guilt, the confession is merely considered as part of 
evidence to be considered by the judge alongside other evidence; it does not replace 
a trial, but usually shortens it. Additionally, unlike in Kenya or South Africa, an accused 
person can retract the confession at any time before or during the trial. However, this 
                                            
497 Although some scholars argue that there may be “less explicit exchanges”. See for example Richard 
S Frase, ‘Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, 
How Can We Find out, and Why Should We Care?’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 539, 630. 
498 Ma (n 447) 31; Keedy (n 492) 424. 
499 Frase (n 497) 430. 
500 Ma (n 447) 32–33. 
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does not prevent the confession from being introduced at trial, the prosecutor merely 
needs to state that the confession was given and then retracted.501 
The second French practice which is associated with plea negotiation is known as 
comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (CRPC), which translates to 
appearance after admission of guilt, and which was introduced in 2004.502 This 
procedure is applicable to délits which are punishable by a fine or an imprisonment 
term of less than 5 years and may be commenced by the prosecutor or by the accused 
or the accused’s counsel. It only occurs where the accused admits the offence 
charged. The prosecutor may suggest a penalty to be imposed on the accused and 
where the penalty involves a prison sentence, it should not be more than one year, and 
if a fine is imposed it cannot exceed the maximum fine applicable to the offence; both 
fine and imprisonment may be suspended. The prosecutor may also suggest that the 
penalty be imposed immediately or suspended in part or in whole.   
The prosecutor makes these suggestions in the presence of an accused person’s 
advocate. It is mandatory that the accused be represented by an advocate who is either 
chosen by the accused or appointed by the bar at his/her request; the accused is to 
bear the costs of the advocate unless the accused meets the criteria for legal aid. The 
accused person’s advocate has immediate access to the entire case file which is 
different from the practice in Kenya and South Africa where the defence counsel does 
not have access to the entire prosecution file but only to portions of it disclosed by the 
prosecutor.503 The accused has the right to communicate freely with his/her advocate 
in the absence of the prosecutor and may take up to ten days to consider the proposed 
sentence before communicating his acceptance or declination. However, if the 
accused chooses to have ten days of deliberation, he may be placed under judicial 
supervision or pre-trial detention for that duration. The decision of whether an accused 
should be placed in detention for the period of deliberation is determined by the liberty 
                                            
501 Ma (n 447) 33. 
502 See the French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-7 to 495-16. 
503 See the French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-8 as compared to the South African and Kenyan 
Criminal Procedure sections discussed in parts 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
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and custody judge (who is different from the judge who will preside over the accused’s 
trial).504 
The judge is not involved in the negotiation but rather in the approval of the 
agreements. If the accused person accepts the prosecutor’s proposal, the issue is 
presented before the president of the district court or a judge appointed by him who 
considers the truth of the facts and their legal qualifications.505 The judge issues a 
reasoned decision on the same day at a public hearing; and the prosecutor does not 
have to be present at this hearing. The judge, if s/he accepts the penalties proposed 
by the prosecutor, must state in the decision that the accused has accepted the 
offences charged in the presence of his/her counsel and that the penalty imposed is 
justified based on the offence charged and the character of the perpetrator. The judge’s 
decision amounts to a conviction judgment and is immediately enforceable, however, 
it may be appealed in all cases by both the prosecutor and the defence.506 This is 
different from the position in Kenya and in South Africa, where the conviction based on 
a valid plea agreement cannot be appealed. 
The victim of the offence, if identified, does not take part in negotiation, however, s/he 
is informed of them and invited to appear before the judge at the same time as the 
accused person and his/her counsel, in order to be a civil party to the proceedings and 
have the opportunity to request for damages for harm endured. Even if the victim does 
not appear, the judge rules on the request for damages and the victim has a right to 
appeal against the decision of the judge in this regard. If the victim fails to exercise this 
right, s/he has the right to summon the perpetrator to a correctional court which court 
will rule only on the civil claim after consulting the case file.507 
A report must be drawn indicating the formalities undertaken under the CRPC regime, 
otherwise the proceedings could be nullified. However, if the accused does not accept 
                                            
504 See the French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-8 and 495-10. 
505 If the accused person does not accept the proposal of the prosecutor, the prosecutor may seize the 
correctional court or order investigations into the matter. 
506 French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-9 and 495-11. 
507 French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-13. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za




the proposal of the prosecutor, the report or statements made, or documents produced 
during the negotiation cannot be used in further proceedings.508 
Correctionnalisation and CRPC occur simultaneously in the French criminal justice 
system. The former is where a prosecutor, unilaterally requalifies a serious offence (a 
crime with a penalty of 10 plus years) in order to prosecute it in a Correctional Court 
instead of an Assize Court as the law mandates. There is no requirement for the 
accused to plead guilty and though the accused may oppose the process, they rarely 
do. While CRPC involves only minor offences (délit with a penalty of 5 years and below) 
and the prosecutor’s decision is not unilateral rather the accused is required to plead 
guilty and must be assisted by counsel. In both processes the participation of victims 
is permitted. 
4.3.4 Germany 
Plea agreements in Germany involve the judge, the prosecution and the defence. 
Unlike in South Africa and in Kenya where the parties take the initiative to commence 
negotiation, in Germany the law requires the judge to make the first step and to 
propose an agreement to the prosecution and defence. The agreement can only relate 
to the legal consequences that will form part of the judgment, as well as procedural 
matters and the conduct of the parties during trial. A confession is an integral part of 
such an agreement, however like in France such confession does not lead to an 
automatic guilty verdict on the accused.509 Instead, it forms part of the evidence and a 
judge has a further obligation to establish the truth by taking evidence from all facts 
and means of proof relevant to the case.510 
In proposing the agreement, the court announces what it may contain and may indicate 
the upper and lower limits of the sentence based on the circumstances of the case and 
the sentencing guidelines. Thereafter the prosecution and the defence are afforded the 
opportunity to make submissions. An agreement is reached if the prosecution and 
                                            
508 French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-14. 
509 The German Code of Criminal Conduct (Strafprozessordnung) as amended on 23 April 2014, s 257 
c (hereinafter referred to as StPO).   
510 StPO, s 244 (2). 
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accused person agree to the content of the agreement proposed by the judge.511 The 
agreement is then entered into the court record and it reflects the essence, course of 
the negotiation, the content thereof as well as the outcome of the agreement.512 The 
court has a wide discretion to set aside the agreement if it becomes apparent that the 
proposed sentence does not match the gravity of the offence or the guilt of the 
accused. Such a situation may arise if factually or legally important factors were 
overlooked during the agreement; if such factors arise after the agreement has been 
entered into; or, if the conduct of the defendant during trial does not correspond to that 
which the court’s prediction was based. If the court decides that it is no longer bound 
by the agreement, it informs the parties promptly and the defendant’s confession can 
no longer be used in the case. 513  
However, if the court sets aside the agreement, unlike in Kenya and South Africa, the 
accused person is not entitled to a trial before a different presiding officer and faces 
the same judges who were part of the botched negotiation and who are aware of the 
contents of the confession. This undermines the practical value of excluding the 
defendant’s confession if the negotiation fail and leaves the defendant with “no more 
than a highly volatile sentence offer.”514 Perhaps for this reason, the statute provides 
that the defendant is to be informed of the circumstances which  might cause the court 
to set aside the agreement and the consequences of that.515 Some scholars opine that 
by including this provision, the legislature intended that the accused be made aware of 
the danger that could arise from issuing a confession.516 Furthermore, the defence and 
the prosecution both have the right to appeal a judgment made following an agreement 
and such right to appeal cannot be waived in the agreement.517 
A number of principles govern criminal procedure in Germany and at least three of 
these regulate plea agreements. The first is the doctrine of compulsory prosecution 
                                            
511 StPO, s 257 c (3). 
512 StPO, s 273 (1a). 
513 StPO, s 257 c (3). 
514 Thomas Weigend and Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal 
Judgments in Germany’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 81, 92. 
515 StPO, s 257 c (4). 
516 Weigend and Turner (n 514) 92. 
517 StPO, s 302. 
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which, as discussed below requires that all serious offences be prosecuted, with some 
expressly stated exceptions, therefore charge bargaining is forbidden. The second is 
that it is the role of the judge to investigate and arrive at the material truth. For this 
reason, judges are required not to convict based on an agreement or the confession 
of the accused but to find objective evidence to support the conviction. The third is the 
guilt principle according to which sentencing should be proportionate to the guilt of the 
accused and the gravity of the offence; and, it is for this reason that judges are required 
to give the general range of the sentence and not the specific sentence. 518 
However, there is a wide gap between the provisions of the law above, and plea 
negotiation as they occur in practice. In a survey conducted in 2012, it emerged that 
59% of the surveyed judges conducted the agreements in a manner contrary to the 
statute and did not record the agreement as required by statute. Similarly, the research 
found that some judges failed to inform accused persons that the court may withdraw 
from the agreement and under what circumstances; that judges convicted the accused 
on the sole basis of their confession; there was evidence of charge bargaining; judges 
told defendants the specific sentence to be expected as opposed to the range; 
sentences were disproportionately low or high in relation to the guilt of the accused.519 
Furthermore, the prosecution and the defence are often involved in informal 
negotiation, without involving the court, as a result of which charges are dropped and 
less serious charges are proffered.520  
4.4 Comparison between common law and civil law jurisdictions 
This section includes the comparison of the criminal procedure and practice in Kenya, 
South Africa, France and Germany which affect plea negotiation in these countries in 
order to understand the commonalities and differences of plea negotiation in common 
law countries and civil law jurisdictions. 
                                            
518 Weigend and Turner (n 514) 85. 
519 Weigend and Turner (n 514) 92–93. 
520 McCleery (n 447) 1114. 
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4.4.1 Prosecutorial discretion versus compulsory prosecution  
Prosecutorial discretion refers to a range of powers the prosecutor possesses including 
whether to charge a defendant with one offence or another, whether to proceed to trial, 
and whether to drop or amend charges. Since the prosecutor is an essential part of 
plea negotiation in all the four jurisdictions, the amount and extent of prosecutorial 
discretion determines whether plea negotiation can occur in a particular jurisdiction 
and, if it can, the type, or the extent of it. In some common law countries, the 
prosecution has a very wide discretion as shown below by the practice in Kenya and 
South Africa. However, in civil law countries the prosecutor has little to no discretion 
as in the case France discussed below, where the prosecution has limited discretion; 
while in Germany, the prosecutor has no discretion due to the concept of compulsory 
prosecution. 
Kenya 
In Kenya the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the officer in charge of all criminal 
prosecutions, has the power to institute and undertake prosecutions against any 
person, take over prosecutions instituted by other persons or authority, as well as to 
discontinue at any time before judgment is delivered any proceedings instituted or 
taken over by the DPP.521 The decision of the DPP to institute or withdraw proceedings 
should be based on whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute and should 
consider issues such as the public interest, the interests of administration of justice 
and the need to prevent the abuse of the legal process.522 The DPP cannot withdraw 
a case without the permission of the Court but if the case is withdrawn, the defendant 
is acquitted. In practice, Kenyan courts are reluctant to curtail the discretion of the DPP 
to institute or withdraw cases if he gives reasons for the decision and seems to act in 
good faith.523  
                                            
521 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, art 157 (6); Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 2013, 
s 5 (1) (b).  
522 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, art 157 (11). 
523 See for example Communications Commission of Kenya v. Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions & another [2018] eKLR (the Court of Appeal in this case confirmed the discretion of the 
DPP in deciding not to institute charges). See also Seenoi Ene Parsimei Esho Sisina & 8 Others v. 
Attorney General [2013] eKLR paras 24-34 (the Court held that the DPP could exercise the power to 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za





The position in South Africa is very similar to that in Kenya in that the prosecuting 
authority in South Africa, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), has the power to 
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state.524 In instituting cases the NPA is 
guided by whether there is sufficient evidence and whether there is a reasonable 
prospect for a conviction. The NPA has the power to stop a prosecution if a plea has 
been taken; or, if due to other circumstances the prosecution becomes undesirable. In 
South Africa, unlike in Kenya, a court cannot prevent a prosecutor from withdrawing a 
case or accepting a plea.525 If the NPA stops the prosecution, the defendant is 
acquitted and may not be charged again on the same facts, however under exceptional 
circumstances, the NPA may recommence prosecution.526 The NPA is required to give 
reasons for its actions which may be challenged before the courts by affected persons 
or organisations.527 
France 
As discussed above, offences in France are categorised according to their level of 
seriousness and the sentence they attract: contravention (minor offences), délit 
(intermediate offences) and crime (serious offence). Investigations are generally 
conducted by the prosecutor, who has the discretion to decide how to handle 
complaints and denunciations.528 However, where a crime is concerned the prosecutor 
is obligated to contact an investigative judge who then proceeds with judicial 
investigations and who generally has broader investigative powers than the 
                                            
withdraw a case before judgment if he acted in good faith and took into consideration the interests of all 
concerned especially the victims). 
524 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 179 (2). 
525 Esther Steyn, ‘Plea-Bargaining in South Africa: Current Concerns and Future Prospects’ (2007) 20 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice 206, 206. 
526 ‘Prosecution Policy (Final as Revised in June 2013. 27 Nov 2014)’ pt 4 
<https://www.npa.gov.za/content/prosecution-policy-and-policy-directives>. 
527 Pieter Du Toit and Gerrit Ferreira, ‘Reasons for Prosecutorial Decisions’ (2016) 18 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 1506. 
528 French Code of Criminal Procedure 2006, s 40. 
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prosecutor. Similarly, if the matter concerns a flagrant délit,529 the prosecutor may refer 
the case to an investigative judge who would carry out investigations.  
The prosecutor has the power to decide whether to prosecute complaints received; 
although this discretion is limited by the right of the victims to institute proceedings in 
police court530 or to directly request the investigative judge to commence 
investigations. Furthermore, victims have the right to appeal the investigative 
judge’s/prosecution’s decision not to investigate and/or prosecute, although this does 
not happen often in practice.531 
Unlike in Kenya and South Africa, the French prosecutor does not have the formal 
power to drop a case once it has been filed in court or forwarded to the investigative 
judge. This power rests with the court/ the investigative judge to determine whether the 
crime fits the facts which are alleged by the prosecutor or revealed upon further 
investigation.532 Therefore, a prosecutor in France has relatively lower power during 
plea negotiation because s/he has less leverage as once the case is filed, the 
prosecutor no longer has the power to suspend or terminate proceedings. 
Germany  
Like in Kenya, South Africa, and France, the public prosecution office in Germany has 
the power to institute charges. However, unlike in these jurisdictions, in Germany there 
exists a doctrine of compulsory prosecution whereby the prosecutor is obliged “to take 
action in relation to all prosecutable criminal offences, provided there are sufficient 
factual indications.”533 There are exceptions to this rule: the public prosecuting office 
may decline to prosecute where the offence is a misdemeanour and the  perpetrator’s 
guilt is of a minor nature.534 The prosecutor’s declination is subject to the approval of 
                                            
529 This concept is very specific to the French criminal justice. See the definition and scope of the phrase 
in Keedy (n 492) 391. 
530 Petty offences in France are handled in the police court. 
531 Frase (n 497) 613. 
532 Frase (n 497) 613. 
533 The German Code of Criminal Conduct (Strafprozessordnung) as amended on 23 April 2014, s 152 
(hereinafter referred to as StPO).  
534 Herrmann (n 464) 757 (the author mentions that a misdemeanour can be set aside if the accused 
agrees to pay a sum of money to the state or to a non-governmental organization). 
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the court competent to open the main proceedings and can only be allowed where 
public interest is not concerned. However, this does not seem to limit the power of the 
prosecutor much because in practice, the court generally grants its approval.535 The 
approval of the court may be dispensed with when the misdemeanour involved is not 
subject to an increased minimum penalty and where the effect of the misdemeanour is 
minimal.536  
However, after a case has been brought before the court, the prosecutor has no power 
to discontinue prosecutions and the proceedings may only be terminated by the court, 
with the consent of the prosecution office and the accused person.537 Therefore, the 
law requires that all felonies and misdemeanours which do not fall under the above 
exceptions be prosecuted if there is sufficient evidence.538 Like in France, the victim of 
the crime may ask for the review of a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute, and if the 
decision is upheld, the victim has the right to appeal to the courts to compel 
prosecution.539 Because of limited prosecutorial discretion, a prosecutor in Germany 
has less power during plea negotiation as will be discussed below. 
4.4.2 Role of the prosecution, defence, judge and victims in plea negotiation 
The prosecution 
The role of the prosecution is the most closely related in the four jurisdictions: in Kenya, 
South Africa, France and Germany, the prosecutor conducts investigations and 
prosecutes cases therefore they have a role in plea negotiation. However, the powers 
they possess differ in that common law prosecutors generally have more powers in 
plea negotiation than in their civil law counterparts. As discussed above, the directors 
of public prosecutions in Kenya and South Africa have powers to choose which cases 
to prosecute, to choose what offences to charge the defendants with, as well as to stay 
or withdraw the cases at any time before judgment is entered. These prosecutors 
therefore have wide leverage during negotiation with defendants and defence counsel 
                                            
535 Herrmann (n 464) 759.s 
536 StPO, s 153 (1). 
537 StPO, s 153 (2). 
538 Langbein, ‘Land without Plea Bargaining’ (n 450) 211. 
539 Langbein, ‘Land without Plea Bargaining’ (n 450) 211. 
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which their civil law counterparts do not possess. These prosecutors may choose to 
charge the defendant with a lesser charge, drop some charges or not to charge at all. 
Furthermore, they could drop the case against the defendants, at any time before 
judgment is entered, in exchange for a guilty plea. These jurisdictions also allow the 
prosecutor and defence to negotiate a sentence and recommend it to the court. Though 
these sentences are by law not binding on the court, courts in Kenya and South Africa 
generally sentence within the range recommended. Therefore, prosecutors have wide, 
almost unfettered powers when they participate in plea negotiation. 
Conversely, in civil law countries, like Germany and France, prosecutors’ powers in 
relation to plea negotiation are limited.  In both France and Germany, once trial begins 
the prosecutor no longer has powers to withdraw charges, which powers now rest with 
the court. Similarly, in both countries charge bargaining is curtailed, if at all permitted: 
in France, if the offence is classified as a crime, the prosecutor must refer the case to 
an investigating judge who takes over the investigations and the prosecutor no longer 
has power. The prosecutor’s sole discretion, in this regard, therefore, is to classify an 
offence which would otherwise be a crime as a lesser offence, a délit or a 
contravention, so that the prosecutor retains the power to prosecute it in a lower court. 
Therefore, their leverage with the defendant is limited as they have less to offer 
compared to Kenyan and South African prosecutors.  
German prosecutors are perhaps even more limited because the principle of 
compulsory prosecution requires that they prosecute all cases when there is sufficient 
evidence and therefore, at least in theory, they have very little wiggle room.540 Besides, 
the law requires that negotiation be commenced by the judge who proposes an 
agreement to the prosecution and defence, therefore, leaving the prosecutor with even 
less leverage.541 In fact, in Germany, as discussed above, sometimes negotiation may 
occur between the judge and the defence without involving the prosecutor, which 
would be unheard of in common law countries. 
                                            
540 As seen in part 4.3.4 above, however, there is discrepancy between the law and practice of plea 
negotiations in Germany.  
541 As seen in part 4.3.4 above, this is not always the case in practice as sometimes plea negotiations 
may be commenced by a prosecutor. 
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In all four jurisdictions, the accused person gives up fundamental rights in plea 
agreements, therefore, it is mandatory that the accused person and his/or her counsel, 
if they have one, participate in negotiating the agreement. In fact, in South Africa it is 
mandatory for an accused person to be represented by counsel otherwise the plea 
agreement entered will not be valid. Similarly, an agreement cannot be entered into 
without the accused person’s voluntary consent. Indeed, in Kenya and South Africa, 
the defence is one of the two principal parties in plea agreements and the law permits 
the defence to commence plea negotiation. On the other hand, in France, an accused 
person has more of a negative right in that they can oppose the process of 
correctionnalisation where the prosecutor classifies a crime as a délit or contravention 
instead of a crime. In the case of CRPC, the accused is required to admit guilt and 
must be assisted by counsel. In Germany, the law provides that a judge shall propose 
an agreement to the prosecutor and defence and the agreement becomes valid when 
both the prosecutor and defence agree to it. It does not provide that the defence may 
commence negotiation, although in practice there is evidence that defence counsels 
commence negotiation, as mentioned above. 
In all four countries, the accused person gives up the right to be presumed innocent 
and the right to not give self-incriminating evidence, however in Kenya and South 
Africa, this goes even further as the accused person gives up the right to trial and the 
right to appeal a conviction. In both countries, once the accused pleads guilty, he is 
convicted based on his guilty plea and then sentenced. The accused is not allowed to 
appeal the conviction arising from a guilty plea and can only appeal the sentence. 
However, in France and Germany the accused retains their right to a fair trial and a 
trial is conducted, albeit a short one. The criminal procedure in both countries require 
that the accused be convicted only based on the evidence collected by the judge and 
therefore an accused person’s admission of guilt merely becomes part of the evidence 
at trial. Furthermore, the right to appeal is paramount and cannot be waived by a plea 
agreement, therefore even if an accused person confesses and is convicted at trial, 
s/he still has recourse to appeal the conviction. 
The defence seems to have more leverage in the negotiation in France and Germany 
where the defence counsel has access to the evidence collected by the prosecutor and 
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the judge, therefore they negotiate from a point of knowledge. In both countries, all the 
relevant evidence collected by the judge and the prosecutor are put in a dossier to 
which both parties and the judge have access. This is unlike the defence in Kenya and 
South Africa who negotiate based on the prosecutor’s assertions because they have 
no access to the entire prosecutor’s files. Once the trial begins, the law provides for 
disclosure of information to the defence, but this only covers some documents and 
does not necessarily extend to the entirety of the evidence in the prosecutor’s 
possession. Therefore, as compared to their civil law counter parts, the defence in 
Kenya and South Africa negotiate without ever fully knowing the extent of the evidence 
in the prosecutor’s possession and this may lead to overcharging by the prosecutors 
in order to force the accused to plead guilty, a phenomenon which will be discussed 
below.  
The other issue relates to the ability of the accused person to retract the confession or 
guilty plea. In this regard, the French and German accused persons have an advantage 
over the Kenyan and South African ones as the law permits them to withdraw their 
confessions at any time before judgment is entered. Although, as discussed above, 
the practicality of this right is limited by the fact that even if a confession is withdrawn, 
it is still introduced as evidence, accompanied by a statement to the effect that it was 
withdrawn. Another aspect which weakens the position of the accused in Germany, as 
discussed above, is that judges can set aside an agreement if it becomes apparent 
that important factual or legal factors were not considered, if such factors arise later or 
based on the behaviour of the accused during trial. After the agreement is set aside, 
the confession cannot be used as evidence, however, the accused stands trial before 
the same judges who were part of the negotiation.  
On the other hand, plea agreements in Kenya and South Africa are more binding in 
that, once an agreement is entered between the prosecution and the defence and 
approved by the judge, and subsequently the accused has pleaded guilty, the accused 
person cannot withdraw the guilty plea unless he proves that there was 
misrepresentation on the part of the prosecutor. Furthermore, a judge can only set 
aside the agreement under certain strict criteria, for example, if it was not voluntary or 
unequivocal. If the agreement is set aside, in both South Africa and Kenya, the accused 
has a right to be tried before a different presiding officer, but the accused can waive 
this right. 
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Similarly, in Kenya and South Africa, the agreement entered into is formal and written 
in a specified form and it lays out the facts agreed upon, the sentence, as well as the 
rights forfeited by the accused; this agreement is signed by both the defence and the 
prosecutor and it becomes part of the case record. This protects the accused in that it 
is clear what the content of the agreement is and anything that does not form part of 
the written agreement cannot be relied upon to the accused person’s detriment. On 
the other hand, France and Germany do not have written agreements. Practice reflects 
that a lot of informal negotiation occur between the parties, sometimes on the phone, 
and often there is no record of these anywhere. This puts the accused in a precarious 
position in that the terms of the agreement cannot be verified. In Germany, the law 
requires that the essence, content and consequence of an agreement be entered on 
the case record. However, as mentioned above, some judges surveyed admitted that 
they did not always follow this rule and that some agreements entered were not 
recorded.  
The judge    
The role of the judge in plea negotiation is one of the main distinguishing factors 
between civil law and common law countries. In Kenya and South Africa, the judge 
does not participate in negotiation but is involved in scrutinizing the agreement to 
confirm that all the formal and substantive requirements have been fulfilled and that 
the rights of the accused person have been respected. The judge receives a 
sentencing recommendation from the agreement entered into by the defence and the 
prosecution but is not bound by it. However, in Germany the judge is an active 
participant in negotiation. Indeed, according to the criminal procedure code, the judge 
proposes an agreement to the parties and can state the upper and the lower limit of 
the sentence. This rule is justified by the fact that judges in Germany not only have 
investigative powers but also have access to the complete prosecution file which 
means access to all the relevant information in a case, which is not the case for judges 
in Kenya and South Africa. A German judge therefore proposes an agreement from a 
position of full knowledge and does not need to scrutinise the agreement because s/he 
was party to it. 
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In all four jurisdictions, victims have a remote role in plea negotiation. In Kenya and in 
South Africa, the prosecutor when negotiating a plea agreement is to take into 
consideration the views of the victims unless the circumstances do not permit. 
Furthermore, in these two jurisdictions victims sign the plea agreement if it involves 
issues of compensation. This a weak standard of victim involvement as they are only 
involved at the discretion of the prosecutor who determines if the circumstances permit 
and the law does not provide for a means for the victims to appeal the decision of the 
prosecutor if it is against victims’ interests.  
On the other hand, victims have more rights in the procedural law, and as a result in 
plea negotiation, in civil law countries such as France and Germany. In France, for 
example, a victim has a right to appeal against the decision of a prosecutor to decline 
prosecution or to file a case with the investigating judge or at the Police Court directly, 
thereby bypassing the filtering mechanisms of the prosecutor. Similarly, in Germany, 
the victims of crime have a right to participate in proceedings as “supplementary 
prosecutors” which gives them rights similar to those of prosecutors during plea 
negotiation.542 
4.4.4. The bargain with serious crimes 
Some commentators have argued against the introduction of plea negotiation in 
international criminal tribunals (the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC) because, they argue 
that, the crimes involved are too grievous to permit negotiation with perpetrators.543 
The practice in national jurisdictions is varied in the sense that common law 
jurisdictions, as in the case of Kenya and South Africa discussed above, allow for plea 
bargaining for all crimes, including serious crimes. However, the Kenyan law makes 
an exception when it comes to sexual offences and international crimes (genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity).544 On the other hand, their civil law counterparts 
are more reluctant to allow for negotiations in relation to serious crimes. In France, for 
                                            
542 See StPO, s 395-402. See also Weigend and Turner (n 514) 99. 
543 See discussion in chapter 5.  
544 Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, s 137 N. 
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example, CRPC is only allowed for offences which attract a maximum penalty of five 
years and excludes sexual offences.545 
4.4.5 Sentence bargaining and charge bargaining 
Plea negotiation may occur in at least two ways: charge bargaining and sentence 
bargaining. Charge bargaining involves the amendment of a charge to a less serious 
one, or the dismissal of certain charges or the dropping of charges all together in 
exchange for a guilty plea. Common law countries generally practice charge bargaining 
for example in Kenya and South Africa, the director of public prosecution has the power 
to commence prosecution, take over prosecution commenced by other entities, as well 
as, to stay or terminate prosecutions at any time before judgment is entered. In this 
regard, prosecutors can bargain to reduce charges, amend them and even drop them 
altogether at any time before judgment is entered. 
The position in civil law countries is different, for example, the law in Germany does 
not allow for charge bargaining because of the principle of compulsory prosecution 
which mandates the prosecutor to prosecute all crimes if there is evidence. 
Prosecutors therefore lack the power, in law, to reduce charges in exchange for a 
confession, although the practice seems to be different as discussed above. Similarly, 
in France, charge bargaining is not provided for in the criminal code. However, in 
practice prosecutors perform correctionnalisation through which they change the 
characterization of an offence, which would ordinarily amount to a crime, thereby 
characterising it as a délit or a contravention and prosecuting it in a lower court. 
Commentators equate this practice to charge bargaining in common law countries. 
However, as discussed in part 4.3.3 above, there are differences between charge 
bargaining and correctionnalisation. 
The second type of bargaining, sentence bargaining, occurs when the sentence 
resulting from a plea agreement is lower than that which would have been imposed 
after a regular trial. This practice occurs in both common law and civil law countries. 
For example, in South Africa, the accused person and the defence often agree on an 
accepted range of sentencing, which the court must accept if it accepts the plea 
agreement, otherwise the defendant is entitled to withdraw from the agreement. 
                                            
545 The French Code of Criminal Procedure, s 495-7. 
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Similarly, in France when a defendant pleads guilty under the CRPC regime, s/he is to 
be sentenced to a maximum of one-year imprisonment. Likewise, in Germany, the 
judge is permitted to indicate to the defendant the range of sentence that would be 
imposed by the court if the defendant admits guilt. However, unlike in common law 
countries, the court is not strictly bound to this indication even if it accepts the plea 
agreement and might deviate from it if it becomes apparent that the proposed sentence 
does not fit the crime. 
4.5 Critique of plea negotiation 
Plea negotiation is a controversial practice  many commentators find the practice to 
be repugnant to justice. In fact, any sort of bargain in the arena of crime and 
punishment often excites criticism546  and justifiably so, since the idea of bargaining 
with justice is unsettling. Similarly, since agreements are negotiated in private, there is 
lack of transparency which is often associated with a trial in open court through which 
guilt is publicly established. This therefore leads to public mistrust because the public 
sees the result (the plea agreement and/or conviction) but not the process through 
which it was arrived at. For example, in its infancy, plea bargaining in the US was 
shrouded in secrecy and accompanied by corruption among those involved in the 
bargaining process including police officers, prosecutors and politicians.547 The 
general mistrust against plea bargaining is therefore justified. 
This section deals with the issues arising from the process of plea negotiation itself 
rather than the philosophical or policy issues around the idea of it. In this regard, since 
the practice in common law jurisdictions varies from their civil law counterparts, this 
section examines issues which are common to both forms of jurisdictions.  
                                            
546 Other practices involving some sort of bargain in criminal practice have been heavily criticised as 
well. For example, the practice of compounding where the defendant would pay money to the victim to 
avoid prosecution or the practice of approvement where the accused confessed his crime and provided 
information to be used in the prosecution of his/her accomplices, in exchange for pardon. Both practices 
were heavily criticized during their existence and were therefore abolished. See Alschuler, ‘Plea 
Bargaining and Its History’ (n 435) 14. 
547 Alschuler, ‘Plea Bargaining and Its History’ (n 435) 26. 
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4.5.1 Judicial economy and efficiency  
The main argument for plea bargaining is that it saves judicial time and resources and 
increases the efficiency of case disposal.548 Full trials are costly, and sometimes 
lengthy because of complex procedural rules or evidentiary challenges and therefore 
plea negotiation, which lead to convictions in common law countries and shorter trials 
in civil law countries, serve to shorten the proceedings and save costs. It can also help 
in reducing the caseload in courts and clearing backlogs.  
Additionally, sometimes when defendants plead guilty, they cooperate with the 
prosecutors by providing useful evidence which may be used in other cases and this 
is important especially with regard to organised crime. 549 In the same vein, since trials 
are very uncertain, some see plea negotiation as a chance of ensuring conviction and 
thereby increasing certainty in trials. This is beneficial to the prosecutor who is assured 
of a conviction and can therefore concentrate on more meritorious cases, thereby 
increasing the quality of prosecution. Similarly, an accused person, even when unjustly 
accused,550 would be willing to take a certain, but lower sentence, resulting from plea 
negotiation instead of risking a higher sentence upon conviction at trial.551  There is 
consensus that plea negotiation ensures judicial economy and efficiency; the 
contention, however, is whether this benefit accrues at the expense of the 
administration of justice, and this is discussed below.552  
                                            
548 Nuno Garoupa and Frank H Stephen, ‘Why Plea-Bargaining Fails to Achieve Results in So Many 
Criminal Justice Systems: A New Framework for Assessment’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 323, 326. 
549 Strang (n 444) 30. 
550 See Albert W Alschuler, ‘The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining’ (1968) 36 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 50, 61 (the author illustrates this point by discussing the account of a defence 
counsel whose client, though innocent, chose to plead guilty to a lesser offence rather than take the risk 
of conviction of a more serious offence at trial).  
551 Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Plea Bargaining as Compromise’ (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1969, 
1969. 
552 Michael Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency - Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals’ (2004) 
2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1070. 
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4.5.2 Rights of the defendant 
One of the objections against plea negotiation at the national level is the idea that the 
state is bargaining or making deals with criminals and that criminals are getting less 
than they deserve; but this is not always true.553 In fact, by entering into a plea 
agreement, a defendant gives up fundamental procedural and substantive rights. This 
is especially true in common law countries, like Kenya and South Africa, as discussed 
above. The rights waived by the accused in these countries include: the right to a full 
trial, the right to plead not guilty and persist in that plea, the right not to give self-
incriminating evidence, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain silent, 
the right to examine or have examined by his/her legal representatives all the 
prosecution witnesses; the right to present witnesses in his/her defence; as well as the 
right to appeal conviction arising from the guilty plea.  
The rights waived by the accused persons in civil law countries, like France and 
Germany, are lower since the law mandates, although things seem different in 
practice,554 that an accused person cannot be convicted based solely on the admission 
of guilt, but rather based on the truth as unveiled by the court. Therefore, the 
defendants still undergo trial, albeit a short one, and they retain the right to appeal both 
the conviction and the sentence which cannot be waived in the plea agreement. 
Nevertheless, the defendants still give up fundamental procedural rights even in civil 
law countries as described in part 4.3 above. 
In the same vein, there is concern that plea negotiation puts pressure on innocent 
defendants to either plead guilty or risk more severe punishment for exercising their 
right to trial.555 One scholar, Langbein, equated plea bargaining in the US to torture in 
mediaeval Europe. In this regard, he argues that: 
“We coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to confess his 
guilt. To be sure, our means are much politer; we use no rack, no thumbscrew, 
no Spanish boot to mash his legs. But like the Europeans of distant centuries 
who did employ those machines, we make it terribly costly for an accused to 
                                            
553 Bekker (n 434) 173. 
554 See discussion in part 4.3.4 above. 
555 Alschuler, ‘The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining’ (n 550) 60. 
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claim his right to the constitutional safeguard of trial. We threaten him with a 
materially increased sanction if he avails himself of his right and is thereafter 
convicted. This sentencing differential is what makes plea bargaining 
coercive.”556 
This coercion goes to subvert the accused’s rights to trial guaranteed by the laws of 
most countries and universal human rights principles.  
Commentators suggest at least two remedies: first, some argue for an increase in 
statutory regulation of plea negotiation to protect the rights of the defendants. However, 
some practitioners express concern that regulation may interfere with the discretion of 
those negotiating and prevent them from obtaining the best possible outcomes during 
the negotiation.557 Arguments have also been made to increase judicial oversight 
during plea negotiation, especially in common law countries, since this is already a 
feature of plea negotiation in civil law countries. In this regard, one scholar states that 
“though judicial involvement is not likely to eliminate all risks of plea bargaining, it is 
likely to minimize some of the gravest dangers of the practice: that a plea bargain does 
not reflect the true facts of the case, is unfair to the defendant, or is inconsistent with 
the public interest.”558  
Another issue which relates to the rights of the defendant concerns the equality of arms 
between the prosecution and the defence. In most jurisdictions, the prosecution has 
the backing and the resources of the state, whereas the defendant is a private person 
with relatively limited resources. Therefore, in many instances, unless the defendant is 
rich and can afford an army of lawyers, the negotiation occurs between parties who 
are unequal. Things seem different in civil law countries, like Germany and France, 
where the defence counsel has access to the entire prosecution file and knows exactly 
what evidence is in the dossier and therefore bargains from a point of knowledge unlike 
                                            
556 John H Langbein, ‘Torture and Plea Bargaining’ The University of Chicago Law Review 20, 12. 
557 Brook and others (n 436) 1196. 
558 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View’ (2006) 54 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 199, 202. See also generally McCleery (n 447) (the author 
discusses the lessons which the ICTY, whose procedural law is predominantly modelled after the 
common law system, may learn from the practices in civil law countries). 
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defence counsel in common law jurisdictions. 559 Similarly, during CRPC procedure in 
France, it is mandatory that an accused be represented by a lawyer either at the 
accused expense or at the states expense if the accused is indigent; thereby ensuring 
a higher protection of the defendant’s rights.  
4.5.3 Impact on victims  
There are at least two contrasting views about the impact of plea negotiation on victims 
of crime. The first is that if plea negotiation leads to an accused person admitting guilt 
it saves the victims the need to testify and to face their abusers in open court thereby 
preventing the re-traumatization of victims, especially victims of violent crimes.560 
However, the other perspective is that victims are denied the opportunity to tell their 
stories which could be therapeutic in certain instances.  Some jurisdictions mitigate 
this by allowing victims to participate in plea negotiation, for example, in Germany and 
France victims can apply to become civil parties to a criminal trial, while in Kenya and 
South Africa the victims sign, and therefore are party to the plea agreement, if it 
includes a clause on compensation of the victim. 
4.5.4 Other penological purposes 
In most instances, plea negotiation involves the accused person’s admission of guilt 
and acceptance of responsibility for the crime committed. This could commence the 
process of rehabilitation of the victim and reintegration into the society.561 The judges 
at the ICTY and ICTR stressed this aspect of plea bargain as a factor which can 
contribute to reconciliation in the post-conflict area, as discussed in the next chapter. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the plea negotiation in national jurisdictions focusing on 
common law and civil law jurisdictions. The legal culture and procedural law in these 
countries are different but the idea of negotiated criminal justice continues to grow in 
both legal traditions albeit practiced differently. This chapter examined the practice in 
                                            
559 Herrmann (n 464) 764. 
560 Strang (n 444) 30. 
561 Strang (n 444) 30. 
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Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany since they are representative of common 
law and civil law legal cultures; and they are all states parties to the Rome Statute 
therefore representative of the legal practice at the ICC. The chapter outlined the 
definition and scope of plea negotiation as well as its development and the justification. 
It also explored the salient features of plea negotiation in Kenya, South Africa, France 
and Germany and on that basis compared and contrasted plea negotiation in common 
law and civil law countries. Finally, the chapter discussed the main arguments for and 
against plea negotiation in national jurisdictions. The next chapter will explore plea 



























CHAPTER 5: PLEA NEGOTIATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA  
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter, Chapter 4, contained a comparative analysis of the practice of 
plea negotiation in Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany. The aim of this study 
was to understand how plea negotiation is practiced in common law jurisdictions, 
exemplified by Kenya and South Africa, on the one hand; and plea negotiation as 
practiced in civil law jurisdictions exemplified by France and Germany, on the other 
hand. Since the procedural law of the ICC draws from both common law and civil law 
practices, it is envisioned that such a study will help in understanding how plea 
negotiation would be practiced at the ICC, if at all. In the same vein, this chapter 
focuses on plea negotiation in the ICC’s ad hoc predecessors, namely the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The chapter focuses on the justification for the 
introduction of plea negotiation in these tribunals, the application thereof, the 
challenges faced, and the lessons learnt. This discussion is with a view to 
understanding how plea negotiation was practiced at the ad hoc tribunals and what 
lessons, if any, the ICC may draw from it.  
To aid in this discussion it is important to define two terms which will be utilised in this 
chapter and in the remainder of the thesis and these are: “confession” and “guilty plea”. 
A confession may be given by an accused person concerning any aspect of the crimes 
charged, and at any time during the proceedings. It is considered as evidence to be 
considered in addition to other evidence produced at trial. On the other hand, plea 
taking is a procedural step done at the commencement of trial where the court informs 
an accused person of the charges levelled against them and they are provided with an 
opportunity to take a plea. If they plead guilty, and after the court ensures that certain 
procedural safeguards have been adhered to, a court generally proceeds to convict 
the accused person on the basis of the guilty plea. Guilty pleas and confessions are 
linked to plea negotiation in the sense that an agreement entered between the 
prosecutor and the defence, as a result of negotiation, may lead to the accused person 
issuing a confession or entering a guilty plea in exchange for charging or sentencing 
concessions offered by the prosecutor. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: the current section, part one, deals with the 
introduction. Part two discusses the organization and procedural law at the ad hoc 
tribunals. Where appropriate, the similarities and/or differences with the procedural law 
at the ICC will be pointed out. The objective of this discussion is to establish, at the 
end of the dissertation, how the structure and procedural law of the ad hoc tribunals 
compares to that of the ICC; and, whether plea negotiation would be compatible with 
the structure and procedural law at the ICC. Part three deals with the introduction of 
plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals. In this regard, it discusses the functional need 
for the adoption of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals and the circumstances which 
led to such introduction. By way of illustration, it discusses two cases, the Prosecutor 
v Drazen Erdemović from the ICTY; and the Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda from the 
ICTR, which were the first cases involving guilty pleas at the respective tribunals. 
Part four illustrates, with reference to the jurisprudence from the ICTY and the ICTR, 
the emergence of a streamlined practice of plea negotiation at both tribunals. In this 
regard, the essential elements of a valid guilty plea are discussed, and these are: 
whether the plea is voluntary, informed; and, unequivocal and whether is accompanied 
by a sufficient factual basis. Part four also discusses the interpretation of these 
elements and the standard applied by the various Trial Chambers to satisfy themselves 
that a plea was valid. Lastly, this part discusses to what extent a guilty plea was 
considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
Part five critiques the practice of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals. The judges 
at both Tribunals stated that a guilty plea was beneficial because it saves judicial 
resources, and leads to the establishment of historical truth, and fosters reconciliation. 
This part examines whether guilty pleas, procured as a result of plea negotiation, 
indeed serves these purposes. Finally, part 6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Organization and procedural law of the ad hoc tribunals 
5.2.1 Establishment and composition  
The ICTY was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to prosecute the persons responsible for the violations 
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of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia from 1991.562 
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was a result of succession wars within and among 
the six states563 and two autonomous provinces564 which formed part of the former 
Yugoslavia. Over 100,000 people were killed, over 2 million were displaced, and 
thousands of women, girls, men, and boys were raped during the conflict.565  The ICTY 
had jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of 
laws or customs of war, other war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity 
committed during this war.566 
The ICTR was also established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to prosecute 
persons most responsible for genocide and other violations of international 
humanitarian law, in Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for similar violations 
in neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.567 During 
that period there was an ethnic conflict between the two major ethnic groups in 
Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis, leading to the death of about 1 million people, mostly 
Tutsis, in about 100 days.568 The ICTR had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II committed during the conflict in Rwanda.569 
                                            
562 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as 
amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993, preamble. 
563 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. 
564 Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
565 ‘The Conflicts | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ 
<http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/conflicts> accessed 18 July 2018. 
566 ICTY Statute  arts 2,3,4, and 5.  
567 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 
13 October 2006), 8 November 1994, preamble.  
568 The number of people who died in the Rwandan genocide is a controversial issue with different 
sources stating significantly different estimates. For example, according to the government of Rwanda 
about 1,070,014 Tutsi were killed in about 100 days. See  ‘Background’ (National Commission for the 
Fight against Genocide) <http://cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/background/#.WOqNvaJBrIU> accessed 18 July 
2018. While the Commission of Experts established by the UNSC in 1994 states that an estimated 
number of 500,000 people died during the conflict but acknowledges this to be a conservative figure. 
See ‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
935 (1994) Annex to UN Doc S/1994/1405 (9 December 1994)’.  
569 ICTR Statute, art 2,3 and 4. 
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Both the ICTR and the ICTY consisted of Chambers, comprised of Trial Chamber and 
Appeals Chamber; the latter which was shared between the two institutions.570 It is 
noteworthy that unlike the ICC, neither the ICTY nor the ICTR had Pre-Trial 
Chambers.571 Therefore, pre-trial proceedings were conducted by the Trial Chamber 
or by a pre-trial judge appointed from the Trial Chamber as discussed below.572  The 
ICTY and the ICTR judges were appointed by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) from a list provided by the UNSC. 573 The ICTY judges had the power to adopt 
the rules of procedure and evidence, which were applicable to the ICTY, and to the 
ICTR with relevant changes adopted by the ICTR judges.574 This is different from the 
ICC system where the rules of procedure and evidence are adopted by the Assembly 
of States Parties (ASP) as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The ad hoc Tribunals each had a Prosecutor, and a Registry – the latter servicing both 
the Chamber and the Prosecution.575 In the beginning, the ICTY and ICTR shared the 
Office of the Prosecutor, however, this was changed in 2003 when the UNSC amended 
Article 15 of the ICTR Statute to allow for the appointment of a Prosecutor of the ICTR, 
separate from that of the ICTY.576 The Registrars and the Prosecutors of both 
institutions were appointed by the UN Secretary General.577 
Both the ICTY and ICTR have since closed: the ICTR on 31 December 2015 and the 
ICTY on 31 December 2017. The United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal 
                                            
570 ICTR Statute, art 13.  
571 The Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC is an innovation introduced by the drafters of the Rome Statute to 
ensure judicial supervision of the prosecutorial powers and duties among other functions. See part 2.3.2 
of this dissertation. 
572 ICTY RPE Rule 65 ter (A). 
573 ICTY Statute , arts 13 bis and 13 ter and ICTR Statute  arts 12 bis and 12 ter.  The UNSC chose 
from a list of nominees presented by UN States parties and non-member States maintaining permanent 
observer missions at United Nations Headquarters. The process of election of judges is marred by 
politics, just like the ICC. See generally Mackenzie and others (n 142). 
574 ICTR Statute  art 14 and ICTY Statute  art 15. The rules of procedure adopted by the judges in this 
regard were: ICTY RPE; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and evidence 
(as amended on 13 May 2015), Adopted on n 29 June 1995. 
575 ICTY Statute, art 11 and ICTR Statute art 10.  
576 see ‘UNSC Resolution 1503 (28 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1503’. 
577 ICTY Statute, art 17 and ICTR Statute art 16. 
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Tribunals (MICT), established by the UNSC on 22 December 2010 currently carries 
out the residual functions of both the ICTY and the ICTR.578 These functions include 
finding and trying of fugitives, hearing of appeals, supervising sentence enforcement, 
continued protection of witnesses and taking care of the ad hoc tribunal archives. The 
MICT commenced operations on 1 July 2012 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 
and on 1 July 2013 in The Hague, the Netherlands, inheriting the functions of the ICTR 
and ICTY, respectively.579 
 
5.2.2 Procedural law at the ad hoc tribunals 
Investigation and indictment 
The ICTY and the ICTR had identical procedural law in terms of investigation and 
indictment. The Prosecutor had the power to initiate investigations ex officio or based 
on information received from the United Nations, Governments, and intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations.580 The Prosecutor then had the power to 
question suspects and witnesses, collect evidence and conduct on-site 
investigations.581 The suspect, if questioned, had the right to counsel or the right to 
legal assistance without payment in case they could not afford counsel. The suspect 
also had a right to translation into a language s/he fully understands and speaks. The 
Prosecutor would issue an indictment, if satisfied that a prima facie case exists, and 
the indictment would contain a concise statement of the facts and crimes with which 
the accused is charged.582  
Pre-trial Proceedings 
A judge of the Trial Chamber would review the indictment and confirm it if satisfied that 
a prima facie case had been established, otherwise the indictment would be dismissed. 
                                            
578 ‘About the MICT’ (n 78). 
579 ‘About the MICT’ (n 78). 
580 ICTY Statute art 18 and ICTR Statute art 17. 
581 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and evidence (as 
amended on 8 July 2015), 11 February 1994, Rule 39. 
582 ICTY Statute art 18 and ICTR Statute art 17. 
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After confirmation, the judge, upon the request of the Prosecutor, had the power to 
issue orders such as warrants of arrest or summons to appear.583 
As mentioned above, the ad hoc tribunals, unlike the ICC did not have a pre-trial 
chamber and therefore pre-trial proceedings were conducted by the Trial Chamber or 
by a pre-trial judge appointed from the Trial Chamber.584 At this stage, the Trial 
Chamber or the single judge appointed for this purpose read the indictment, ensured 
that the rights of the accused are respected, confirmed that s/he understood the charge 
and instructed the accused to enter a plea.585 If the accused entered a plea of not guilty 
a trial date would be set by the Registrar. However, if the accused person pleaded 
guilty, the Trial Chamber would ensure that the guilty plea was unequivocal, voluntary, 
and informed; and that there was sufficient factual basis of the crime and the accused’s 
participation in it.586 Once satisfied of these factors the Trial Chamber would enter a 
plea of guilty and order the Registrar to set a date for sentencing hearing.587  
Both the ICTY and ICTR RPE provided for a plea agreement concluded between the 
prosecution and the defence.588 As discussed below, plea agreements were not 
provided for in the initial versions of the ICTY and ICTR RPE adopted in February 1994 
and June 1995, respectively, and were continuously amended as from 1997, when the 
need arose.589 According to the amended provisions, if an accused person entered a 
guilty plea, based on a plea agreement, the Prosecutor may agree to: apply to the Trial 
Chamber to amend the indictment; submit to the Trial Chamber that a sentence or a 
sentencing range is appropriate; and/or not oppose the submission of the accused for 
a particular sentence or a sentencing range.590 However, such agreements were not 
binding on the Trial Chamber. If an agreement was reached, it would as a rule be 
                                            
583 ICTY Statute art 19 and ICTR Statute art 18. 
584 ICTY RPE Rule 65 ter (A). 
585 ICTY Statute art 20 and ICTR Statute art 19. 
586 ICTY RPE Rule 62 bis; ICTR RPE Rule 62. 
587 ICTY RPE Rule 62 bis; ICTR RPE Rule 62. 
588 ICTY RPE Rule 62 bis and 62 ter; ICTR RPE Rules 62 and 62 bis. 
589 See part 4.4 below. 
590 ICTY RPE Rule 62 ter (A); ICTR RPE Rule 62 bis (A). 
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disclosed in open Court at the time the accused entered the guilty plea, however, this 
was sometimes carried out in closed session if good cause was shown.591  
This process of dealing with guilty pleas provided for in the Statutes and RPEs of the 
ad hoc tribunals was drawn from the practice in common law countries, where a guilty 
plea, if considered valid by the judges, generally results in conviction.592 By contrast, 
generally in civil law countries, an accused person’s confession of guilt merely forms 
part of evidence to be examined by the judge in making the decision.593 
Trial 
Trial began by optional opening statements – the defence had the option to defer its 
opening statements until after the presentation of the Prosecutor’s case but before the 
commencement of the defence case.594 If the defence opted to defer its opening 
statement, the accused would sometimes be authorised by the Trial Chamber to issue 
a statement at the beginning of the trial.595 Trial at the ad hoc tribunals leaned more 
towards adversarial system prevalent in common law jurisdictions since, for example, 
the investigation and indictment was conducted by the Prosecutor, as opposed to the 
judge.596 This is further demonstrated by the sequence of the presentation of evidence 
which commenced by the Prosecutor, then defence, then prosecution evidence in 
rebuttal, then defence evidence in rejoinder. Subsequently, any further evidence 
ordered by the Trial Chamber would be presented as well as any relevant information 
necessary to aid the Chamber in entering an appropriate sentence upon conviction. 597  
                                            
591 ICTY RPE Rule ter (C); ICTR RPE Rule 62 bis (C). 
592 See for example the opinion expressed by judge Cassese in The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović 
(Appeal Judgment Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese) IT-96-22-T (7 October 1997) 
[7]. See also discussion in Chapter 4. 
593 Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese)  (n 592) para 7. See also discussion in Chapter 
4. 
594 ICTY RPE Rule 84; ICTR RPE Rule 84. 
595 ICTY RPE Rule 84 bis. This provision is unique to the ICTY RPE; therefore, an equivalent does not 
exist in the ICTR RPE. 
596 Steven R Ratner and Jason S Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford University Press 2001) 169. 
597 ICTY RPE Rule 85 (A); ICTR RPE Rule 85 (A). 
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It is worth noting the difference with the procedural law of the ICC, in that the ICC RPE 
provides that the prosecution and the defence are to agree on the order and manner 
in which evidence is to be presented to the Trial Chamber.598 If they fail to agree, the 
Trial Chamber is to issue directions on the conduct of proceedings. In theory, therefore, 
a trial at the ICC, unlike at the ad hoc tribunals, could begin with the presentation of 
evidence by the defence, if the parties agree to it. In practice however, Trial Chambers 
in each case at the ICC usually issue directions on the conduct of proceedings 
according to which trials begin with the presentation of evidence by the Prosecutor, 
followed by the victims’ representative, then the defence, then the prosecution rebuttal, 
then defence rejoinder, more like at the ad hoc tribunals.599 
During the presentation of evidence at the ad hoc tribunals, both parties were permitted 
to conduct the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of witnesses and the judge 
was authorized to ask additional questions.600 After the presentation of evidence both 
the Prosecutor and Defence would make closing arguments where they would address 
sentencing matters, among other things.601 It is noteworthy that typically common law 
terms such as ‘examination-in-chief’ and ‘cross-examination’ were employed in the 
ICTY and ICTR RPE to refer to the questioning of witnesses. By contrast the ICC, 
which has a relatively more hybrid procedural law, avoids such terms, instead referring 
to the process simply as questioning witnesses.602 In practice Trial Chambers at the 
ICC sometimes distinguish between the party questioning the witness using descriptive 
words such as questioning by the calling party and questioning by the non-calling party, 
respectively.603 
                                            
598 ICC RPE Rule 140 (1). 
599 See for example The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Annex A to Decision 
adopting amended and supplemented directions on the conduct of the proceedings) ICC-02/11-01/15-
498-AnxA (4 May 2016) [1]. See also The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Directions on the 
conduct of the proceedings) ICC-01/05-01/08-1023 (19 November 2010) [5].  
600 ICTY RPE Rule 85 (B). 
601 ICTY RPE Rule 86. 
602 See for example ICC RPE Rule 140 (2) and Regulations of the Court, Regulation 43. 
603 See for example Gbagbo and  Blé Goudé (Amended directions on the conduct of proceedings) (n 
599). 
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Judgment and Sentencing 
After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the presiding judge of the ad hoc 
tribunals declared the trial closed and deliberations occurred in private. The judges 
entered a conviction if, by majority, they found that the charges against the accused 
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.604 Sentencing at the ad hoc tribunals was 
limited to imprisonment, the most severe sentence being imprisonment for the 
remainder of the convicted person’s life.605 The length of imprisonment was determined 
considering a number of factors namely: the general practice regarding sentencing in 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively; the gravity of the offence; the extent 
to which a sentence imposed by a national court of any state, on the same person for 
the same act, has already been served;  as well as mitigating factors. 606 In mitigation, 
the RPE of the ad hoc Tribunals expressly required Trial Chamber to consider 
cooperation of the accused with the prosecution before or after conviction.607 The 
judges considered these, as well as other factors including a guilty plea, remorse, 
duress, mental capacity during commission of crime and personal circumstances of 
the accused such as age, as discussed below.608   
In addition to imprisonment, the convicted person could also be ordered to return 
property acquired through criminal activity to the rightful owners.609 
Appeal 
As mentioned above, the ICTR and the ICTY shared an Appeals Chamber. In both 
Tribunals, the defence and prosecution had the right to appeal against both a 
conviction and an acquittal based on an error of law invalidating the decision or an 
error of fact occasioning miscarriage of justice. The Appeal’s Chamber could affirm, 
reverse or revise a decision of the Trial Chamber.610 In a few exceptional cases, the 
Appeals Chamber would remit the case to a different Trial Chamber for reconsideration 
                                            
604 ICTY RPE Rule 87 (A) and ICTR RPE Rule 87 (A). 
605 ICTY RPE Rule 101 (A) and ICTR RPE Rule 101 (A). 
606 ICTY Statute art 24 and ICTR Statute art 23; ICTY RPE Rule 101 and ICTR RPE Rule 101. 
607 ICTY RPE Rule 101 (B) (2) and ICTR RPE Rule 101 (B) (2). 
608 See discussion in part 5.4.3 of this dissertation. 
609 ICTY Statute art 24 (3) and ICTR Statute art 23 (3). 
610 ICTY Statute art 25 and ICTR Statute art 24. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za




as occurred, for example, at the ICTY in the Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović discussed 
below.611 
5.3 The introduction of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals 
The introduction of plea negotiation at the ad hoc Tribunals was a highly contested 
issue. Both the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes as well as their RPE, as initially adopted, 
deliberately avoided making provisions for plea negotiation.612 In 1994, during the 
adoption of the ICTY RPE, on which the ICTR RPE is based, representatives of the 
United States of America proposed the inclusion of a provision providing for partial or 
complete immunity for accused persons in exchange for their cooperation. This 
suggestion was rejected. Judge Antonio Cassese, the then President of the ICTY, 
stated that the ICTY had the task of prosecuting persons suspected of the most serious 
international crimes, and such persons should not be immune from prosecution no 
matter how helpful their testimony was.613 
As a result, initially there was no framework to govern guilty pleas and plea agreements 
in either tribunal. When two accused persons, Drazen Erdemović at the ICTY and Jean 
Kambanda at the ICTR, pleaded guilty in 1996 and 1998 respectively, their guilty pleas 
were dealt with in an inconsistent manner, as discussed below. In 1999, the ICTY RPE 
was amended, a process which was informed by the guidelines, discussed in detail 
below, set by the Appeals Chamber in Erdemovic regarding the validity of guilty 
pleas.614 Later in 2001, when the ad hoc tribunals, prompted by reasons discussed 
                                            
611 See part 5.3.1 below. 
612 See Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese) (n 592) para 10. In this dissenting opinion, 
Judge Cassese stated that: 
“Both the Statute and the Rules deliberately do not make provision for plea bargaining - or, at 
least, of any endorsement or acknowledgement by the Chambers of out of court plea bargaining. 
This means, among other things, that the framers of the Statute and the Rules aimed at averting 
those distortions of the free will of the accused which may be linked to plea bargaining." 
613 Speech of ICTY President Antonio Cassese to the Diplomatic Missions on 11 February 1994 
reprinted in Morris and Scharf (n 29) 652. 
614 Rule 62 bis of the ICTY RPE (similar to Rule 62 of the ICTR RPE) which deal with the validity of guilty 
pleas was adopted in 1997 and amended in 1999. 
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below, changed their stance to welcome plea negotiation, the RPE of both tribunals 
were further amended to regulate plea agreements.615  
5.3.1 The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović 
First sentencing judgment  
During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Srebrenica had been designated as a safe 
zone by the UN, excluding it from being a legitimate military target, and therefore 
thousands of Bosnian Muslims took refuge there.616 However, from 5 July 1995, 
Srebrenica was attacked by the Bosnian Serb army and when it fell to them on 11 July 
1995, the Bosnian Muslims fled and sought refuge in other places. Among the fleeing 
population of Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb army and police separated men from 
women and children and these men were transported to various locations, among them 
the Branjevo farm in Pilica, where they were executed.617  
The accused, Drazen Erdemović, a soldier and a member of a unit stationed in 
Branjevo farm, admitted to being involved in these killings.618 He explained that he and 
his colleagues were ordered to line up about 1200 men with their backs to the firing 
squad and to shoot them.619 He was later arrested by the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia; and on 30 March 1996, he was transferred to the ICTY, where 
he confessed to the Prosecutor immediately after his arrival.620 
At the ICTY, he was indicted on one count of crimes against humanity and an 
alternative count of a violation of the laws or customs of war. He pleaded guilty to the 
crimes against humanity charge and testified against other accused persons notably 
Ratco Mladić and Radovan Karadić, the then chief of staff of the army and the 
President of the Republika Srpska, respectively.621 However, in addition to his guilty 
                                            
615 See Rule 62 ter of the ICTY RPE which is similar to Rule 62 bis of the ICTR RPE. 
616The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović (Sentencing judgment) IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) [76]. 
617 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 2. 
618 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 2. 
619 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 2. 
620 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 81. 
621 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 1. 
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plea, he stated that he had been forced to commit the killings as his refusal would have 
endangered his life and the lives of his wife and young child. In this regard, he said: 
“Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together 
with the victims. When I refused, they told me: ‘If you’re sorry for them, stand 
up, line up with them and we will kill you too.’ I am not sorry for myself but for 
my family, my wife and son who then had nine months, and I could not refuse 
because then they would have killed me.”622 
On the issue of the formal validity of the guilty plea, the Trial Chamber held that the 
plea had been “made voluntarily and in full cognisance of the nature of the charge and 
its consequences”.623 The Trial Chamber recognised that the accused’s statement, that 
he was ordered to commit the crimes and that he did so under the fear for his life and 
that of his family, constituted a claim of physical duress accompanied by superior 
orders; which, depending on the circumstances and the available evidence, could 
present a valid defence or a mitigating factor.624 The Trial Chamber acknowledged that 
if duress, accompanied by superior orders, amounted to a legal defence in international 
criminal law, the Trial Chamber would have had to consider the guilty plea to be 
ambiguous and therefore invalid.625 Upon analysis of legal authorities, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that duress accompanied by superior orders could amount to a 
legal defence only upon fulfilment of certain restrictive conditions which, in the Trial 
Chamber’s conclusion, were not satisfied by the accused.626 The Trial Chamber, 
therefore, held that the guilty plea was valid and proceeded to consider sentencing. 
In the sentencing, the Trial Chamber considered the gravity of the crime as well as the 
personal circumstances surrounding the commission and how the accused conducted 
himself during the proceedings at the ICTY. The Trial Chamber found that the following 
were mitigating circumstances: his age - the accused was 23 during the commission 
of the crime; the fact that he was a subordinate and not a high-ranking officer in the 
army; the remorse he had expressed; the fact that he had surrendered himself to the 
                                            
622 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 100. 
623 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 11. 
624 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 14. 
625 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 14. 
626 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 19. 
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Tribunal; his guilty plea; and his cooperation with the prosecution; the fact that the 
Chamber considered that he did not pose a danger to his community and that he had 
a corrigible personality.627 The Trial Chamber did not consider the accused’s claim of 
duress as a mitigating factor since it considered that the accused had failed to furnish 
proof of the same.628 On 29 November 1996, the Trial Chamber sentenced him, 
following the recommendation of the Prosecutor, to 10 years imprisonment.629 
Appeal judgment 
He appealed against the judgment, requesting the Appeals Chamber: to uphold the 
conviction but to excuse him from serving the sentence since, he argued, he committed 
the crimes under duress and a real fear for his life and that of his family; or in the 
alternative, to consider his duress as a mitigating factor and to considerably reduce his 
sentence.630 In the appeal judgment issued on 7 October 1997, the Appeals Chamber, 
proprio motu, dealt with the validity of the guilty plea entered by the Appellant.  The 
main point of contention was whether the Trial Chamber rightly held that Erdemović’s 
guilty plea was valid being that it was accompanied by a claim that he had committed 
the crime under duress.631 Key to answering this question, was the secondary question 
of whether a soldier could urge the defence of duress to the crime of killing innocent 
people during the commission of a war crime or a crime against humanity.  In this 
regard, the judges differed both in terms of conclusions reached and the justifications 
thereof. As a result, each judge wrote a separate and/or dissenting opinion expressing 
their views on the matter.632  
The Appeal’s Chamber was in agreement that for a guilty plea to be valid it has to fulfil 
at least three requirements: it must be voluntary, informed, and non-equivocal.633 
                                            
627 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 111. 
628 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 91. 
629 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 111. 
630 Erdemović (appeal judgment) (n 238) para 11. 
631 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment) (n 238) para 16. 
632 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment) (n 238) para 17. 
633 The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah) IT-96-22-T (7 October 1997) [8]; Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese)  
(n 592) para 9; The Prosecutor v Drazen (Appeal Judgment Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Stephen) IT-96-22-T (7 October 1997) [15].  
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Firstly, for a guilty plea to be voluntary it must not be induced by threats or blackmail 
or any considerations other than the possible desire of the accused to benefit from a 
lighter sentence. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber, like the Trial Chamber, held that 
the plea had been voluntary.634  
Secondly, the plea had to be informed which means that the accused had to be fully 
cognisant of the charges and their legal consequences. On this issue, the Appeals 
Chamber was divided. The majority held that the plea was not informed since the 
accused was not advised on the difference between the alternative charges, being 
crimes against humanity or war crimes in the alternative. The Majority based this 
decision on the finding that the accused’s counsel did not appear to appreciate the 
distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity and that neither the 
Prosecutor nor the Trial Chamber had explained the said difference to the accused.635 
Consequently, it seemed to the Majority that the accused had unknowingly pleaded 
guilty to the more serious of the two offenses, that is crimes against humanity, thereby 
inadvertently attracting a harsher penalty.636 For this reason the Majority held that the 
guilty plea was not informed. Judge Li, in his dissenting opinion disagreed with the 
Majority’s assertion that a charge of crimes against humanity is inherently more serious 
than that of war crimes and, therefore, held that the plea was informed.637 
Thirdly, on the question of whether the plea was unequivocal the judges differed as 
well. The Majority, finding that duress was not a complete defence for the crime with 
which the accused had been charged, held that the plea was unequivocal.638 
Conversely, in each of their separate and dissenting opinions, both judge Stephen and 
judge Cassese held that duress could be urged as a defence and therefore found that 
                                            
634 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment) (n 238) para 18. 
635 See Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) 
(n 633) para 19. 
636 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 19. 
637 The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Li) IT-96-22-T (7 October 1997) [18–26].  
638 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
paras 88–89.  
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the plea was equivocal.639 In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber, by Majority, Judge Li 
dissenting,640 remitted the case back to a Trial Chamber, different from the one that 
had made the impugned decision, so that the Appellant would have an opportunity to 
plead afresh.641 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber by majority rejected the request 
to review the sentence; and, unanimously rejected the Appellant’s request for an 
acquittal. 
Second sentencing judgment 
Upon his appearance before the second Trial Chamber, Erdemović pleaded guilty to 
the charge of violations of customs of war and the Prosecutor withdrew the alternative 
charge of crimes against humanity.642 The Trial Chamber then explained to the 
accused the difference between the two charges and the implications of pleading guilty 
to one as opposed to the other, as had been held by the Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber. The Trial Chamber then satisfied itself that the guilty plea was valid and 
convicted the accused. The second Trial Chamber applied the ruling by the Majority of 
the Appeal’s Chamber that duress is not a complete defence for the offence to which 
the accused had pleaded guilty, therefore held that the plea was unequivocal. They 
considered his duress in mitigation. 
Interestingly, the prosecution and the defence in Erdemović entered a plea agreement 
after the Appeals Chamber judgment and before the second sentencing hearing. This 
was the first plea agreement received by the ICTY, before there was a provision for it 
in the ICTY RPE.643 The Trial Chamber took the agreement, which recommended 
seven years imprisonment, into consideration but sentenced the accused to five years 
imprisonment, with credit to time served since detention. 644 
                                            
639 Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese)  (n 592) para 50. Erdemović (Appeal Judgment 
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen) (n 633) para 24. 
640 Judge Li in his dissenting opinion found that the guilty plea was valid and opined that the decision of 
remitting the decision to a trial chamber had no practical purpose and would unnecessarily prolong the 
proceedings. See Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li) (n 637) 
para 27.  
641 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment) (n 238) para 20.  
642 The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) IT-96-22-Tbis (5 March 1998) [8]. 
643 Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) paras 18–19. 
644 Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 23. 
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This case made a significant contribution to the law and practice relating to guilty pleas 
and plea agreements at the ad hoc tribunals. The essential elements of a valid guilty 
plea as identified and defined by the Appeals Chamber judges were later included in 
both the ICTY and ICTR RPE.645 This formed the basis of subsequent adjudication of 
guilty pleas at both the ICTY and the ICTR as discussed below. 
5.3.2 The Prosecutor v Kambanda  
Guilty plea and sentencing judgment 
Jean Kambanda was the Prime Minister of the interim government of Rwanda, from 8 
April 1994 to 17 July 1994, during which time the genocide occurred.646 On 1 May 
1998, during his first appearance before the ICTR, he pleaded guilty to six counts 
contained in the indictment: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to 
commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity of murder and 
crimes against humanity of extermination.647 He also signed a plea agreement with the 
Prosecutor, under seal, where he admitted all the facts alleged by the Prosecutor.648  
He admitted inter alia that there was a generalised and systematic attack against the 
Tutsi population where the intention was to exterminate them; that as Prime Minister 
he was the head of the Council of Ministers which had control over national policy and 
over the actions of the military; that he participated in meetings where genocide was 
planned, reports on the execution of the plans discussed and follow ups made; that he 
gave incendiary speeches which were later repeatedly broadcasted on the radio and 
financially supported the radio station which was participating in incitement; that he did 
not take any action to stop or punish those participating in the killing while he punished 
prefets649 who refused to participate; that he participated in buying and distributing 
weapons with the knowledge that it would be used to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus; 
                                            
645 See ICTY RPE Rules 62, 62 bis and 62 ter and ICTR RPE Rules 62 and 62 bis. 
646 The Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda (Judgment and sentence) ICTR-97-23 (4 September 1998) [42–
44]. 
647 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 3. 
648 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 5.  
649 Rwanda is divided into eleven regions called prefectures each of which is governed by a prefet. 
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and, that he ordered the establishment of roadblocks where the killing was done and 
he personally witnessed some killing.650  
In addition to his guilty plea and the admission of the above facts, he willingly 
cooperated with the prosecution, providing information that was vital to the 
investigations and he was expected to testify in future trials against other 
perpetrators.651 However, he neither provided explanation for his crimes nor expressly 
showed remorse, nor expressed regret for his participation.652 
Before convicting him, and following the decision of the Appeals Chamber in 
Erdemović, the Trial Chamber sought to confirm the validity of the plea and asked the 
accused whether his guilty plea was voluntary, informed and unequivocal; he 
responded in the affirmative.653 Therefore, the Trial Chamber found that his guilty plea 
was valid and on that basis, as well as on the basis of the above facts admitted in the 
plea agreement, convicted him of all the above-mentioned counts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.  
For the purpose of sentencing, the Defence urged three factors in mitigation: the guilty 
plea, remorse, and substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor.654 The Prosecutor 
agreed that the accused’s past and future cooperation should be considered by the 
Trial Chamber in mitigation.655 It is noteworthy that the plea agreement did not include 
a sentence agreement; in fact the prosecution later recommended a life sentence while 
the defence argued for a term not exceeding two years.656 The Trial Chamber 
considered the three factors namely his guilty plea, remorse and cooperation. In 
discussing these three issues, the Trial Chamber held as follows: first on the guilty 
plea, the Trial Chamber recognised that a guilty plea is considered as a mitigating 
                                            
650 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 39. 
651 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 47.  
652 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 51.  
653 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 5. 
654 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 46. 
655 Mr Kambanda had already provided information which aided the Prosecutor’s investigations and was 
expected to keep cooperating in future by testifying against other accused persons. Kambanda 
(Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 47. 
656 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 60. Later plea agreements included sentence 
agreements as discussed in part 5.4.1 below. 
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factor in many national jurisdictions, applying both common law and civil law.657 As for 
remorse, the Trial Chamber held that the accused had not given any explanation for 
his voluntary participation in genocide or offered any sympathy for the suffering of the 
victims of the genocide; and stated that remorse was not the only inference that could 
be made from a guilty plea. Thirdly, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the accused 
had cooperated with the Prosecutor and that his cooperation would encourage other 
perpetrators to come forward and acknowledge their crimes.658 
However, the Chamber found that these mitigating factors were negated by 
aggravating circumstances namely: that the crimes committed by Kambanda were 
intrinsically grave and particularly shocking to the human conscience; that he had 
committed the crimes with knowledge and premeditation; and, that as the Prime 
Minister he had been entrusted with the security and peace of the population, a position 
which he had abused.659 For this reason he was sentenced to imprisonment for the 
remainder of his life. 
Appeals Chamber judgment 
After the sentence was passed Kambanda refused further cooperation with the 
Prosecutor and appealed, requesting the Appeals Chamber to quash the conviction or 
revise the sentence.660 The appeal was based on eight grounds, three of which relate 
to his guilty plea, notably its validity and impact on sentence mitigation. The three 
specific grounds are: that the Trial Chamber had accepted the guilty plea without 
investigating whether it was voluntary, informed and non-equivocal and based on 
sufficient facts to prove the crime; that the Trial Chamber had not considered the 
general principle of law that a guilty plea is accompanied by a sentence reduction; and, 
that the Trial Chamber had failed to consider the cooperation of the Appellant as a 
mitigating factor.661  
The Appeal’s Chamber found that the Appellant had had numerous occasions to 
contest the validity of his guilty plea in a timely manner, but he did not raise any 
                                            
657 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) paras 52–53. 
658 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 61. 
659 Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646) para 61.  
660 The Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) ICTR 97-23-A (19 October 2000) [11].  
661 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 10.  
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objections except after he had been sentenced to life imprisonment.662 In the absence 
of a reasonable justification for the Appellant’s silence, the Chamber deemed that it 
was entitled to hold that the Appellant had waived the right to contest the validity of the 
plea at the appellate stage. However, because the plea formed the basis of the 
conviction, as a result of which the Appellant would serve a life sentence, the Appeals 
Chamber nevertheless decided to consider the issue of the validity. For this reason, 
the Appeals Chamber allowed the Appellant to testify as to whether his plea had been 
voluntary, informed and unequivocal.663 
The Appellant argued that his plea had not been voluntary since at the time of signing 
the agreement he had been detained and questioned in an unofficial location and had 
been deprived of his chosen counsel. These incidents, he argued, amounted to an 
oppressive atmosphere which deprived him of free choice, forcing him to sign the plea 
agreement.664 In deciding the matter, the Appeal’s Chamber adopted the decision in 
Erdemović which held that for a plea to be voluntary the accused had to have mental 
capacity to understand the consequences of his actions when pleading guilty; and, that 
the plea ought not to be motivated by any inducements, threats or promises, apart from 
the expectation of a reduced sentence.665 The Appeals Chamber found that the 
Appellant’s assertion that he was depressed at the time of signing the plea agreement 
did not meet the set criteria. This was especially since the accused, in his previous 
position as Prime Minister of a country must have been required to make serious 
decisions under stressful circumstances.666 The Appeals Chamber therefore rejected 
the argument that the plea had not been voluntary. 
                                            
662 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 45.  
663 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 6.  
664 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) paras 57–58. The Appellant had expressed the desire to be 
represented by Mr Johan Scheers but this was not possible since Mr Scheers was under sanctions 
imposed by the ICTR Trial Chamber in 1996, as a result of which he had not been reinstated on the list 
of counsel. For this reason, the Registry proposed the services of Mr Oliver Michaels Inglis, which the 
Appellant did not oppose at the time. The Appellant later raised this as his first ground of appeal, that 
he had not been represented by counsel of his choice. The Appeals Chamber dismissed this ground 
along with others. See Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) paras 18–21. 
665 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 61. 
666 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 62. 
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On the issue of whether his plea was informed, the Appellant argued that he had had 
ineffective assistance of counsel whom he said had only had one hour of consultation 
with him and had not conducted investigations.667 The Appellant, therefore, argued that 
at the time he entered the plea, he did not properly understand the charges or the 
consequences of a guilty plea. The Appellant argued that the Trial Chamber had failed 
to inform him that the consequence of a guilty plea would be a life sentence and that 
the guilty plea would not count as a mitigating factor.668 The Appellant relied on the 
Erdemović case where the Appeals Chamber had found that the accused had not been 
properly informed of the charges since his counsel appeared not to appreciate the 
distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity, with which the accused 
was charged.  
The Appeals Chamber adopted the ruling of judge McDonald and judge Vohrah in 
Erdemović that a plea was informed only if the accused understood the nature of the 
charges, the nature of a guilty plea and the consequences of pleading guilty in general, 
as well as the distinction between the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty 
to one charge rather than the other.669 The Appeals Chamber did not find any similarity 
with the Erdemović case since in Kambanda, there was no indication that defence 
counsel did not understand the nature of the charges, and had failed to explain the 
same to the Appellant.670 The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had 
effectively discharged its duty of informing the Appellant and this was evidenced by the 
fact that upon questioning by the Trial Chamber the Appellant stated that he fully 
understood the charges and the consequences of his guilty plea.671 The Appeals 
Chamber therefore dismissed the claim that the plea was uninformed.672 
On the question of whether the plea was equivocal, the Appeals Chamber adopted the 
definition of an equivocal plea outlined in Erdemović where the Appeals Chamber held 
that a guilty plea is equivocal if it is accompanied by a claim which amounts to a 
                                            
667 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 67. 
668 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 68.  
669 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 75.  
670 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 77.  
671 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 76. 
672 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 78. 
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defence in law.673 The Appeals Chamber held that Kambanda had not raised any 
defence either at the time of the plea or after. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber found 
that, unlike Erdemović who repeatedly stated that he committed the crime under the 
fear for his life and that of his family, Kambanda had not given any explanation for his 
actions.674 The Appeals Chamber also rejected the Appellant’s assertion that he had 
failed to raise a defence due to ineffective assistance by counsel and held that his plea 
was unequivocal.675 
On the question of whether there was sufficient factual basis supporting the plea, the 
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had rightly relied on the plea 
agreement which confirmed that the parties had agreed on the facts surrounding the 
alleged charges.676 The Appeals Chamber noted that there was no disagreement, 
between the Prosecutor and the Defence, on any of the facts presented by the 
Prosecutor in the indictment. Therefore, the Trial Chamber had not erred in finding that 
a factual basis had been established for the guilty plea.677 
Having found that the guilty plea was valid, the Chamber upheld the conviction and 
turned to the second aspect of the Appellant’s argument that is the request to revise 
the sentence. In this regard, the Appellant had argued that the Trial Chamber had erred 
in failing to find that a guilty plea was a mitigating factor which carried with it a reduced 
sentence and in failing to consider the cooperation of the accused with the 
Prosecutor.678 Furthermore, the Appellant argued that the Trial Chamber erred in 
taking into account, during sentencing, the fact that the Appellant had offered no 
explanation for his actions. 
The Appeals Chamber recognised that the Trial Chamber was indeed under obligation, 
under Rule 101B of the RPE, to consider mitigating factors during sentencing. The 
Appeals Chamber however noted that the weight that the Trial Chamber put on the 
                                            
673 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 84. 
674 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 85. 
675 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 87. 
676 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 93. 
677 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 94. 
678 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 114. 
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mitigating factors was a matter of the Trial Chambers discretion.679 The Appeals 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had indeed considered the guilty plea of the 
Appellant and his cooperation but had decided that the aggravating factors outweighed 
the mitigating factors.680 The Appeals Chamber held that it could not interfere with the 
Trial Chamber’s exercise of discretion unless there was evidence that the Trial 
Chamber had abused such discretion, evidence which did not exist in this case.681 The 
Appeals Chamber found that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber fell within 
the discretionary framework of the ICTR Statute and the RPE and therefore upheld the 
sentence.682 
The Trial Chamber in Kambanda adopted the decision of the Appeals Chamber in 
Erdemović regarding the essential elements of a valid guilty plea, finding as in 
Erdemović that the guilty plea was valid. However, in Kambanda, unlike in Erdemović, 
the guilty plea and cooperation of the accused did not result in a reduced sentence for 
the accused. In fact, the Trial Chamber gave no weight to these mitigating factors and 
instead sentenced Kambanda to the most severe sentence permitted in the ICTR 
statute. However, as shown in part 5.4.3 below, as the policy at the ICTR (and the 
ICTY) changed in favour of plea negotiation, and as the practice at both tribunals 
became more streamlined, guilty pleas and cooperation resulted in considerable 
reduction of sentences for accused persons. After Kambanda, no accused person who 
pleaded guilty ever received the maximum sentence that is life imprisonment. 
5.3.3 Change of policy towards plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals 
The ad hoc tribunals faced challenges which were largely similar to those affecting the 
ICC, discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. These challenges included novel and 
                                            
679 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 122. 
680 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) paras 119–120. 
681 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 124. 
682 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 126. 
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complex procedural law,683 high cost,684 insufficient state cooperation,685 and lengthy 
proceedings,686 among other challenges.  
                                            
683 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the former ICTY President recounts that in 1993 when the first 11 judges 
met in The Hague, and she was one of them, they had no premises, no permanent staff and no “legal 
framework to guide the work of the prosecution staff and the judges”. See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
‘Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
558, 558.  The judges at the ICTY formulated rules of procedure and evidence, pursuant to article 14 of 
the ICTY Statute,  making amendments to tackle new challenges arising as the cases evolved. For 
example, between 1994, when the ICTY RPE was adopted, till 2005 the ICTY RPE was amended over 
fifty times. See ICTY RPE, preamble.  The ICTY RPE was used almost verbatim for the ICTR RPE. 
684 For example, the ICTY budget was as follows for the following years: 2014-2015 US dollars 
179,998,600; 2012-2013 US dollars 250,814,000; 2010-2011 US dollars 286,012,600. It is noteworthy 
that these figures were even higher in the previous years. See ‘The Cost of Justice | International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ <http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/the-cost-of-justice> 
accessed 8 June 2018. See also Michael P Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency - Plea-Bargaining and 
International Tribunals Symposium on Guilty Plea - Part I: The Theoretical Background’ (2004) 2 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1070, 1077. The author argues that though the costs at the ICTY may 
appear exorbitant, they are reasonable considering the nature of crimes tried and the number of victims 
involved. He puts this into perspective by comparing costs at the ICTY with that of domestic trials in the 
United States (US) involving more than 100 victims. 
685 Both the ICTY and the ICTR, like the ICC, had no enforcement mechanisms of their own and had to 
rely on state cooperation to obtain evidence, arrest and surrender accused persons as well as to enforce 
sentences imposed on convicted persons. Both Tribunals experienced challenges in this regard, 
especially the ICTY. The ICTY faced a major challenge since the former Yugoslavia, where conflict was 
still ongoing, failed to comply with the ICTY requests to arrest and surrender accused persons to the 
Tribunal. See McDonald (n 681). The author discusses several reports of non-compliance reports which 
she, in her capacity as the then President of the ICTY, and her predecessor Antonio Cassese, submitted 
to the UNSC on this issue. Concerning the ICTR, although states were often more willing to cooperate 
with the ICTR, compared to the ICTY, massive delays were experienced in executing requests. For 
example, it took the US about four years to extradite Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, due to the accused’s 
efforts to challenge his extradition before the US courts. See ‘United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas — Laredo Division: In the Matter of Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’ 
(1998) 37 International Legal Materials 398. Secondly, due to the delays in the extradition of Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza from Cameroon, the ICTR judges found that his fair trial rights had been violated and this 
almost resulted in his release before trial. See a discussion of the same in Dina Temple-Raston, Justice 
on the Grass: Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Trial for War Crimes, and a Nation’s Quest for 
Redemption (Simon and Schuster 2005) 81.  
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In an attempt to mitigate some of these challenges, the ICTY (and the ICTR) Statutes 
as well as their RPE were amended, introducing measures intended to improve the 
operations of both Tribunals.687  However, the need to make further changes kept 
mounting. The UNSC and especially the United States government, which contributed 
about a quarter of the tribunals’ funding, put pressure on both tribunals to complete 
investigations by 2004, first instance trial by 2008 and all their work by 2010.688  
To this end the ICTY established a Completion Strategy containing two main 
proposals: one, to focus on the crimes which have the highest impact on international 
peace and security by prosecuting highest ranking political and military suspects; and 
two, to transfer cases involving lower ranking officials to the national courts.689 In this 
regard, Judge Theodore Meron, the then ICTY President stated that guilty pleas and 
referral of cases to national jurisdictions had the “the greatest chance of assisting the 
                                            
686 See for example Christina M Carroll, ‘An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with 
the Mass Atrocities of 1994’ (2000) 18 Boston University International Law Journal 163, 181–183. The 
author discusses delays in proceedings caused by several issues at the ICTR and opines that these 
delays might have interfered with the defendant’s fair trial rights. See also Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to 
Genocide’ (n 27) 90. The author discusses the typical length of an ICTY pre-trial and trial which tended 
to last ten months and one year respectively. 
687 Some of the changes made included the appointment of ad litem judges, delegation of some of the 
duties of the Trial Chamber judges to senior legal officers, as well as enlargement the common Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY and the ICTR. See ‘UNSC “Identical Letters Dated 7 September 2000 from the 
Secretary General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the 
Security Council” UN Doc S/2000/865’. Some scholars also argue that the ICTY judges amended the 
ICTY RPE to introduce more non adversarial aspects to simplify and speed up the process. See for 
example Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 94; Daryl A Mundis, ‘The Legal Character and 
Status of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2001) 1 
International Criminal Law Review 191, 205. 
688 See Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, ‘UN 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia’ (28 February 2002) 
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/rm/2002/8571.htm> accessed 3 August 2018; Julian A 
Cook, ‘Plea Bargaining at The Hague’ (2005) 30 The Yale Journal of International Law 473, 474; UNSC 
Resolution 1503 (28 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1503. 
689 See UNSC “Letter Dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council” UN Doc S/2002/678.  
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Tribunal in achieving the Completion Strategy.”690 Judge Meron, however, recognised 
that it would not be appropriate for judges at the ICTY to encourage guilty pleas as 
such encouragement would violate the fair trial rights of accused persons. He stated 
that the discretion to seek out and enter plea agreements with accused persons rested 
entirely with the Prosecutor.691 The UNSC urged the ICTR to complete a detailed 
strategy modelled on the above-mentioned ICTY Completion Strategy.692 
Both Tribunals were required to make bi-annual reports to the UNSC on their 
respective Completion Strategies. In these reports both tribunals noted the contribution 
of guilty pleas in helping them complete their work within the stated deadline. For 
example, in the ICTY May 2004 report the ICTY President noted that: 
“Any further growth in the trial docket would therefore make achievement of the 
2008 deadline entirely dependent on the ability to dispose of some pending 
cases other than by a full trial at the Tribunal. The most effective routes would 
be guilty pleas by persons currently awaiting trial and referral of cases to 
domestic jurisdictions under Rule 11bis. Guilty pleas or Rule 11bis referrals 
would free up staff and court facilities enabling the conduct of trials in cases that 
would otherwise require trial work to continue past 2008.” 693 
Similarly, in the ICTR Completion Strategy of May 2004 the ICTR President noted that: 
“Guilty pleas reduce the length of trials. Experience shows that not more than a 
day is needed for a Chamber to satisfy itself that a guilty plea is informed, 
                                            
690 ‘Assessments and Report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1534 (2004) Annex to UN Doc S/2004/420 (24 May 2004)’ para 73. 
691 ‘Assessments and Report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1534 (2004) Annex to UN Doc S/2004/420 (24 May 2004)’ (n 690) para 72. 
692 UNSC Resolution 1503 (28 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1503. 
693 ‘Assessments and Report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1534 (2004) Annex to UN Doc S/2004/420 (24 May 2004)’ (n 690) para 52. 
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unequivocal, and made freely and voluntarily. The writing of the judgment 
requires a few weeks.” 694 
One of the measures taken to make the tribunals better equipped to handle plea 
negotiation was the amendment of the RPE of both Tribunals. At the ICTY, Rule 62 
was amended and Rules 62 bis and 62 ter adopted in 1999 and in 2001, respectively, 
to deal with guilty pleas and plea agreement procedure.695 The same occurred in the 
ICTR RPE with the amendment of Rule 62 and the adoption of Rule 62 bis in 2003.  
5.4 Emergence of a streamlined jurisprudence on plea negotiation  
After the ad hoc tribunals became more receptive towards plea agreements, the 
practice in both tribunals became relatively harmonised. There were more plea 
bargains at the ICTY, where 20 accused persons pleaded guilty,696 than at the ICTR 
where the number was 10.697 The total number of guilty pleas at both tribunals, thirty, 
                                            
694Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Annex to UN Doc S/2004/341 
(3 May 2004) para 48. 
695 See Rules 62, 62 bis, 62 ter of ICTY RPE. 
696 The accused who pleaded guilty at the ICTY were: Milan Babić, Predrag Banović, Miroslav Bralo, 
Ranko Češić, Miroslav Deronjić, Damir Došen, Dražen Erdemovič, Miodrag Jokić, Goran Jelisić, Dragan 
Kolundžija, Darko Mrđa, Dragan Nikolić, Momir Nikolić, Dragan Obrenović, Biljana Plavšić, Ivica Rajić, 
Duško Sikirica, Milan Simić, Stevan Todorović, Dragan Zelenović. See ‘Guilty Pleas | International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ <http://www.icty.org/en/cases/guilty-pleas> accessed 10 
July 2018. This list excludes those who pleaded guilty after being transferred to the State court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under Rule 11 bis of the ICTY RPE. 
697 The cases involving guilty pleas at the ICTR were: The Prosecutor v Michel Bagaragaza (Sentencing 
Judgment) ICTR-2005-86-S (17 November 2009); The Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (Judgment) 
ICTR 00-60-T (13 April 2006); Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) (n 646); The Prosecutor v Joseph 
Nzabirinda (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR 2001-77-T (23 February 2007); The Prosecutor v Juvénal 
Rugambarara (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-00-59-T (16 November 2007); The Prosecutor v Georges 
Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) ICTR-97-32-I (1 June 2000); The Prosecutor v Vincent Rutaganira 
(Judgment and Sentencing) ICTR-95-1C-T (14 March 2005); The Prosecutor v Serugendo (Judgment 
and Sentence) ICTR-2005-84-I (12 June 2006); The Prosecutor v Omar Serushago (Decision Relating 
to a Plea of Guilty) ICTR- 98-39-T (14 December 1998); The Prosecutor v GAA (Judgment and 
Sentence) ICTR-07-90-R77-I (4 December 2007). The last case is to be distinguished from the rest 
since it was a contempt case meaning that unlike the other accused who were charged with international 
crimes, the accused GAA was charged with an offence against the administration of justice at the ICTR 
(witness tempering). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za




makes it impractical to discuss each of them in a comprehensive manner in this 
chapter. Therefore, the method adopted is to discuss some of the salient features of 
these guilty pleas and their impact on sentencing. This section therefore deals with the 
general characteristics of a plea agreement, the essential elements of a valid guilty 
plea and a guilty plea as mitigating factor.  
5.4.1 General characteristics of a plea agreement 
In the early cases at the ICTY, for example in Erdemović, guilty pleas preceded inter-
party negotiation. Later, the accused who pleaded guilty generally started by signing a 
plea agreement accompanied by a document outlining the factual basis of the guilty 
plea. The agreements which form part of the public record,698 are very similar and 
generally contain the following information: first, an introduction stating that the 
agreement is made between the Prosecutor and the accused through his/ her counsel. 
The introduction also states that the purpose of the agreement is to aid the Trial 
Chamber in determining that the plea is made pursuant to Rule 62; meaning that it is 
voluntary, informed and equivocal, as well as accompanied by a factual basis.699   
Secondly, the agreement states that the accused pleads guilty to a certain list of 
crimes, as stated in the indictment and that the guilty plea is voluntary. It also discusses 
the nature of the offence and explains the charges which the Prosecutor would be 
required to prove beyond reasonable doubt at trial.700 Thirdly, it provides for penalty 
and sentencing stating that the accused acknowledges that upon conviction for the 
crime to which s/he has pleaded guilty, s/he could be liable to imprisonment for the 
remainder of their life, according to the ICTY Statute and Rules. The agreement then 
                                            
698 Some of these plea agreements, especially those entered before 2003 were classified as confidential 
ex parte and at the time of writing were still not available on the public record. See for example The 
Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1 (31 July 2001) [7]. 
699 The Prosecutor v Predrag Banovic (Plea Agreement) IT-02-65-PT (2 June 2003) [1]; The Prosecutor 
v Milan Babić (Plea agreement) IT-03-72-I (22 January 2004) [1]; The Prosecutor v Miroslav Bralo (Plea 
agreement) IT-95-17-PT (18 July 2005) [1]; The Prosecutor v Ranko Češić (Plea agreement) IT-95-
10/1-PT (October 2003) [1–2]; The Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić (Plea Agreement) IT-00-39&40-PT (30 
September 2002) [1].  
700 Banovic (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 3–7; Babić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 4–7; Bralo (Plea 
Agreement) (n 699) paras 3–5; Češić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 3–9; Plavšić (Plea Agreement) (n 
699) paras 3–5.  
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states the sentence agreed on between the parties, if any, and an acknowledgement 
that the Chamber is not bound by the agreement but will consider both aggravating 
and mitigating factors to determine sentence.701 Fourthly, the agreement provides for 
concessions made by the Prosecution, if any, for example the withdrawal of charges 
followed by a statement to the effect that no other promises have been made by the 
Prosecution, apart from those stated in the agreement, to induce the accused to plead 
guilty.702 
Additionally, the agreements provide that the accused forfeits certain procedural rights 
namely: the right to plead not guilty and to have charges against him/her proven by the 
Prosecutor beyond reasonable doubt; the right to examine witnesses against him/her 
and to have witnesses against him/her examined; the right to prepare and present a 
defence at trial; the right to be present at trial and to be represented by counsel of their 
own choosing; the right to be tried without undue delay; as well as, the right not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to plead guilty. The accused however retains the 
right to be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings until the end. 703  
Finally, the accused states that the agreement has been read to him/her in a language 
s/he fully understands, and that the pertinent issues have been explained by counsel 
for the accused. The accused acknowledges that counsel has explained the accused’s 
rights under international law, the elements of the crime to which the accused pleads 
guilty, possible defences that may be raised in the case, as well as possible sentences 
which the Chamber might impose on the accused. Counsel confirms the same in an 
appended declaration. In addition, the accused also declares that the agreement has 
been made freely and voluntarily, and the accused is of sound mind and understands 
                                            
701 Banovic (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 8–10; Babić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 11–15; Bralo 
(Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 6–8; Češić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 12–17; Plavšić (Plea 
Agreement) (n 699) paras 6–7. It is noteworthy that earlier plea agreements did not contain sentence 
agreements see for example The Prosecutor v Stevan Todorovic (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S 
(31 Jul 2001) [79].  
702 Banovic (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 13–14; Babić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 19; Bralo (Plea 
Agreement) (n 699) para 9; Češić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 21; Plavšić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) 
para 9.  
703 Banovic (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 15–16; Bralo (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 10; Češić (Plea 
Agreement) (n 699) paras 18–19; Plavšić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 10. 
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the terms of the agreement. Both the accused and their counsel append their 
signatures to the agreement.704 These plea agreements were accompanied by details 
on the factual basis on which the plea is based, either on the same document as the 
plea agreement or on a separate document.705  
At the ICTR, after Kambanda, practice was largely similar to the above described ICTY 
practice. The accused persons pleaded guilty pursuant to plea agreements entered 
between them and the Prosecutor. It is noteworthy that unlike at the ICTY, the plea 
agreements entered at the ICTR were not on the public record therefore one can only 
glean their content with reference to the judgments.706 
In both tribunals, the Trial Chambers generally considered whether the plea was 
voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and that the accompanying facts were sufficient to 
prove the crimes charged, as discussed in part 5.4.2 below. The Chamber then 
convicted the accused of the crimes to which he had pleaded guilty and proceeded to 
sentencing. During the sentencing, the Chamber considered aggravating factors such 
as the gravity of the crime as well as mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea, remorse 
expressed by the accused and/or cooperation with the Prosecutor.707  
After balancing the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors, the Chamber 
would usually issue a sentence deemed appropriate. In most cases the Chamber 
imposed a sentence within the range proposed by the Prosecutor and Defence in the 
plea agreement.708 However there were exceptions where, the Chamber sentenced 
                                            
704 Banovic (Plea Agreement) (n 699) paras 16–17; Babić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 20; Bralo (Plea 
Agreement) (n 699) para 11; Češić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) para 22; Plavšić (Plea Agreement) (n 699) 
paras 11–12.  
705 See for example The Prosecutor v Predrag Banovic (Annex 1 To Plea Agreement Factual Basis of 
Plea Agreement) IT-02-65-PT (2 June 2003); The Prosecutor v Miroslav Bralo (Factual Basis) IT-95-17-
PT (18 July 2005); The Prosecutor v Ranko Češić (Factual Basis) IT-95-10/1-PT (October 2003); The 
Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić (Factual Basis for Plea of Guilt) IT-00-39&40-PT (30 September 2002). 
706 I was not able to find any of these plea agreements on the public record of the ICTR cases. Scholars 
who refer to them in their articles make the note that they are “on file with author”. See for example 
Nancy Amoury Combs, ‘Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of 
Sentence Discounts’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 69 (footnotes 154 and 178). 
707 See part 5.4.3 of this dissertation. 
708 See for example ICTR: Bagaragaza (Sentencing Judgment) (n 697) The parties recommended a 
sentence of between 6 to 10 years, the Chamber sentenced him to 8 years and there was no appeal; 
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outside this range.709 Those who received a sentence within the proposed range 
generally did not appeal those sentences, in line with the plea agreements.710 Among 
the few who appealed, the Appeals Chamber generally affirmed the sentences 
imposed by the Trial Chamber, with a few exceptions at the ICTY.711 In these 
                                            
Nzabirinda (Sentencing Judgment) (n 697) para 75,116 In this case, the parties proposed a sentence 
of between 5-8 years, the Chamber Sentenced him to 7 years and there was no appeal; Rugambarara 
(Sentencing Judgment) (n 697) paras 48, 61 The parties proposed 9-12 years the Chamber sentenced 
him to 11 years and there was no appeal; Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) (n 697) paras 79, 95 
Parties proposed a sentence of 6-14 years and the Chamber sentenced him to 6 years there was no 
appeal.  
ICTY: The Prosecutor v Predrag Banović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003) [11] 
Parties recommended not more than 8 years, the Chamber sentenced him to 8 years; The Prosecutor 
v Ranko Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) [105] the parties recommended 
13-18 years, the Chamber sentenced him to 18 years there was no appeal. ; The Prosecutor v Duško 
Sikirica, Damir Došen and Dragan Kolundžija (Sentencing judgment) IT-95-8-S (13 November 2001) 
This case involved three co-accused persons and the Chamber stayed within the proposed range as 
follows: Duško Sikirica - the Parties recommended 10-17 years, the Chamber imposed 15 years; Damir 
Došen the Parties recommended 5-7 years, the Chamber imposed 5 years; Dragan Kolundžija - the 
Parties recommended 3-5 years, the Chamber imposed 3 years. None of the accused persons appealed 
their respective sentence. 
709 See for example ICTR: Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) para 81 The defence did not 
propose any sentence, the Prosecution proposed 20 years but the Chamber sentenced him to 12 years; 
Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) paras 186–188 Prosecution and defence proposed a sentence of not 
more than 14 and 12 years respectively, Chamber sentenced him to 15 years. 
ICTY: The Prosecutor v Milan Babić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-03-72-S (29 June 2004) [9] Parties 
recommended no more than 11 years, Chamber sentenced him to 13 years.   
710 See examples in footnote 708 above. 
711 See for example ICTR: Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) where the accused appealed against 
the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Trial Chamber but the Appeals Chamber affirmed the 
sentence; The Omar Serushago v The Prosecutor (Reasons for judgment) ICTR-98-39-A (6 April 2000) 
where the accused was sentenced to 15 years and this was affirmed on appeal.  
ICTY: The Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-01-42/1-A (30 August 2005) 
Accused sentenced to 7 years and this was affirmed on appeal; The Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić 
(Judgment) IT-95-10-A (5 July 2001) where a sentence of 40 years imprisonment was affirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber. 
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exceptions, the Appeals Chamber granted some grounds of appeal, rejected others 
and reduced the sentence by a few years.712  
5.4.2 Elements of valid guilty pleas at ICTY and ICTR 
The criteria for determining the validity of a guilty plea was established by the Appeals 
Chamber in Erdemović which then informed the amendment of both the ICTY and 
ICTR RPE as discussed above. For a guilty plea to be valid at the ad hoc tribunals it 
had to be voluntary, informed, non-equivocal and accompanied by sufficient factual 
basis to establish the charge. These essential elements of a valid guilty plea, as 
expounded on in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, are discussed in this 
section. 
Voluntary guilty pleas 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR RPEs provide that a valid guilty plea must be 
voluntary.713In the Erdemović appeal judgment, judges McDonald and Vohrah stated 
that for a plea to be voluntary “it must be made by an accused who is mentally fit to 
understand the consequences of pleading guilty and who is not affected by any threats, 
inducements or promises … other than the expectation of receiving credit for a guilty 
plea by way of some reduction of sentence.”714 Judge Cassese added that this 
safeguard was particularly important since an accused person who pleads guilty gives 
up fundamental fair trial rights, for example, the right to be presumed innocent and the 
right to question witnesses appearing against the accused.715 
The element of mental competence, was discussed by both the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber in Erdemović. The accused pleaded guilty during his first 
appearance on 31 May 1996. The Trial Chamber ordered experts to conduct 
                                            
712 See for example ICTY: The Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-02-
60/1-A (8 March 2006) where the Appeals Chamber granted some grounds of appeal and reduced his 
sentence from 27 to 20 years; The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-
94-2-A (4 February 2005) where the Appeals Chamber granted some grounds of appeal and reduced 
his sentence from 23 to 20 years.   
713 Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE; Rule 62 of ICTR RPE. 
714 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
paras 8–10. 
715 Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese) (n 592) para 10. 
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psychiatric tests on him, and on 27 June 1996, the experts reported that he was 
suffering from a severe post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of which he was not 
fit to appear before the Chamber or stand trial.716 The experts recommended a further 
test to be conducted within six to nine months of the first.  A question arose whether a 
finding that he was not fit to stand trial also implied that he was not fit to plead guilty.717  
However, this issue became moot since during the second psychiatric evaluation, 
conducted on 17 October 1996, the experts found that the accused was fit to stand 
trial. Subsequently, the accused affirmed his guilty plea on numerous occasions, a 
factor which led the Appeals Chamber to conclude that even if he had been mentally 
incompetent at the time he entered his initial guilty plea, his subsequent affirmations, 
made after he was declared competent, compensated for this anomaly.718 His plea was 
therefore held to be valid. Similar tests were also ordered in the Prosecutor v Jelisić 
and the Trial Chamber found that the accused was capable of understanding the nature 
of the charges against him.719   
At the ICTR, in Kambanda the defence argued, while citing Erdemović, that Kambanda 
was not mentally competent to plead guilty because he had been detained in an 
unofficial location, a fact which created a hostile atmosphere which made the accused 
depressed, therefore, he lacked the mental capacity to enter a guilty plea.720 However, 
the Appeals Chamber rejected this argument finding that the claim that the accused 
person was depressed at the time he entered the guilty plea was insufficient to 
invalidate the guilty plea. The Appeals Chamber added that the accused person having 
served as the Prime Minister of his country ought to have been habituated to making 
serious decisions under stressful conditions.721 The Appeals Chamber concluded that 
his plea was valid. 
                                            
716 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 5. 
717 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 12. 
718 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 12.  
719 The Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić (Judgment) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) [27].  
720 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 58. 
721 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 62. 
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On the second aspect of a voluntary plea, that is whether it was induced by threats or 
promises rather than the reduction of sentence, plea agreements contained clauses 
where the accused persons declared their guilty plea was voluntarily.722 At the 
sentencing hearing, the Chambers questioned the accused persons on this issue, 
requiring them to confirm that their guilty pleas were free from threats and 
inducements. The accused persons generally answered in the affirmative and this 
satisfied the Chambers who ruled that the plea was voluntary. 723  
Informed 
For a guilty plea to be valid it has to be informed.724 An informed guilty plea is one that 
is made when the accused person understands: one, the nature of the charges and 
the consequence of pleading guilty generally; two, in case of the alternative charges, 
the accused understands the distinction between the charges and the consequence of 
pleading guilty to one as opposed to the other.725 This was an area of contention in 
Erdemovic where, as discussed above, the majority held that the accused’s guilty plea 
was not informed because he did not seem to understand the difference between the 
alternative charges – war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Majority found that 
he had inadvertently pleaded guilty to the more serious offence of crime against 
humanity thereby attracting a higher penalty.726 
In Kambanda, the accused appealed against the sentence of life imprisonment arguing 
inter alia that his plea was uninformed because he had not been made aware of the 
fact that by pleading guilty he would be sentenced to life imprisonment and that his 
                                            
722 See discussion in part 5.4.1 above. 
723 See for example ICTY: The Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 
December 2003) [19–20]; The Prosecutor v Milan Simić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/2-S (17 October 
2002) [20].  
At the ICTR: Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) paras 21–23; Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) 
11–12. 
724 Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE; Rule 62 of ICTR RPE. 
725 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 14. 
726 See discussion in part 5.3.1 above. It is noteworthy that Judge Li did not agree with the Majority’s 
assessment of this issue therefore found that the plea was informed. 
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guilty plea would not serve as a mitigating factor.727 The Appeals Chamber, however, 
dismissed this argument holding that the accused was aware that if he pleaded guilty 
he would be convicted, upon which, he could receive a sentence of up to life 
imprisonment according to the ICTR Statute. The determination of the length of the 
sentence was at the discretion of the Trial Chamber.728 The Chamber therefore held 
that his guilty plea was informed. 
In subsequent cases, both at the ICTY and ICTR, the accused signed plea agreements 
which stated that they understood the nature of the charge, and the consequence of 
pleading guilty. Some plea agreements contained sentencing agreements by the 
parties but acknowledged that the decision on sentencing rested with the Chamber 
which was not bound by the parties’ recommendation.729 Therefore, the issue of 
whether a guilty plea was informed was no longer contentious. Furthermore, at the 
sentencing hearing the Chamber would ask the accused whether they understood the 
indictment against them, whether the content of the plea agreement had been 
explained to the accused by counsel, whether the accused understood the 
consequence of a guilty plea, and whether the accused understood that sentencing 
was at the discretion of the Chamber. The accused persons often answered in the 
affirmative to the satisfaction of the Chamber.730 
Unequivocal 
Before accepting a guilty plea, the Chamber had to satisfy itself that it is unequivocal.731 
According to the ad hoc tribunal’s jurisprudence, for a guilty plea to be unequivocal it 
must not be accompanied by an explanation that amounts to a defence in international 
criminal law.732 As discussed above, the issue was discussed at length in Erdemovic 
                                            
727 See discussion in part 5.3.2 above. 
728 See part 5.3.2 above. 
729 See part 5.4.1 above. 
730 See for example ICTY: Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 20; The Prosecutor v Biljana 
Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39&40/1-S (27 February 2003) [5].  
ICTR: Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) paras 21–23; Nzabirinda (Sentencing Judgment) (n 697) para 
12.  
731 Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE; Rule 62 of ICTR RPE. 
732 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 31. 
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where the contentious issue was whether his plea was equivocal because it was 
accompanied by the claim that he had committed the crimes under duress.733 The 
secondary question was whether duress constituted a defence under international 
criminal law. The judges were divided in their findings. The Majority held that duress 
did not amount to a defence in international law but could be a mitigating factor, 
however, Judge Stephen and Judge Cassese dissented stating that duress amounted 
to a defence in international law if certain restrictive conditions were fulfilled.734 
Subsequently, both the ICTY and ICTR Chambers followed the Majority ruling in cases 
which followed.735 
Similar to the other two requirements of a guilty plea, that it be voluntary and informed, 
this issue was not contentious in subsequent cases. Many of the plea agreements at 
the ad hoc tribunals contained a clause recognising that, by pleading guilty, the 
accused gave up the right to present a defence.736  Therefore, the Chamber merely 
asked the accused whether the plea was unequivocal and generally the accused 
persons answered in the affirmative.737 
Sufficient factual basis supporting the guilty plea 
A guilty plea alone was not sufficient for a Chamber to convict and the Chamber had 
to satisfy itself that the guilty plea was based on sufficient facts to prove the crime and 
the accused’s participation in it. This was determined either on the basis of objective 
indicia or lack of material disagreement between the parties on the facts.738 In the 
Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić the Chamber held that even after the parties agree on the 
crime charged, “it is still necessary for the Judges to find something in the elements of 
the case upon which to base their conviction both in law and in fact that the accused 
                                            
733 See discussion in part 5.3.1 above. 
734 See discussion in part 5.3.1 above. 
735 See for example Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 84. In this case the Appeals Chamber 
found that an assertion that the Appellant’s case had been ‘defendable’, without further explanation does 
not mean that the plea was equivocal. 
736 See discussion in part 5.4.1 above. 
737 See for example ICTR: Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) paras 21–23; Nzabirinda (Sentencing 
Judgment) (n 697) para 13; Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) paras 11–12.  
738 Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE; Rule 62 of ICTR RPE. 
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is indeed guilty of the crime.”739 In this regard, the Chamber might examine the 
contents of the plea agreement. However, the Chamber was not confined to facts as 
agreed on in the plea agreement thus if the chamber was dissatisfied it might conduct 
a trial on a particular aspect to establish the facts.740 This too, was generally not a 
contentious issue since, as discussed above, plea agreements were accompanied by 
a factual basis containing an agreement between the parties on the crime committed 
and the accused’s participation in it.741 The Chambers often found the facts in the plea 
agreement to be sufficient to establish the crime and the accused’s participation in it.742 
Upon satisfying itself that the above four requirements were met, the Chamber would 
enter a plea of guilty and order the Registrar to set a date for the sentencing hearing.743 
At such hearing the Parties would make submissions on sentencing issues including 
mitigating factors and the Chamber might allow the presentation of evidence on the 
same. The following section discusses some of the mitigating factors considered at the 
ad hoc tribunals particularly those related to a guilty plea. 
5.4.3 A guilty plea as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
When imposing the sentence, the Chambers took into account the gravity of the 
offence, aggravating factors, mitigating factors, sentencing practices in the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, respectively, and the personal circumstances of the person.744 On 
mitigating factors, the RPE requires that the Chamber consider substantial cooperation 
of the convicted person with the Prosecutor.745 Other than that, a Chamber has the 
discretion to take into account any factors it considers to be mitigating in nature. 
Generally, the Chambers considered many factors in mitigation of sentences including: 
                                            
739 Jelisić (Judgment) (n 719) para 25. 
740 Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) para 48. 
741 See part 5.4.1 above. 
742 See for example ICTY: Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 21. ICTR: Bisengimana 
(Judgment) (n 697) para 25. 
743 Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE; Rule 62 of ICTR RPE. 
744 Article 24 ICTY Statute and Rule 101 of ICTY RPE; Article 23 of the ICTR Statute and Rule 101 of 
ICTR RPE. 
745 Rules 101 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
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a guilty plea,746 cooperation,747 voluntary surrender,748 remorse,749  duress,750 
diminished mental capacity at the time of the offence,751 lack of previous convictions,752 
personal circumstances including age,753 character754 and family circumstances, as 
well as acts of kindness to victims.755 
Guilty Plea 
According to the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, guilty pleas were important to the 
work of the tribunals because it: showed that the honesty of the perpetrator, might have 
encouraged other perpetrators to come forward, saved judicial time and resources, as 
well as promoted the establishment of the historical truth and reconciliation.756 For this 
                                            
746 See for example Jelisić (Judgment) (n 711) para 122; Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) 
para 16; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 698) paras 75–82. 
747 See for example Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 16 (iv). 
748 Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 107; Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 84; 
Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentencing) (n 697) para 145. 
749 Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) para 152,194,230; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 
698) 89–92; Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 16 (iii). 
750 See for example ICTY: Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 17. ICTR: Rutaganira 
(Judgment and Sentencing) (n 697) paras 161–162. 
751 See Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 41 the Chamber accepted it as a mitigating factor 
although it was not considered as a mitigating factor in this case. 
752 See for example ICTY: Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 108. ICTR: Rutaganira (Judgment 
and Sentencing) (n 697) para 130; Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) para 165.  
753 See Jelisić (Judgment) (n 711) paras 129–131; Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 
16 (i) in both cases the Chamber considered the young age of the accused persons. However, in Plavšić 
(Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 106; Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentencing) (n 695) para 166; 
Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) para 175 the Chamber considered the advanced age of the accused 
persons as a mitigating factor. 
754 See for example ICTR: Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentencing) (n 697) paras 122–125; Bisengimana 
(Judgment) (n 697) para 150; Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) (n 697) para 65. ICTY: Nikolić 
(sentencing judgment) (n 723) para 165. 
755 See for example ICTY: Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) paras 195 and 229. ICTR: 
Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentencing) (n 697) para 155; Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) (n 697) 
paras 68–69. 
756See for example ICTY: Banović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 708) para 68; Erdemović (sentencing 
judgment) (n 616) para 16; Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) paras 145–147; Plavšić (Sentencing 
Judgment) (n 730) para 180.  
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reason, a guilty plea was considered as a mitigating factor and the more timely a guilty 
plea was, the more credit the judges gave it. Although an accused would receive credit 
for a guilty plea entered at any time, it was preferable for an accused to enter a guilty 
plea before the commencement of trial. An accused person who pleaded guilty at a 
later stage of the proceedings received some credit for the guilty plea, although not as 
much as the credit received by an accused who pleaded guilty before the start of the 
trial. 757  
In the Prosecutor v Sikirica et al, for example, a case involving three accused persons, 
one of the accused, Kalundzija, who pleaded guilty after the completion of the 
prosecution case but before the start of the defence case, received “close to full credit” 
for his guilty plea. This means that he received more credit than his co-accused Sikirica 
and Došen, who pleaded guilty after the termination of both the prosecution and the 
defence case.758 Therefore, the timeliness of the guilty plea also counted in mitigation. 
In this regard, the Chamber stated (referring to Sikirica) that: “It is worth noting that, 
had he not pleaded guilty in the circumstances of this case, even taking into account 
the lateness of that plea, he would have received a much longer sentence.”759 
Though the Chambers generally accepted that a guilty plea was a mitigating factor, the 
weight attached to it was at the discretion of the Chamber and some Chambers, 
especially in earlier cases, namely Kambanda at the ICTR and Jelisić at the ICTY 
chose to put little or no weight on the guilty plea. In Kambanda, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that a guilty plea entitled an accused person to sentence reduction but 
did not give weight to the accused’s guilty plea but instead found that the aggravating 
circumstance negated the mitigating factors, and sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.760 Similarly, in Jelisić, the Chamber took note of his guilty plea but gave 
it little weight since the Chamber found that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
                                            
ICTR: Bisengimana (Judgment) (n 697) para 139; Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) paras 53–
54; Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentencing) (n 697) paras 150–152; Serugendo (Judgment and 
Sentence) (n 697) paras 32–34.  
757 Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) paras 149–150; Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) 
para 85.  
758 Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) para 228. 
759 Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) para 234. 
760 Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) para 120. 
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mitigating factors and that the accused had “enthusiastically committed his crimes”. He 
was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.761 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber in both 
cases declined to interfere with the discretion of the respective Trial Chambers arguing, 
in both instances, that the Appellants had not provided evidence indicating abuse of 
discretion by the Trial Chamber.762  
A guilty plea was a mitigating factor at the ad hoc tribunals and the earlier an accused 
person pleaded guilty, the more credit they would get for it. But even those who 
pleaded guilty at later stages of the proceedings received some credit for their guilty 
pleas and received lower sentences than they would have otherwise received. The 
weight given to a guilty plea as a mitigating factor varied, generally the Chambers 
attached significant weight to it, and this led to lower sentences.763 However, 
sometimes the Chambers attached little or no weight to guilty pleas as in the two cases 
discussed above.   
Cooperation 
The Trial Chambers were obligated to consider substantial cooperation of the accused 
person with the Prosecutors as a mitigating factor in sentencing.764 The Chambers, 
both at the ICTR and ICTY generally imposed reduced sentences on accused persons 
who cooperated with the Prosecutor or with the Court.765 However, the question on 
whether cooperation was ‘substantial’ and therefore amounting to a mitigating factor 
                                            
761 Jelisić (Judgment) (n 719) paras 129–136. 
762 ICTY: The Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić (Judgment) IT-95- 10-A (5 July 2001) [122–123].  
ICTR: Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) (n 660) paras 123–124; see also a similar argument by the 
Chamber in Serushago (Reasons for judgment) (n 711) para 23. 
763 See for example Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 80. Her guilty plea was considered to 
be particularly vital to reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina  because of her position as the President 
of Republika Srpska at the time of commission of crimes. Therefore, the Chamber gave a lot weight to 
it during sentencing. 
764 Rules 101 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE 
765 See for example ICTY: Banović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 708) paras 60–61; Todorović (Sentencing 
Judgment) (n 698) para 114; Sikirica et al (Sentencing judgment) (n 708) para 227. 
 ICTR: Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) paras 56–58; Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) (n 
697) paras 61–62; The Prosecutor v Omar Serushago (Sentence) ICTR 98-39-S (5 February 1999) [31–
33]. 
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was at the discretion of a Trial Chamber.766 In determining this, at least three aspects 
of cooperation were considered: the degree and extent of cooperation, the quality of 
information provided, and the earnestness of the cooperation which means it is done 
without expecting any reward in return. These three factors were outlined by the 
Chamber in the Prosecutor v Timohir Blaškić, where it was held: 
“Co-operation with the Prosecutor is the only circumstance explicitly provided 
for within the terms of the Rules. By this simple fact, it takes on a special 
importance. The earnestness and degree of co-operation with the Prosecutor 
decides whether there is reason to reduce the sentence on this ground. 
Therefore, the evaluation of the accused’s co-operation depends both on the 
quantity and quality of the information he provides. Moreover, the Trial Chamber 
singles out for mention the spontaneity and selflessness of the co-operation 
which must be lent without asking for something in return. Providing that the co-
operation lent respects the aforesaid requirements, the Trial Chamber classes 
such co-operation as a “significant mitigating factor.”767  
This ruling was adopted in other cases at both the ICTY and ICTR cases. For example, 
in the Prosecutor v Stevan Todorović, the prosecution argued that considering the 
benefits which had accrued to the accused from the plea agreement, his cooperation 
with the Prosecutor could not be considered selfless or to have been rendered without 
expecting anything in return.768 However, the Chamber while agreeing with the ruling 
in Blaškić above in principle, pointed out that the fact that the accused has gained or 
may gain something in return for cooperation with the Prosecutor does not preclude 
the Chamber from considering such cooperation as a mitigating factor. The Chamber 
therefore decided to consider the accused’s cooperation as a mitigating factor on the 
determination of the sentence.769  
Another aspect considered in assessing whether cooperation was substantial is the 
credibility of the accused and the veracity of the information provided. Therefore, lying 
or giving untruthful information or being evasive and vague may cause the Chamber 
                                            
766 Jelisić (Judgment) (n 711) para 126. 
767 The Prosecutor v Timohir Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) [774]. 
768 Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 698) para 85.  
769Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 698) paras 86–88. 
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to put less weight on cooperation as a mitigating factor.770 For example, in the 
Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić, the Trial Chamber chose to attach little weight to the 
accused’s cooperation with the prosecution on the basis that the accused had 
previously lied about his involvement in certain crimes; a fact which, in the view of the 
Trial Chamber, affected the credibility of the accused and the veracity of the information 
provided to the Prosecution and to the Chamber.771  
However, it is noteworthy that on appeal, though the Appeals Chamber agreed with 
the Trial Chamber in principle, it found that the Trial Chamber had committed a 
discernible error by considering that the Appellant had given false information but not 
considering that the Appellant had admitted to lying and taken initiative to correct the 
false information, therefore, lessening the impact of the lie. The Appeals Chamber held 
that these factors should have been considered in assessing the value of cooperation, 
therefore, the Trial Chamber had given insufficient weight to the Appellant’s 
cooperation.772 
While cooperation is a mitigating factor, lack of cooperation is not an aggravating 
factor. For example, in the Prosecutor v Milan Simić one of the accused’s conditions 
for entering a plea agreement with the prosecution was that if any information 
generated as a result would not be used in evidence against his co-accused. The 
Prosecution accepted this but later argued that his refusal to cooperate in the case 
against his co-accused should be considered as an aggravating factor. The Chamber 
did not give credit to the accused for cooperation with the prosecution in the case 
against co-accused but rejected the argument that lack of cooperation should be an 
aggravating factor.773 
The Chambers considered cooperation as a mitigating factor as required by the RPE 
of both Tribunals but the question of whether cooperation had been substantial was at 
the discretion of the Chamber. The Chambers took into account many varying factors 
to determine whether cooperation had been substantial and some of the examples are 
discussed above. This determined the weight that the Chamber put on cooperation as 
                                            
770 Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) para 156. 
771 Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) para 156. 
772 Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) (n 712) para 107. 
773 Simić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 89. 
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a mitigating factor. Sometimes cooperation of the accused was also considered in the 
decision determining whether the accused could benefit from early release.774 
Remorse 
The Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals generally considered the expression of remorse 
for the crimes committed by the accused person as a mitigating factor based on the 
belief that it contributed towards reconciliation. Guilty plea and cooperation alone are 
not sufficient to demonstrate remorse and the accused person generally had to issue 
a statement explaining their actions, acknowledging the impact of the conflict in general 
and their actions, in particular, on the lives of the victims; and showing commitment to 
participate in the truth and reconciliation processes. 775 The accused who took this 
cause of action generally benefited from lower sentences than those who did not offer 
an explanation for their actions.776 
However, for remorse to qualify as a mitigating factor, the Chamber had to be satisfied 
that the remorse expressed was sincere.777 For example, in Jelisić, the Chamber held 
that the accused had not expressed any remorse before it and further considered that 
the remorse expressed by the accused to the psychiatrist did not seem sincere. 
                                            
774 See for example the ICTY: The Prosecutor v Darco Mrda (Decision of the President on the early 
release of Darco Mrda) IT-02-59-ES (18 December 2013) [28–30]; The Prosecutor v Dragan Obrenovic 
(Decision of the President on the early release of Dragan Obrenovic) IT-02-60/2-ES (21 September 
2011) [25–28]. 
775 See for example the ICTY: Banović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 708) paras 71–72; Nikolić (sentencing 
judgment) (n 723) paras 160–161; Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 71; Simić (Sentencing 
Judgment) (n 723) para 94.  
The ICTR: Ruggiu (Judgment and sentence) (n 697) paras 69–72; Rutaganira (Judgment and 
Sentencing) (n 697) paras 156–158; Serugendo (Judgment and Sentence) (n 697) paras 63–64; 
Serushago (Sentence) (n 765) paras 40–42.  
776 See examples in footnote 214 above and contrast with the Kambanda case where the Trial Chamber 
found that he had shown no remorse, had offered no explanation for his actions and shown no sympathy 
for the victims of his crimes. Therefore, despite his guilty plea and extensive cooperation with the 
Prosecutor, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. See part 5.3.2 above for detailed discussion of this 
case. 
777 Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 698) para 89.  
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Remorse was therefore not considered as a mitigating factor and despite his guilty plea 
he was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.778 
The question is how the Chamber can determine that remorse is sincere. For example, 
in the Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić, the accused person expressed remorse which was 
taken into consideration by the Trial Chamber and she was sentenced to 11 years 
imprisonment.779 She later reportedly told journalists that she had merely expressed 
remorse to benefit from sentencing concession, which proves that her remorse had not 
been sincere.780 There is, therefore, no foolproof method with which the Chamber can 
determine whether the accused is truly remorseful as discussed further in part 5.5.3 
below. 
5.5 Critique of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals 
The use of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals was always a controversial issue. 
Some commentators thought it a necessary addition to the ad hoc tribunals,781 while 
others, especially those with civil law training showed more reluctance.782 The 
supporters argued, inter alia, that: plea negotiation is an efficient way to resolve cases 
fast thereby saving judicial time and resources; the admission of guilt by defendants 
helps to clarify the historical record in line with the objectives of the Tribunals; and 
guilty pleas together with expression of remorse foster reconciliation. On the other 
hand, the opponents argue, inter alia that the crimes dealt with at international tribunals 
are too grievous to be bargained; that plea bargaining runs counter to a transparent 
                                            
778 Jelisić (Judgment) (n 719). 
779 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 71. 
780 See part 5.5.3 below for a detailed discussion of this case. 
781 For example the opinion of Judges Vohrah and McDonald of the ICTY in Erdemović appeal where 
they stated that plea bargaining, should find a ready place at the ICTY since it saves judicial time and 
costs, and spares witnesses the trouble of traveling to the tribunal and testifying Erdemović (Appeal 
Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) para 2. 
782 See Combs, ‘Copping a Plea to Genocide’ (n 27) 139. The author discusses the introduction of plea 
bargaining at the ICTY stating that the ICTY’s civil lawyers and judges were unfamiliar with the concept 
of plea bargaining and suspicious about its suitability to the ICTY.  
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process; and, that the victims are denied the opportunity to tell their stories.783 This 
part discusses some of these issues. 
5.5.1 Practical necessity of plea negotiation 
Plea negotiation was incorporated in the Completion Strategies of both the ICTY and 
the ICTR in response to deadlines set by the UNSC requiring both Tribunals to 
complete investigations by 2004, first instance trials by 2008 and all their work by 2010. 
In the beginning, ICTY judges had previously rejected plea negotiation on an 
ideological basis, arguing that it was incompatible with the role of the Tribunal to 
prosecute the most serious international crimes; later, they welcomed it as practical 
tool. Indeed, judge Mellon noted that without plea negotiation the ICTY would not have 
been able to meet the aforementioned deadline. It is generally accepted that guilty 
pleas, and by extension plea negotiation, saves judicial time and resources. As judges 
McDonald and Vohrah of the ad hoc Tribunals’ Appeals Chamber stated: 
“The concept of the guilty plea per se is the peculiar product of the adversarial 
system of the common law which recognises the advantage it provides to the 
public in minimising costs, in the saving of court time and in avoiding the 
inconvenience to many, particularly to witnesses. This common law institution 
of the guilty plea should, in our view, find a ready place in an international 
criminal forum such as the International Tribunal confronted by cases which, by 
their inherent nature, are very complex and necessarily require lengthy hearings 
if they go to trial under stringent financial constraints arising from allocations 
made by the United Nations itself dependent upon the contributions of 
States.”784  
Similarly, judge Cassese stressed on the contribution of a guilty plea to public good. 
He said:  
                                            
783 Angela Banks, ‘Carla Del Ponte: Her Retrospective of Four Years in The Hague’ (2004) 6 
International Law Forum du Droit International 37, 38. The author discusses the reflections of the former 
Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, on the advantages and limitations of using plea bargaining at 
the ICTY. 
784 Erdemović (Appeal Judgment Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah) (n 633) 
para 2. 
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“It is apparent from the whole spirit of the Statute and the Rules that, by 
providing for a guilty plea, the draftsmen intended to enable the accused (as 
well as the Prosecutor) to avoid a possible lengthy trial with all the attendant 
difficulties. These difficulties – it bears stressing – are all the more notable in 
international proceedings. Here, it often proves extremely arduous and time-
consuming to collect evidence. In addition, it is imperative for the relevant 
officials of an international court to fulfil the essential but laborious task of 
protecting victims and witnesses. Furthermore, international criminal 
proceedings are expensive, on account of the need to provide a host of facilities 
to the various parties concerned (simultaneous interpretation into various 
languages; provision of transcripts for the proceedings, again in various 
languages; transportation of victims and witnesses from far-away countries; 
provision of various forms of assistance to them during trial, etc.). Thus, by 
pleading guilty, the accused undoubtedly contributes to public advantage.785 
Generally, with a guilty plea the proceedings are much shorter, the judgments take a 
shorter time to write, and the accused persons agree not to appeal against the 
conviction therefore there is generally fewer appeals.786  
The question, however, is at what cost is such judicial economy obtained? Some 
commentators argue that the ad hoc tribunals by widely accepting plea negotiation 
may have traded justice for judicial efficiency.787 For example, Judge Hunt, as a 
member of the ICTY and the ICTR Appeals Chamber, decried measures taken to 
speedily resolve cases in line with the Completion Strategy.788 He noted that the 
                                            
785 Erdemović (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese) (n 592) para 8. 
786 For example, in the ICTR Completion Strategy report of 2004 the President of the ICTR stated that: 
“Guilty pleas reduce the length of trials. Experience shows that not more than a day is needed for a 
Chamber to satisfy itself that a guilty plea is informed, unequivocal, and made freely and voluntarily. The 
writing of the judgment requires a few weeks.” Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda Annex to UN Doc S/2004/341 (3 May 2004) para 48.   
787 See for example Scharf (n 684). 
788 The Prosecutor v Milosevic (Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in 
Chief) IT-02-54-AR734 (21 October 2003) [20–22]. It is noteworthy that this comment was in not in the 
context of plea bargaining but rather was about the admission of evidence. The similarity, however, is 
that both actions were taken to speed up cases to meet the Completion Strategy. See also the concerns 
expressed by the trial chamber in Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) para 67. 
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Appeals Chamber Majority in its desire to comply with the Completion Strategy tended 
to deviate  from established interpretations of the ICTY Statute and RPE in a manner 
which violated the fair trial rights of the accused. He added that the fact that the Tribunal 
faced the challenge of insufficient time and money was not sufficient justification for 
the violation of the rights of accused persons.789 
The second practical advantage of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunal was that it 
helped solve challenges related to the collection of evidence.  As seen above, a guilty 
plea, was often accompanied by a factual basis which sometimes provided the 
Prosecutor with invaluable information which may have otherwise remained unknown. 
For example, in Kambanda the accused, being that he was the acting Prime Minister 
and the highest official charged with genocide at the ICTR, provided the Prosecutor 
with vital information which was useful in understanding the conflict and was used in 
the cases against many other accused persons.790 Similarly, in Erdemović the accused 
provided the Prosecutor with information which was vital to the investigation, such as 
where the bodies of the victims of the Srebrenica massacres had been buried, which 
would not have been known but for the accused’s confession.791 However, the 
historical truth of the conflict which is constructed from information collected by way of 
accused persons confessions is often incomplete, which poses a challenge as 
discussed below.  
5.5.2 Establishment of historical truth 
Apart from prosecuting and punishing international crime, ending impunity and 
promoting international peace, another mandate of the ad hoc tribunals was to 
establish the underlying truth of the conflicts in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia.792 
The judges repeatedly stated that a guilty plea helps in the establishment of truth in 
line with this mandate of the tribunal.793  
                                            
789 Milosevic (Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief) (n 788).  
790 See discussion of the case in part 5.3.2 above. 
791 Erdemović (sentencing judgment) (n 616) para 99. 
792 See a summary of the tribunals’ mandate in Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) paras 58–63. 
793 See for example Banović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 708) para 68; Sikirica et al (Sentencing 
judgment) (n 708) para 149; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) (n 698) para 81; Erdemović (Sentencing 
Judgment bis) (n 642) para 21. 
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This might have been an overstatement for the following reasons: first, truth is 
intrinsically a disputed concept especially in the context of international crimes which, 
unlike domestic crimes, are committed within a political and ideological context. Often, 
perpetrators of international crimes enact a policy supporting a systematic attack and 
use propaganda to fuel fear and hatred against would be victims, leading the 
perpetrators to believe that their actions are justified in defending themselves.794 This 
perhaps explains why, despite the conviction of defendants at international tribunals 
many people in the post-conflict regions deny that horrific crimes were committed and 
continue to believe in the innocence of the defendants. For example, although 
convictions at the Nuremberg Tribunal were based on records kept by the convicted 
persons which proved the commission of crimes, opinion polls conducted in West 
Germany between 1946-1958 showed that the majority of people believed that the 
convicted persons were innocent.795 In addition, despite the many convictions at the 
ICTY, many people in the Former Yugoslavia deny the version of truth established by 
the ICTY.796 Therefore the idea of truth, concerning who were the victims and 
perpetrators in a conflict, remains disputed irrespective of facts proven beyond 
                                            
794 See for example ‘Statement of Guilt: Biljana Plavšić | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ <http://www.icty.org/en/content/statement-guilt-biljana-plav%C5%A1i%C4%87> accessed 
3 August 2018. Biljana Plavšić, the former President of Republika Srpska explains her motivation to 
commit crimes as follows:  
“I have now come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent people were 
the victims of an organised, systematic effort to remove Muslims and Croats from the territory 
claimed by Serbs. At the time, I easily convinced myself that this was a matter of survival and 
self-defence. In fact, it was more. Our leadership, of which I was a necessary part, led an effort 
which victimised countless innocent people. Explanations of self-defence and survival offer no 
justification. By the end, it was said, even among our own people, that in this war we had lost 
our nobility of character. The obvious questions become, if this truth is now self-evident, why 
did I not see it earlier? And how could our leaders and those who followed have committed such 
acts? The answer to both questions is, I believe, fear, a blinding fear that led to an obsession, 
especially for those of us for whom the Second World War was a living memory, that Serbs 
would never again allow themselves to become victims. In this, we in the leadership violated 
the most basic duty of every human being, the duty to restrain oneself and to respect the human 
dignity of others. We were committed to do whatever was necessary to prevail” (emphasis 
added).  
795 See Scharf (n 33) 1079.  
796 Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY’ (n 32) 425–426. 
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reasonable doubt before international tribunals. It does not help that international 
tribunals are often far removed from the affected people in terms of physical location, 
language used, and complexity of legal procedure.797   
Furthermore, critics have argued that truth revealed at international tribunals is limited 
because tribunals are governed by stringent rules of evidence which may exclude 
important information which does not fit the often-restrictive criteria of admissible 
evidence. This is unlike, for example, truth and reconciliation commissions which have 
less stringent rules of admissibility of evidence.798  
The truth becomes even more limited with plea negotiation especially when in involves 
the withdrawal of some charges or factual allegations. When this happens, the 
established truth is incomplete and leaves many questions unanswered. 799 The judges 
at the ad hoc tribunals were alive to the fact that withdrawal of charges or factual 
allegations limit the historical truth because “the public will not know whether the 
allegations were withdrawn because of insufficient evidence or because they were 
simply a ‘bargaining chip’ in the negotiation process.”800 Furthermore, the practice at 
the tribunal was that a plea agreement would be accompanied by a factual basis which 
the Chambers could rely on to enter convictions. These documents were often only a 
few pages long compared to thousands of pages which ordinarily result from judgments 
rendered by Chambers at the end of a full trial.801 This further restricted the nature of 
truth revealed. 
                                            
797 Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY’ (n 32) 434. The author mentions how the ICTY is far removed 
from the people of the former Yugoslavia and makes the point that it is important to strengthen the 
outreach of the ICTY, to bridge the distance, in order to increase its impact on reconciliation. 
798 Anna Petrig, ‘Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals’ (2008) 8 Chicago-
Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 13. 
799 Mirjan Damaska, ‘Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts Symposium on Guilty Plea - 
Part I: The Theoretical Background’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1018, 1032. Mirjan 
Damaska, ‘Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts Symposium on Guilty Plea - Part I: The 
Theoretical Background’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1018, 1032; Jelena Subotić, 
‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’ (2012) 36 Southeastern Europe 39, 46. 
800 Nikolić (sentencing judgment) (n 723) para 63. 
801 See Scharf (n 33) 1080. The author argues the truth established as a result of plea bargains as 
compared to a full trial is “only the merest bare-bones.” 
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5.5.3 Impact on reconciliation 
The judges at the ICTY and the ICTR generally accepted that guilty pleas foster 
reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively, as the perpetrators 
admit wrongdoing and show remorse which helps the victims to heal.802 And some 
scholars agree that guilty pleas accompanied by remorse can help in the reconciliation 
process.803 However, the impact of guilty pleas on reconciliation is dependent on the 
establishment of truth. The Trial Chamber in Erdemović acknowledged this when it 
stated that “discovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental 
step on the way to reconciliation: for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious 
hatreds and begins the healing process.”804 As discussed above plea negotiation only 
establishes a limited version of the truth behind conflict. Therefore, if reconciliation is 
dependent on the establishment of truth, then it follows that the limited nature of truth 
established via plea negotiation may be a barrier to reconciliation. 
In addition, there is the argument that sentence reduction which generally 
accompanies guilty pleas hinder reconciliation.805 As discussed in part 5.4.3 above, 
judges at the ad hoc tribunals often considered a guilty plea and other related aspects 
such as remorse and cooperation as mitigating factors which entitled the accused 
persons to lower sentences than those meted after a full trial. However, these short 
sentences arising from guilty pleas tend to embitter victims who feel that the tribunals 
did not take full account of their suffering.806 On the contrary, the supporters of the 
convicted persons were sometimes opposed to the relatively lower sentences 
                                            
802 See for example Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 723) para 72. 
803 Nancy Amoury Combs, ‘Prosecutor v. Plavšić. Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S’ (2003) 97 The American 
Journal of International Law 929, 937. The author makes the argument that guilty pleas and remorse 
may aid in reconciliation but warns that it would take a long time for such impact to be felt and that the 
concessions granted by tribunals to encourage guilty pleas may embitter victims hence hindering 
reconciliation. 
804 Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment bis) (n 642) para 21. 
805 Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY’ (n 32) 430. 
806 Amra Kebo, ‘Regional Report: Plavšić Sentence Divides Bosnia’ (Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting) <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/regional-report-plavsic-sentence-divides> accessed 10 
August 2018; ‘Bosnian Muslims Protest against UN Tribunal Ruling’ Reuters (16 September 2009) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLG416125> accessed 10 August 2018. 
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perceiving them to be too severe.807 Such mixed reactions are evidence of a deeply 
polarised society not moving towards reconciliation.808  
Another issue which impacts on reconciliation is the sincerity of the remorse expressed 
in conjunction with the guilty plea. As the Trial Chamber stated in Nikolić: “when an 
admission of guilt is coupled with a sincere expression of remorse, a significant 
opportunity for reconciliation may be created.” However, interviews conducted by one 
scholar in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that there was an “overwhelming 
consensus” among victims that the guilty pleas at the ICTY were disingenuous and 
only entered by defendants who wanted to benefit from sentencing concessions.809 
This impact must be worse once it becomes clear that the remorse expressed was 
indeed false like in the case of Biljana Plavšić. The facts were as follows: 
Biljana Plavšić was a reputable academic who later joined politics and became the 
President of Republika Srpska during the war in the former Yugoslavia. On 3 April 2000 
she was indicted by the ICTY and accused of genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
the crimes against humanity of persecutions, extermination and killing, deportation and 
inhumane acts.810 On 10 January 2001 she voluntarily surrendered herself to the ICTY. 
At her first appearance she pleaded not guilty, however, after a plea agreement with 
the Prosecutor, on 2 October 2002, she pleaded guilty to the charge of crimes against 
humanity. As part of the agreement, the Prosecutor withdrew the other charges of 
genocide and complicity to genocide.811 She issued a statement recognizing her part 
in the crimes and issued an apology.812 She however refused to cooperate with the 
                                            
807 Kebo (n 804). 
808 See Janine Natalya Clark, ‘The ICTY and the Challenges of Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia’ 
(E-International Relations) <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/23/the-icty-and-the-challenges-of-
reconciliation-in-the-former-yugoslavia/> accessed 10 August 2018. The author discusses the opposing 
narratives of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia held by Serbs and Croats where each group is fixated 
on the crimes committed against them and not those committed by them. 
809 Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY’ (n 32) 432. The author however notes that the interviewees in 
question had not read the statements issued by the defendants they referred to and seemed unaware 
of the ICTY’s general policy towards guilty pleas.   
810 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 2. 
811 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 5. 
812 ‘Statement of Guilt: Biljana Plavšić | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (n 
792). 
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prosecutor and refused to testify or provide any information against her co-accused 
Momčilo Krajišnik and other accused for example Slobadan Milosevic, the former 
Serbian President.813    
During the sentencing hearing, the defence called expert witnesses of “high 
international reputation” who testified about her invaluable contribution to the signing 
and implementation of the Dayton Agreements and her role in promoting peace and 
reconciliation.814 Furthermore, Dr Alex Boraine, the former Deputy Chairperson of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, testified about the nexus 
between remorse and reconciliation stressing that full, voluntary and genuine 
confession and remorse was necessary to provide some closure to victims.815 
The Chamber considered the evidence given regarding her role in the promotion of 
peace and reconciliation, as well as her age (72 years old), and expression of remorse 
and self-surrender and sentenced her to 11 years imprisonment.816 This was a 
considerably lower sentence than that meted out on other accused persons charged 
with similar crimes.817 The judges considered her guilty plea to be particularly vital to 
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of her position as the President of 
Republika Srpska at the time of commission.818 She was sent to Sweden to serve her 
sentence. 
While in Sweden she gave interviews and wrote a memoire, the content of which 
brought to question her acceptance of guilt and the sincerity of her remorse.819 The 
                                            
813 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 64. It is noteworthy that despite her initial reluctance 
she eventually testified in the Krajišnik case having been ordered to do so by the Court. She however 
maintained her refusal to testify in the Milosevic case. See The Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić (Decision 
of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs Biljana Plavšić) IT-
OO-39 & 40/l-ES (14 September 2009) [12].  
814 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) paras 87–94. 
815 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) paras 75–76. 
816 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 132. 
817 Combs, ‘Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence 
Discounts’ (n 704) 8. The author analyses the sentences issued at the ICTY, the similarities and 
differences between the crimes charged in comparison with the sentences imposed. 
818 Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) (n 730) para 80. 
819 See generally Subotić (n 799). The author reproduces lengthy quotes from the relevant sections of 
Plavsic’s interviews and her memoires. I was unable to access the original interviews or the memoires. 
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narrative she presented was that she had been a victim rather than a perpetrator of 
international crimes, a narrative which ran contrary to that contained in the factual basis 
accompanying her guilty plea at the ICTY. She went so far as to say that the only 
reason she pleaded guilty was to save herself because without the guilty plea, the trial 
would have taken long, and she might not have survived because of her advanced 
age.820 It became apparent that her guilty plea and expression of remorse had been 
motivated by self-preservation rather than an acceptance of guilt and regret. The 
judges had deemed her remorse to be sincere and accepted it in mitigation stating that 
it would help in the process of reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia, but they had 
made an error of judgment. The then ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, who had 
worked on the Plavšić case admitted to having been wrong in her assessment of the 
situation.821 
Her memoires and interviews had a negative impact on victims.822 Despite these 
memoires, she was granted early release from prison in September 2009, having 
served two-thirds of her sentence. Her remarks in the interviews and memoires were 
not mentioned in the early release decision, instead the ICTY President argued that 
she had “demonstrated substantial evidence of rehabilitation”.823 Upon release, she 
was picked up from Sweden by a government plane and given a VIP welcome when 
she returned to Republika Srpska.824 Biljana Plavšić had committed fraud on the ICTY 
and gotten away with it. 
As stated above, one of the requirements for remorse to be considered as a mitigating 
factor is that it has to be sincere. And there were instances where the judges declined 
to reduce an accused’s sentence adjudging his remorse insincere, as discussed 
above. But the Plavšić case clearly shows that there is no foolproof way to know 
                                            
820 Subotić (n 799) 48. 
821 Carla Del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the 
Culture of Impunity : A Memoir (Other Press 2009) 161. 
822 Subotić (n 799) 48. 
823 Plavšić (Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs 
Biljana Plavšić) (n 813) paras 8–13. The decision states that one of the judges consulted expressed 
concern as to whether Plavšić had shown sufficient evidence of rehabilitation. But the decision does not 
state the basis of the said judge’s concern. 
824 Subotić (n 799) 40. 
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whether a person is sincere in their expression of remorse or otherwise. The 
Prosecution and the judges, even while exercising due diligence, may be mistaken as 
to one’s sincerity.  An accused may say all the right words but not mean them and later 
rescind them. There can be no prevention against that. If reconciliation is based on 
expression of genuine remorse, then false remorse most likely has a negative impact 
on reconciliation. 
Lastly, this debate remains on a theoretical level and there is hardly any empirical 
research to establish whether guilty pleas and international prosecutions in general 
foster reconciliation.825 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter commenced by discussing the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, their 
mandate and their composition as well as their procedural law. Then it examined the 
introduction of plea negotiation focusing on the reasons that led to it. The main reason 
for the adoption of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals was to benefit from the 
practical advantages of plea negotiation mainly efficiency and saving judicial resources 
in an attempt to meet the deadline set by the UNSC to finish first instance trials by 
2008 and all the Tribunals’ work by 2010. In addition, the Chambers argued that guilty 
pleas promoted establishment of historical truth and fostered reconciliation. However, 
guilty pleas at the ad hoc tribunals were often procured through plea agreements a 
process which often negatively impacted on the search for truth and reconciliation as 
discussed above. Guilty pleas indeed helped with faster dispensation of cases, but the 
Tribunals still missed the set deadlines and only completed their work on 31 December 
2015 and on 31 December 2017, for the ICTR and ICTY respectively. 
Although the ICC is a permanent court and has no temporal deadline to complete its 
work, some of the challenges it faces, necessitate research into whether plea 
negotiation would be a potential solution. To answer this question, it was necessary to 
discuss the operation of plea negotiation at the ICTY and the ICTR, examining how it 
worked and critiquing it, as has been done in this chapter. The next Chapter will discuss 
                                            
825 Janine Natalya Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’ (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 415, 434. 
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whether plea negotiation would be compatible with the philosophical underpinning of 
the ICC as well as its procedural law. 
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CHAPTER 6: WHETHER THE ICC SHOULD IMPLEMENT A PLEA 
NEGOTIATION POLICY  
6.1 Introduction 
The main research question that this dissertation explored was whether the ICC should 
implement a plea negotiation policy to mitigate some of the challenges it faces. To 
provide the foundation for answering this question, the dissertation set out four sub-
questions as follows: whether the legal architecture of the ICC supports the practice of 
plea negotiation; what challenges the ICC faces which plea negotiation might mitigate; 
what lessons can be learnt from the application of plea negotiation in national 
jurisdictions; and, what lessons may be learnt from the application of plea negotiation 
at the ICTY and the ICTR. Each of these questions was dealt with in each of the 
substantive chapters of this dissertation that is chapters two to five. 
To begin with, Chapter One set out the background of the study and the introduction 
to the research problem. It then highlighted the sources of the procedural law at the 
ICC which include the Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), 
Regulations of the Court, Regulations of the Registry, Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, further ancillary instruments on criminal procedure drafted by the ASP as 
well as policy documents on pertinent issues formulated by the judges. Furthermore, 
the Chapter outlined the research methodology which is two-pronged: first, a 
comparative study of the international criminal procedure of the preceding international 
criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) on the one hand, with the ICC on the other hand. 
This was done with the view of illustrating the emergence of a sui generis international 
criminal procedure. The second prong was a comparative analysis of plea negotiation 
as practised in national criminal jurisdictions with common law systems on one hand 
and civil law systems on the other hand. In this regard, Kenya and South Africa were 
chosen to represent common law systems, while France and Germany to represent 
civil law systems. These countries are all states parties to the Rome Statute and 
therefore their criminal procedure is relevant to the development of practice at the ICC. 
 Subsequently, each substantive chapter, chapters two to five, tackled each of the 
dissertation’s secondary questions set out above. Chapter Two examined the legal 
framework of the ICC and established the development of a sui generis procedural law. 
In this regard, this chapter highlighted how the procedural law at the ICC differs from 
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that of the ad hoc tribunals. It also established that the procedural law at the ICC is an 
amalgam of common law and civil law practices combined together with innovative 
provisions specific to the unique nature of the ICC. Chapter Three discussed the 
challenges facing the ICC which were divided into three categories: legal and 
procedural challenges, political challenges, as well as challenges in relation to the 
victim participation and reparation regime. Chapter Four dealt with plea negotiation as 
practised in common law countries represented in the discussion by Kenya and South 
Africa, on one hand; and civil law countries represented by Germany and France, on 
the other hand. Chapter Five discussed the use of plea negotiation at the ICTY and 
the ICTR outlining the development of a streamlined jurisprudence on plea negotiation 
in both tribunals as well as the role of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor.  
This chapter, Chapter Six, is a culmination of the various historical, comparative and 
international procedural analyses conducted in the preceding chapters. The question, 
whether the ICC should implement a plea negotiation policy to mitigate some of the 
challenges it faces, can now be answered. This chapter contains four parts including 
this introduction. Part two discusses whether the ICC should implement a plea 
negotiation policy. This question is answered in the affirmative and justified by two 
arguments: one, that plea negotiation would mitigate some of the challenges the ICC 
faces; and two, that the ICC has the benefit of learning from best practices and 
challenges experienced in national jurisdictions and at the ad hoc tribunals. Part three 
discusses whether plea negotiation would fit into the legal and procedural framework 
of the ICC. This question is also answered in the affirmative and supported by two 
arguments: one, that the compromise involved in the development of the legal 
framework of the ICC is akin to the compromise which underpins the practice of plea 
negotiation; and two, that plea negotiation is permitted by Article 65 of the Rome 
Statute as implemented in the Al Mahdi case. It is however admitted that the legal 
provisions regarding the admission of guilt are sparse and do not sufficiently provide 
for a practice as complex and potentially contentious as plea negotiation. Therefore, 
part four discusses the proposed amendments to the Rome Statute and the RPE 
which, if implemented, would enhance the capacity of the ICC to adopt a policy of plea 
negotiation. This part presents the salient features of these proposed amendments 
which are presented in full in Appendices A and B of this dissertation. Part five 
concludes the Chapter. 
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6.2 Whether the ICC should implement a plea negotiation policy 
This part argues that the ICC should implement a policy of plea negotiation for two 
reasons: that it would mitigate some of the challenges facing the Court, and that the 
ICC can pick up best practices and avoid limitations of plea negotiations by considering 
the experiences of the ad hoc tribunals and comparative national jurisdictions. 
6.2.1 Plea negotiation would mitigate some of the challenges facing the ICC  
The challenges facing the ICC may be divided into three main categories: legal and 
procedural challenges, political challenges, and challenges related to the victim 
participation and reparation regime of the ICC.826 This thesis argues that some of these 
challenges may be mitigated by implementing a policy of plea negotiation as explained 
below. 
Legal and procedural challenges 
One of the legal and procedural challenges facing the Court is the complexity of 
proceedings. Part of this results from the sui generis nature of the procedural law which 
is very complex and therefore leads to constant litigation between the participants. 827  
This leads to lengthy proceedings which are costly and which threaten to infringe on 
defendants’ rights to a speedy trial, especially when the accused person is in pre-trial 
and trial detention. In this regard, the ICC faces similar challenges to those that 
informed the implementation of a policy of plea negotiation at the ICTY and the ICTR 
– namely lengthy and costly proceedings. Admittedly, the two tribunals were temporary 
and therefore adopted plea negotiation as part of their completion strategy to enable 
them meet the deadlines set by the UNSC for completion of their work; while the ICC 
is a permanent institution with no completion deadlines. Nevertheless, the importance 
of expeditiousness, efficiency and effectiveness at the ICC should not be understated, 
especially since one of the performance indicators at the ICC is expeditious, 
transparent and fair proceedings at all stages.828  
                                            
826 See discussions of these challenges in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
827 See discussions in part 3.2 of this thesis 
828 ‘Independent Expert Review on the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System’ 
(2020) 114 <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/IER%20-
%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf> accessed 26 October 2020; See also International Criminal Court, 
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Plea negotiation was recognised as a tool which expedites proceedings and makes 
them more efficient and effective at the ICTY and the ICTR as well as in national 
jurisdictions as discussed in Chapters Four and Five respectively. The ICC also 
recognised the importance of a guilty plea, arrived at through a plea agreement, in the 
Al Mahdi case stating inter alia that it shortens proceedings and makes them more 
efficient. For this reason, the ICC should implement a policy of plea negotiation like the 
ICTY and the ICTR in order to benefit from its practical advantages. However, it is 
noteworthy that plea negotiation is not without challenges which could potentially derail 
the delivery of the ICC’s mandate. Some of these challenges and how they may be 
mitigated are discussed in parts 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 below.  
Political challenges 
One of the political challenges facing the ICC is the apparent bias of the ICC against 
African states. Pertinent issues have been raised on this subject, by African States 
Parties as well as other commentators, which deserve to be dealt with by the ICC, if it 
is to retain its legitimacy among African States Parties.829 The second political 
challenge relates to the cooperation of states parties to the Rome Statute. Since the 
ICC does not have an enforcement mechanism of its own, it relies on states parties to 
cooperate with it on many levels, including:  the arrest and surrender of suspects to 
the ICC, the authorization to conduct investigations and collect evidence in a state’s 
territory, as well as the enforcement of sentences. The case against former President 
Bashir illustrates how the ICC has experienced challenges with states parties which 
have repeatedly failed to cooperate with the Court by refusing to arrest and surrender 
him when he visited their territories. Eventually, the ICC was forced to hibernate the 
case against him because his appearance before the Court could not be secured.830  
                                            
‘Third Court’s Report on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal Court’ 
(2017) <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-icc-perforamnce-indicators-
20151208.pdf> accessed 7 August 2018.  
829 See discussion in part 3.3.1 of this dissertation. 
830 It is noteworthy that the OTP has ramped up efforts to continue with this case following Mr Bashir’s 
ouster and has in fact visited Sudan for the first time since the UNSC referred the matter in 2005. See 
‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at a Media Briefing 
in Khartoum, Sudan: “There Is an Urgent Need for Justice in Sudan. Sustainable Peace and 
Reconciliation Are Built on the Stabilizing Pillar of Justice.”’ <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201020-otp-statement-sudan> accessed 26 October 2020. 
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The third political challenge the Court faces is that of political instrumentalization of the 
Court whereby states parties use the ICC to settle their political scores, for example, 
by using the self-referral regime under Article 13 of the Rome Statute to refer the ruling 
party’s political foes to the ICC. This occurred, for example, in the case of Uganda, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic.831 
The implementation of a plea negotiation policy might mitigate some of the political 
challenges at the ICC. For example, if an accused person were to plead guilty and 
cooperate with the prosecution by providing evidence against other accused persons 
it might be useful in at least two ways: first, it would reduce the dependence of the 
Prosecutor on a state party’s cooperation for the purpose of investigation and collection 
of evidence. The Kenyatta case is instructive in this regard. The Chamber found that 
the Kenyan government had refused to cooperate with the prosecution in a manner 
which violated Kenya’s obligation to cooperate under Article 87 (7) of the Rome 
Statute. The Chamber held that:  
“the Kenyan Government's non-compliance has not only compromised the 
Prosecution's ability to thoroughly investigate the charges, but has ultimately 
impinged upon the Chamber's ability to fulfil its mandate under Article 64, and 
in particular, its truth-seeking function in accordance with Article 69 (3) of the 
Statute.”832 
Arguably, if there had been plea negotiation in this case, it might have reduced the 
ICC’s need for Kenya’s cooperation in securing evidence necessary to fulfil the 
Prosecutor’s and the Chamber’s mandate. The caveat here is that the decision of an 
accused person to plead guilty, especially in a high-profile case such as the Kenyatta 
case or Bashir case depends on many (political) issues which would be outside the 
control of the Court. However, this goal may be achieved when the guilty plea is taken 
by a less high profile accused person, who would then testify against or help in securing 
                                            
831 See discussion is part 3.3.3 of this dissertation. See also Oumar Ba, States of Justice: The Politics 
of the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press 2020) 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/states-of-justice/A919F84A580AB04F29B51817ECB8A192> 
accessed 6 September 2020. 
832 The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-
compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute) ICC-01/09-02/11-982 (3 December 2014) [79]. 
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evidence in more high-profile cases, like those that occurred at the ICTY. It is 
noteworthy that Mr Al Mahdi who pleaded guilty in 2016 to one charge of war crimes 
in Mali is set to give evidence for the prosecution against of Mr Al Hassan who is also 
accused of war crimes arising from the same situation.833 This therefore proves the 
fact that accused persons who admit guilt could give insider evidence against other 
accused persons for crimes arising from similar situations. 
Secondly, an admission of guilt could increase the legitimacy of the ICC which has 
become a challenge, especially with some African states parties to the Rome Statute 
that threatened to withdraw from the ICC. As one scholar noted: 
“an admission of guilt confirms that the prosecution was right to open the case 
and that the defendant deserves the sentence imposed. Hence, every 
defendant who shows remorse and co-operation demonstrates that he or she 
accepts the Court and its rulings.”834 
One of the criticisms levelled against the ICC is that it is a political court and therefore 
some of the cases are politically motivated and not rightfully before the Court.835 If an 
accused person pleads guilty it could help demonstrate that the charges levied against 
the person are legitimate, that indeed the person committed the crimes charged, that 
the case is rightfully before the Court, and the person is rightfully charged; thereby 
helping increase the legitimacy of the Court.  
In the same vein, the ICTY remarked that the guilty plea of Ms Plavšić, the President 
of the then Republika Srpska, sent a powerful message about the legitimacy of the 
international tribunal and its functions.836 Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that the 
sincerity of Ms Plavšić’s guilty plea came into question as she later gave interviews 
and wrote memoirs the contents of which negated her admission of guilt and remorse 
                                            
833 ‘ICC: Last Chance to de-Quarantine Justice for Mali’ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/justiceinfo-
comment-and-debate/opinion/45752-icc-last-chance-to-de-quarantine-justice-for-mali.html> accessed 
26 October 2020. 
834 Regina Rauxloh, ‘Plea Bargaining - A Necessary Tool for the International Criminal Prosecutor’ 
(2011) 94 Judicature 178, 180. 
835 David Hoile, Justice Denied: The Reality of the International Criminal Court (The Africa Research 
Centre 2014) 25. 
836 The Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39&40/1-S (27 February 2003) [76]. 
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on the basis of which she had received a sentencing concession.837 It therefore 
seemed like she had perpetrated fraud against the ICTY and gotten away with it.838 
This is a risk which the ICC would have to take, because no matter how vigilant judges 
are, it can be difficult to ascertain the true intentions and sincerity of an accused 
person’s admission of guilt and expression of remorse.  
In the same vein, plea negotiation might impact negatively on the legitimacy of the ICC 
by creating an impression of “unfair back door dealing” especially if it is shrouded in 
secrecy or is otherwise not transparent.839 However, if the Court adheres to the 
procedural safeguards and only accepts guilty pleas that are voluntary, equivocal and 
informed, it would evince little to no criticism as in the Al Mahdi case and would lead to 
shorter, less expensive proceedings thereby saving judicial time and resources while 
ensuring the accused person’s fair trial rights. 
Challenges arising from victim participation and the reparation regime 
The third type of challenge discussed arises from the victim participation and reparation 
regime at the ICC. The ICC is the first international criminal tribunal system to provide 
for the participation of victims in the proceedings. This is done by the incorporation of 
a robust and forward-thinking regime which has been hailed as an important addition 
to international criminal procedural law. However, because the ICC’s main focus is on 
the trial and punishment of persons considered to be most responsible for international 
crimes, the Court has faced challenges in the implementation of the victim participation 
and reparation regime.840 These challenges include balancing of the rights of the 
accused person with those of the victims as well as offering victims reparations which 
have so far been merely symbolic and collective.  
Besides, the reparation regime at the ICC is tied to conviction which means that without 
conviction there can be no reparation. In case of a conviction, reparation proceedings 
commence and run simultaneously with the appeal process. However, the reparation 
proceedings are terminated as soon as the accused is acquitted on appeal because 
                                            
837 See discussion in part 5.5.3 of this dissertation. 
838 See discussion in part 5.5.3 of this dissertation. 
839  Rauxloh (n 34) 180. 
840 See generally Owiso Owiso, ‘The International Criminal Court and Reparations: Judicial Innovation 
or Judicialisation of a Political Process?’ (2019) 19 International Criminal Law Review 505. 
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the legal basis of reparations ceases to exist, which is what happened in the Bemba 
case.841 In this case, reparation proceedings were running simultaneously with the 
appeal after Mr Bemba’s conviction by the Trial Chamber. Upon Mr Bemba’s acquittal 
by the Appeal’s Chamber, the reparation proceedings came to an abrupt stop with the 
Chamber appreciating the harm caused to the victims and admitting, rightly, that its 
hands were tied in that it could not issue a reparations order without a conviction.842  
These challenges have prompted experts, like Judge Van den Wyngaert, to consider 
alternatives such as the separation of the reparations and the trial proceedings so that 
trials be handled by the ICC and reparations be handled by a Victims Trust Fund and 
Reparation Commission, both processes operating simultaneously.843 
Since the current victim reparation regime at the ICC depends on conviction, plea 
negotiation, which results in a conviction, might aid in this process. The trial would be 
completed fast, resulting in a certain conviction after which reparations proceedings 
would commence. Subsequently, a reparation order would be issued, like in the Al 
Mahdi case, and there would be no risk of such a conviction being overturned on 
appeal unlike in the Bemba case. Therefore, a conviction resulting from a plea 
negotiation and a guilty plea might mitigate some of the challenges facing the Court in 
relation to the reparation of victims.  
Another advantage of plea negotiation in this regard is that victims, who sometimes 
are also witnesses, are saved the trouble of having to travel to The Hague, The 
Netherlands to testify. Sometimes the process of providing evidence in Court may lead 
to re-traumatization of victims and other times it may put their lives and that of their 
families at risk so that the Court is forced to put them in witness protection. This often 
means moving them from their ordinary place of residence, away from family and 
friends, to a location that is considered safe. For this reason, plea negotiation which 
                                            
841 The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Final Decision on the Reparations Proceedings) ICC-
01/05-01/08-3653 (3 August 2018). 
842 Bemba (Final Decision on the Reparations Proceedings) (n 16). 
843 Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge - Presented by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’ (2011) 
44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475, 495. See also discussion in part 3.4 of this 
dissertation. 
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leads to an accused person pleading guilty and thereby eliminating the need for 
witnesses to testify,844 would be a beneficial tool. 
However, it has been noted that some victims would like an opportunity to tell their 
stories. Plea negotiation might deny them this opportunity. This would perhaps be 
exacerbated by the fact that victims do not ordinarily play a prominent role in plea 
negotiation, as seen in national jurisdictions and the ad hoc tribunals. Similarly, the 
concessions offered to an accused person, by the Prosecutor (and confirmed by the 
Chamber) in exchange for a guilty plea might anger victims who may feel that the 
accused person has not received the punishment they deserve for the crimes 
committed.845 These are challenges that may be more glaring at the ICC, because 
unlike other international criminal tribunals, the ICC has both a retributive and 
restorative mandate, the latter which is fulfilled by the victim participation and 
reparation regime.  
The question which arises, therefore, is if the ICC is to adopt a plea negotiation policy, 
what role would the victims play? Perhaps the Legal Representative of Victims would 
be involved in negotiating a plea agreement, alongside the Prosecutor and the 
defence. However, this suggestion would give rise to a new set of challenges the first 
of which is that the involvement of victims in a plea agreement is not foreseen by Article 
65 (5) of the Rome Statute which envisions “discussions between the Prosecutor and 
the defence regarding modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty 
to be imposed”. It is also debatable whether victims should be allowed to participate in 
plea negotiation in the first place especially considering the fact that there is no 
precedent for active victim participation in the negotiation of plea agreements either in 
national jurisdictions846 or at the ad hoc tribunals. The answers to these questions are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation and would need to be the subject of further debate 
and scholarship. 
                                            
844 Under article 65 of RS, the chamber might require to hear witness statements, in addition to an 
admission of guilt. 
845  Rauxloh (n 34) 181. 
846 See part 4.4.2 of this dissertation which discusses the limited role of victims in plea negotiations in 
Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany. 
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6.2.2 Lessons the ICC can learn from the practice of plea negotiation in national 
jurisdictions 
To understand the perspective of both common law and civil law countries, a 
comparative analysis of the practice in Kenya and South Africa, both common law 
countries on one hand, and France and Germany as civil law countries on the other 
hand, was conducted. All four countries are states parties to the Rome Statute 
therefore members of the ASP whose procedural law can influence that of the ICC. 
The thesis analysed the development of plea negotiation in all four jurisdictions with 
regard to three main thematic areas: first, the issue of prosecutorial discretion versus 
compulsory prosecution whereby common law prosecutors tend to have more 
prosecutorial discretion, while civil law countries lean more towards compulsory 
prosecution. Secondly, the issue of participants in plea negotiation, that is the fact that 
on one hand in common law jurisdictions, plea negotiation is between the prosecutor 
and the defence, and the role of the judge is that of a neutral arbiter who determines 
whether the guilty plea was valid. On the other hand, plea negotiation in civil law 
countries generally involves a judge, in fact in Germany the judge commences the 
process and proposes an agreement to the prosecutor and defence. In all these 
jurisdictions, victims have only a limited participation in plea negotiation. Often victims 
participate in the negotiation of agreement which involves compensation, but this 
participation is often times subject to the discretion of the prosecutor. 
Plea negotiation is practised differently in all the four jurisdictions above, but some 
similarities abound: one, that the practice is introduced to mitigate challenges facing 
the criminal justice systems, for example, to deal with an influx of cases in the courts, 
to clear backlog or to deal with organized crimes. The main reason it is introduced is 
to benefit from its practical advantages such as shorter proceedings and reduced 
costs. Secondly, plea negotiation is a controversial practice with many disadvantages 
such as the potential violation of the rights of the accused and the potential abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion. Thirdly, many jurisdictions do not allow plea negotiation for 
sexual offences and for serious crimes including genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. 
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The introduction of plea negotiation to mitigate challenges facing the criminal justice 
system 
In all the four jurisdictions studied, Kenya, South Africa, France and Germany, the 
practice of plea negotiation was viewed as a way to solve some of the challenges 
facing the criminal justice system which challenges ranged from the backlog of cases 
to solving complex white-collar crimes. In the common law jurisdictions, Kenya and 
South Africa, plea bargaining has a long history although both countries continue to 
amend their applicable laws and come up with policy documents to regulate plea 
bargaining. On the other hand, plea negotiation has a more recent history in civil law 
countries like Germany and France. In fact, there was some resistance to the 
introduction of plea negotiation in civil law countries because some commentators and 
practitioners consider it a violation of the fundamental principles which underpin civil 
law systems. For example, an Article published in 1979 referred to Germany as the 
‘land without plea bargaining’,847 however, the practice of abrutschen arose secretly 
among practitioners and was so taboo that it took an academic writing using a 
pseudonym to expose the practice to the public. Eventually, recognizing the practical 
benefits of plea negotiation, Germany developed legislation, which follows the 
principles underlying the German criminal law and procedure, to deal with the practice.   
As has been established, national jurisdictions, even those which had previously been 
opposed to the practice, introduce plea negotiation to mitigate practical challenges and 
to benefit from its practical advantages; therefore, the ICC could borrow a leaf from 
this. As discussed above, there are many challenges facing the ICC and therefore a 
policy of plea negotiation should be considered as a way to mitigate some of the 
challenges facing the Court. This is however only to be done while being mindful of the 
possible negative aspects of plea negotiation discussed below. 
Serious crimes 
The common thread in all the four jurisdictions, except South Africa, is that there is an 
exception to using plea negotiation when it concerns international crimes (crimes 
against humanity, genocide, war crimes) as well as sexual offences. The rationale of 
                                            
847 John H Langbein, ‘Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It’ (1979) 78 Michigan Law 
Review 204. 
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this may be that these crimes are too serious for their resolution to be negotiated. This 
gives credence to the initial reluctance of ICTY judges to introduce plea negotiation at 
the ad hoc tribunals, arguing that the crimes dealt with therein were too serious to be 
negotiated. This seems to be an accepted rule at the national level, except in South 
Africa, that crimes of the gravity of which are dealt with at the ICC should not be 
negotiated. However, as seen below, the international community created an exception 
to this rule when it allowed plea negotiation at the ICTY and the ICTR both of which 
prosecuted crimes of a similar magnitude as the ICC, thereby creating precedent for 
the application of plea negotiation to grave crimes. The ICC should therefore follow 
this precedent and adopt a policy of plea negotiation to deal with charges arising from 
crimes within its jurisdiction because of the practical advantages of this practice 
experienced by the ad hoc tribunals and which are discussed below. 
Limitations of plea negotiation 
According to jurisprudence from national jurisdictions and ad hoc tribunals as well as 
scholarship, plea negotiation results in judicial economy and efficiency in the criminal 
justice system.848 However, the question which arises is whether such benefits accrue 
at too high a cost to the public interest, for the victims and for the defendant. On the 
one hand, plea negotiation could protect victims from re-traumatization which could be 
caused by facing their offenders in court. On the other hand, there are concerns raised 
that the use of plea negotiation excludes victims and denies them an opportunity to 
participate in the trial process by telling their stories. On the issue of public interest, the 
question is whether it serves public interest for courts to ‘make deals’ with guilty 
persons, instead of trying them and issuing just punishment.  
Similarly, there is the issue of the defendant waiving fundamental rights by pleading 
guilty and giving up the protections afforded to them by fair trial rights. Especially, in 
common law jurisdictions, the conviction entered as a result of a guilty plea is generally 
not subject to appeal except if the accused person can prove some misrepresentation 
on the part of the prosecutor or other extraneous circumstances. In Germany, for 
example, the court can withdraw the agreement under certain circumstances and if this 
occurs, the accused is to stand trial under the same tribunal, which places the accused 
person in a precarious and potentially prejudicial situation. Similarly, plea negotiation 
                                            
848 See part 4.5.1 of this thesis. 
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can be subject to abuse, especially in common law jurisdictions where the prosecutors 
have wide prosecutorial discretion to institute charges and to discontinue or withdraw 
them. There is a risk that prosecutors can use their power to pressurise innocent 
defendants into pleading guilty which has led one commentator to equate plea 
bargaining with torture of accused persons as practised in medieval times.849 
A study of the practices at national jurisdictions is beneficial to the ICC because it 
enables it to foresee some of the pitfalls and put in place mechanisms to deal with 
them before they arise. Admittedly, some of these limitations may spill over to the ICC 
should the Court decide to implement a policy of plea negotiation. ICC practitioners 
and stakeholders would have the difficult task of devising means to mitigate these 
challenges. One of the ways in which these challenges can be mitigated is by ensuring 
that an admission of guilt made pursuant to an agreement fulfils some mandatory 
formal requirements for example: that it is voluntary, informed and unequivocal and 
accompanied by essential facts establishing that the defendant did commit the crimes 
for which they admit guilt. These formal requirements are provided for in the Rome 
Statute and their application was sufficiently dealt with at the preceding ad hoc tribunals 
as discussed below. The ICC should implement a policy of plea negotiation because it 
has the benefit of learning from the advantages and limitations of plea negotiation as 
practised at national jurisdiction, as discussed above. Admittedly, some challenges 
would be unique to the ICC and cannot be foreseen in this manner. The ICC would 
have to deal with these types of challenges on a case-by-case basis as they arise in 
practice at the Court. 
6.2.3 Lessons the ICC can learn from the practice of plea negotiation at the ICTY 
and ICTR 
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals were discussed in this thesis beginning with 
their establishment, composition and mandate; and then venturing into their procedural 
law while comparing and contrasting with that of the ICC. It was demonstrated that 
while the ad hoc tribunals’ procedural law leaned more toward common law practices, 
the ICC’s procedural law is a sui generis system which blends both common law and 
                                            
849 See generally John H Langbein, ‘Torture and Plea Bargaining’ The University of Chicago Law Review 
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civil law practices as well as other novel creations designed to meet circumstances 
particular to the ICC. The following lessons may be learned by the ICC from the 
practice of plea negotiation by the ad hoc tribunals:  
Implementation of plea negotiation policy to mitigate challenges 
The introduction of plea negotiation at the ad hoc tribunals was a highly contested 
issue. At the formulation of the ICTY Statute, the US delegates proposed the 
incorporation of immunity for defendants who would cooperate with the Court. This 
proposal was rejected by the ICTY judges, the late Judge Cassese, in his capacity as 
the president of the ICTY, famously stating that the crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY were too grave to allow any form of bargain or immunity no matter how helpful 
the cooperation of an accused person was.850 Therefore, in the beginning, the ICTY 
and later the ICTR did not provide for plea negotiation in their Statutes and RPE.  
Later the UNSC gave both tribunals a deadline to complete investigations by 2004, 
first instance trials by 2008, and all the tribunals’ work by 2010. To meet these 
deadlines, the UNSC invited both tribunals to present their completion strategy. In their 
strategies, both tribunals listed two ways to expedite proceedings and help meet the 
deadline: referral of low-profile cases to national jurisdictions and implementing a 
strategy of plea negotiation.  Under new leadership, the ICTY and ICTR were able to 
successfully implement a plea negotiation policy, amending their Statutes and RPEs 
to incorporate plea negotiation and applying it in 20 cases at the ICTY and 10 cases 
at the ICTR.851 Plea negotiation was therefore introduced as a tool to ensure shorter, 
faster trials in an attempt to meet the deadlines set by the UNSC.  
The ICC is facing similar challenges which faced the ad hoc tribunals – namely lengthy, 
complex and costly trials. Granted, the ICC is a permanent court which does not have 
a completion deadline which motivated the implementation of a plea negotiation policy 
at the ad hoc tribunals. However, most ICC stakeholders including the ASP, which 
funds the Court; the victims, the accused persons, counsel and the international 
community at large appreciate the need for shorter and more efficient trials at the ICC. 
                                            
850 See the speech of President Cassese in response to the proposal by the United States reproduced 
in Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis (Hotei Publishing 1995) 652. 
851 See part 5.4 for the names of the cases in which plea negotiation was practiced in both tribunals. 
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Currently there is a general dissatisfaction with the ICC’s delivery on its mandate. The 
ICC could borrow a leaf from the ad hoc tribunals and introduce plea negotiation as a 
tool to help mitigate some of the challenges it faces as discussed in part 6.2.2 above. 
Development of streamlined jurisprudence 
When the ad hoc tribunals received their first guilty pleas from two accused persons, 
Mr Erdemović and Mr Kambanda at the ICTY and the ICTR, respectively, both tribunals 
were unprepared for them and the decisions were inconsistent. The main question on 
the Erdemović case was whether his guilty plea was valid. He pleaded guilty without a 
plea agreement and stated that he had committed the crimes charged under duress 
because his superiors had threated his life and that of his wife and young child. The 
question before the Chamber was whether this assertion amounted to a defence in 
international criminal law which would make his guilty plea equivocal and therefore 
invalid. The Trial Chamber held that his guilty plea was valid. On appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber was deeply divided on this issue, with some judges holding that his guilty 
plea was valid, while others held that it was not. In the end, the Appeal’s Chamber 
referred the case back to a different Trial Chamber and required that the accused 
person re-plead.852  
The issue of validity of the guilty plea also arose at the ICTR in the Kambanda case, 
albeit in a completely different way. Mr Kambanda pleaded guilty under the assumption 
that he would receive a sentence concession from the chamber, relying on the 
Erdemović case at the ICTY. The Trial Chamber convicted him on the basis of his guilty 
plea, but did not give him any concession for pleading guilty but instead sentenced him 
to life imprisonment. The accused appealed against both the conviction and the 
sentence, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis, inter alia, that the plea was 
not informed. In this regard, he argued that he had not received effective advice from 
counsel and that he was under a lot of pressure when he pleaded guilty. In the 
alternative, he sought a sentence reduction arguing that the Trial Chamber had failed 
to follow the principle established in Erdemović that a guilty plea entitles an accused 
person to a reduced sentence. He argued for a sentence of two years’ imprisonment. 
The Appeals Chamber upheld both the conviction and the sentence and the accused 
                                            
852 See discussion in part 5.3.1 of this dissertation. 
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was not allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or receive a sentencing concession for his 
guilty plea.853 
At the time the above two cases were determined, the ad hoc tribunals had not 
established guidelines concerning guilty pleas, for example, the essentials of a valid 
guilty plea and whether a guilty plea should be considered as a mitigating factor. 
However, going forward, as both tribunals opened their doors to guilty pleas and plea 
agreements, they amended the law relating to guilty pleas and jurisprudence became 
more streamlined. For example, it was established that for a guilty plea to be valid it 
had to be voluntary, informed, unequivocal and supported by essential facts showing 
that the accused person indeed committed the crime in question. Subsequently, the 
question of whether a guilty plea was valid did not arise again at either tribunal. 
Similarly, plea agreements entered into by the accused and the Prosecutor followed a 
standard format and provided information which demonstrated that the essential 
ingredients of a guilty plea had been fulfilled. Correspondingly, the tribunals amended 
the Statutes and RPE (and confirmed in their jurisprudence) that a guilty plea is a 
mitigating factor in sentencing especially if given timeously and accompanied by 
remorse and cooperation of the accused.854 
The ICC has the benefit of learning from the ICTY and the ICTR which had developed 
a clear, rich and streamlined jurisprudence of guilty pleas and plea agreements which 
was discussed in great detail in Chapter Five of this dissertation. For example, 
questions such as what a plea agreement should contain, the essential ingredients of 
a valid guilty plea as well as the consideration of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor are 
well established in the ICTY and the ICTR jurisprudence. The ICC should not wait until 
they are cornered by circumstances, like the ad hoc tribunals, in order to adopt a policy 
of plea negotiation but should learn from the above experience and the jurisprudence 
established therein. These lessons would be adopted only to the extent that they suit 
the uniqueness of the ICC. Considering the uniqueness of the ICC procedural law, and 
borrowing from the procedural law at the ad hoc tribunals and national jurisdictions, 
part 6.3.4 below discusses how the Rome Statute and the ICC RPE can be amended 
                                            
853 See discussion of the case in part 5.3.2 of this thesis. 
854 See discussion in part 5.4 of this thesis. 
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to become more suitable for plea negotiation. These proposed amendments are 
presented in full in Appendices A and B of this thesis. 
The practical benefits of plea negotiation 
The judges at both ad hoc tribunals considered a guilty plea as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing, especially if accompanied by remorse and cooperation by the accused 
person with the Court. Proceedings where accused persons pleaded guilty took much 
shorter time than those which went through full trial. The judgment could be written in 
a matter of days therefore saving the tribunal both human and financial resources. 
Apart from judicial economy, the information collected from accused persons who 
pleaded guilty and cooperated with the prosecution helped in securing evidence which 
would not otherwise be secured. Similarly, such information provided by accused 
persons through plea negotiation helped with the establishment of a historical record. 
Judges also opined that admission of guilt, when accompanied by remorse, fostered 
reconciliation in the post-conflict region and could help the healing process of 
victims.855 
Similar observations were made by the Trial Chamber in Al Mahdi where the Chamber 
noted that the accused person’s guilty plea had helped the Court save time and 
resources and that his remorse would be helpful in the truth and reconciliation process 
in Mali. If this was seen in one case, it can be argued that the same would be true if 
the ICC implemented a policy of plea negotiation which would mean more convictions 
in a shorter time, with less resources spent, and the information collected during 
negotiation may help solve other crimes and lead to more convictions. It may also help 
improve the legitimacy of the Court since, as noted in part 6.2.1 above, when an 
accused person admits guilt, they acknowledge that they are rightfully before the Court 
and that they committed the crimes charged. Furthermore, if the accused person 
acknowledges the harm caused to the victims and expresses remorse, this may 
facilitate the process of reconciliation in the post-conflict region. This would help the 
ICC in fulfilling its mandate which is both retributive and restorative. The ICC should 
therefore adopt a policy of plea negotiation in order to benefit from its practical benefits 
as observed in the ad hoc tribunals and in the Al Mahdi case.  
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However, even as one appreciates the benefits of plea negotiation, one must not lose 
sight of its limitations especially in the context of an international tribunal and this is 
also a lesson that the ICC can learn from the ad hoc tribunals. 
The limitations of plea negotiation 
While it is established that plea negotiation has practical benefits such as judicial 
economy and efficiency, a question arises whether these benefits accrue at the 
expense of the delivery of justice; and some commentators opine that this is the 
case.856 The argument here is that proceedings at international tribunals are 
necessarily lengthy and complex because they deal with complex subject matter 
namely international crimes within a political context. Similarly, the procedural hurdles 
which make the trials lengthy, exist to ensure fair and transparent trials and to protect 
the rights of the accused persons as well as the interests of the victims. Therefore, 
introducing a practice like plea negotiation may hinder a tribunal’s delivery of justice, 
for example, by infringing on the rights of the accused person. For example, Judge 
Hunt, then a member of the ICTY Appeal’s Chamber, remarked that in order to attain 
efficiency in trial, sometimes the ICTY judges deviated from well-established 
interpretations of the ICTY Statute and RPE in a manner which violated the rights of 
the accused. He added that the fact that the Tribunal needed to save time and 
resources was not sufficient grounds to violate the rights of an accused person.857 
However, in this instance violation of an accused person’s rights may be avoided by 
strict adherence to the formal requirements of plea negotiations: that a guilty plea be 
voluntary, informed, unequivocal and supported by essential facts; and other 
procedural safe guards proposed in Appendix B to this thesis. 
Similarly, the judges at the ad hoc tribunals opined that guilty pleas accompanied by 
cooperation can help in the establishment of the historical truth which was part of the 
mandate of the ad hoc tribunals and that of the ICC. While this may be true, it is also 
true that the truth achieved pursuant to a plea agreement is merely part of the truth. 
This is because in a plea agreement often times some facts and/or charges are 
dropped and the public never gets to know whether this was done because the 
                                            
856 See for example Michael Scharf, ‘Trading Justice for Efficiency - Plea-Bargaining and International 
Tribunals’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1070. 
857 See discussion in part 5.5.1 of this dissertation. 
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prosecutor had insufficient evidence to prove them or merely as part of some 
bargaining chip.   
Furthermore, the positive impact of plea negotiation on reconciliation was fronted by 
the judges especially if such admission of guilt is accompanied by acknowledgement 
of harm caused to the victims and sincere remorse. A challenge arises in situations 
where the remorse of an accused person is later revealed to have been false and 
opportunistic like occurred in the Plavšić case.858 One can only imagine the effect on 
the victims when an accused person, like Madam Plavšić, admits guilt, pretends to be 
remorseful, benefits from a sentence reduction and later as she is serving her sentence 
reveals that the remorse she had expressed was false. Even when judges exercise 
due diligence, there is no foolproof way for a tribunal to establish that the remorse 
expressed is genuine and so it is a risk which the ICC would have to take if it decides 
to adopt a plea negotiation policy. Fortunately, this only occurred in one case out of 
the many cases in which plea agreements were entered into both at the ICTY and 
ICTR. 
It is also noteworthy that the impact of guilty pleas and remorse on reconciliation in a 
post-conflict area would take a long time to be experienced, if at all, and it is a complex 
issue for which it would be difficult to prove using empirical evidence. Therefore, the 
use of plea negotiation remains a complex issue especially in international tribunals 
where the crimes dealt with are not only grave but also often political. 
This thesis argues that the ICC, which deals with crimes of a similar magnitude as the 
ad hoc tribunals, should adopt plea negotiation as occurred in the ad hoc tribunals. 
Even as it adopts the policy it must consider the pitfalls of plea negotiation experienced 
by the ad hoc tribunals. The position of the ICC is even more delicate in the sense that 
it often intervenes in situations involving ongoing conflicts, unlike say the ICTR which 
had jurisdiction over a conflict that had since ended. Therefore, the ICC cannot afford 
to appear to be dealing leniently with accused persons charged with perpetrating mass 
atrocities in ongoing conflicts. To have an accused person admit guilt and later rescind 
the admission would have far reaching consequences in situation countries and on the 
affected communities. It is beneficial that the Court can be aware of these pitfalls from 
                                            
858 See discussion of this case in part 5.5.3 of this dissertation. 
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the experience of the ad hoc tribunals and can therefore guard against them to the 
extent possible or prepare a mechanism of dealing with them on a case-by-case basis 
if and when they arise.  
To conclude, the ICC should adopt a policy of plea negotiation for at least three 
reasons: first, because it would mitigate some of the legal and procedural challenges, 
political challenges as well as the challenges relating to the victim participation and 
reparation regime which the ICC faces in the manner discussed above. Secondly, the 
ICC can benefit from the practical advantages of plea negotiation as experienced in 
the ad hoc tribunals and at national jurisdictions such as shorter proceedings and 
judicial economy as has been discussed in this thesis. Thirdly, the ICC can learn from 
the pitfalls of plea negotiation as experienced in the ad hoc tribunals and national 
jurisdictions such as possible infringement of the accused’s rights. This would give the 
Court foresight and enable it to avoid the avoidable pitfalls and put measures in place 
to mitigate those that cannot be avoided when they arise. The question which then 
arises is whether and how plea negotiation would fit into the legal and procedural 
framework of the ICC. 
6.3 Whether and how plea negotiation fits into the legal and procedural 
framework of the ICC 
This part argues that plea negotiation would fit into the legal and procedural framework 
of the ICC and presents two justifications: first, that plea negotiation and the legal 
framework of the ICC have a similar philosophical underpinning – that of compromise. 
Second, Article 65 (5) of the Rome Statute allows for discussions between the accused 
person and the Prosecutor over admission of guilt by the accused person and 
amendments of charges and sentences recommendations, which amounts to plea 
negotiation. Article 65 (5) was implemented in the Al Mahdi case which establishes 
precedence for this practice at the ICC.  
6.3.1 The legal framework of the ICC as a product of compromise 
The making of multilateral treaties is often a heavily political activity and the Rome 
Statute was not an exception. Most of the delegates participating in the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute were politicians and diplomats most of whom had no legal 
specialization in fields relevant to international criminal law. Therefore, the Rome 
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Statute was a product of both political and legal compromises and many pertinent 
issues, such as the powers of the Prosecutor and the role of the UNSC were voted on 
along political and diplomatic lines. Many alliances were formed and many 
compromises made in that process.859 Similarly, the continued role of negotiation and 
political compromises in the operation of the ICC is seen in the process of the 
appointment of ICC judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar.860 
Apart from political compromises, there were also legal compromises in that the 
drafting of the Rome Statute involved legal scholars from different jurisdictions with 
varying legal backgrounds and experiences. They could not agree on many pertinent 
legal issues and therefore sought legal compromises which were acceptable to most 
of the drafters involved. One of the legal compromises included the introduction of a 
Pre-Trial Chamber, which did not exist in previous international criminal tribunals and 
whose role is to provide judicial supervision to the Prosecutor’s powers of investigation 
and charging. The Pre-Trial Chamber has, for example, the power to authorise the 
Prosecutor to open investigations, to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to open an 
investigation and to confirm charges.861 
The above discussion shows the similarity between the philosophical underpinning of 
the ICC, which is that of compromise, and the very nature of plea negotiation which is 
also compromise. In order to conclude a treaty which would apply globally and satisfy 
many competing interests, the drafters of the Rome Statute and the delegates 
negotiating and voting on it took the middle ground on a number of pertinent issues 
both legal and political. Similarly, plea negotiation is essentially a compromise in the 
sense that parties agree not to go to trial, the accused person pleads guilty, giving up 
key procedural rights, and the prosecution agrees to amend the charges and/or to 
propose a sentencing concession to the Chamber. The philosophical underpinning of 
the plea negotiation therefore is similar to that of the Rome Statute; the latter which 
consists of both legal and political compromises. Therefore, plea negotiation fits into 
the philosophical framework of the ICC as they both share the same spirit of 
compromise. 
                                            
859 See discussion in part 2.2.2 of this dissertation. 
860 See discussion in part 2.3.1 of this dissertation. 
861 See discussion in part 2.4.2 of this dissertation. 
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6.3.2 Article 65 (5) of the Rome Statute and its implementation in the Al Mahdi 
case 
Article 65 of the Rome Statute provides for the proceedings on an admission of guilt. 
Article 65 brings together the practices of both common law and civil law jurisdictions 
as follows: In common law jurisdictions, a guilty plea, if accepted by the court, leads to 
automatic conviction of an accused person, while in civil law jurisdictions admission of 
guilt is merely part of the evidence to be considered by the judge in determining the 
case. Therefore, as a compromise, Article 65 of the Rome Statute provides that a Trial 
Chamber will only convict an accused person on the basis of an admission of guilt if 
such admission accords with the facts as presented by the Prosecutor in the charging 
document and in any other supplementary documents presented by the Prosecutor; 
as well as witness statements presented by the Prosecutor or the accused person. In 
particular, Article 65 (5) provides that: “Any discussions between the Prosecutor and 
the defence regarding modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty 
to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.” 
Article 65 is the legal basis of plea negotiation at the ICC. As argued by this author 
elsewhere: 
“The term ‘plea negotiation’ does not appear in the Rome Statute nor in practice 
at the ICC. However, Article 65 of the Rome Statute is very similar to the 
provisions dealing with plea negotiation in the RPE of the ICTY and ICTR, and 
before both institutions the term plea negotiation was generally accepted. These 
provisions allow for discussions between the prosecution and the defence 
regarding modification of charges and sentencing concessions. However, any 
agreements reached are not binding on the Tribunal’s Chamber. Therefore, it is 
argued that, despite its sui generis nature, Article 65 of the Rome Statute 
permits plea negotiation as was practised at the ICTY and ICTR.” 862 
 
The Al Mahdi case is the first and, thus far, the only case at the ICC where the 
prosecution and defence have entered into a plea agreement as a result of which the 
                                            
862 Phoebe Oyugi and Owiso Owiso, ‘Introducing Aspects of Transformative Justice to the International 
Criminal Court through Plea Negotiation’ in Julie Fraser and Brianne McGonigle Leyh (eds), 
Intersections of Law and Culture at the International Criminal Court (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 260. 
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accused person pleaded guilty and parties agreed on the facts of the case as well as 
the sentence to be imposed on the accused. The judges sentenced the accused within 
the sentence recommendation presented by the parties in the plea agreement. The 
Chamber accepted the guilty plea as a mitigating factor stating that guilty pleas were 
beneficial because they led to speedy trials and contributed to the establishment of 
truth and the process of reconciliation in post-conflict communities.863 The Al Mahdi 
case is proof that plea negotiation fits within the unique legal framework of the ICC.  
The question whether plea negotiation would fit into the legal framework of the ICC is 
answered in the affirmative. Article 65 (5) of the Rome Statute provides for discussions 
between the defence and the prosecution involving the modification of the charges, the 
admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed which may lead to amendment of 
charges or sentence recommendations. The practice defined in Article 65 is plea 
negotiation - where an accused person enters an agreement with the prosecution to 
admit guilt in exchange for a reduced charge or sentence, as in the Al Mahdi case - 
although the Rome Statute does not use the term “plea negotiation”. The Rome Statute 
allows for discussions between the accused person and the prosecution about the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, which phraseology is similar to versions of plea 
negotiation practised at the ad hoc tribunals and at domestic courts as discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, respectively. 
6.3.3 The Prosecution’s guidelines for agreements regarding admission of guilt 
In October 2020 the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC (OTP) published Guidelines 
for Agreements Regarding Admission of Guilt (the Guidelines) which is further proof 
that plea negotiation fits into the legal framework of the ICC.864 The purpose of the 
Guidelines is to guide the OTP on whether and when it may be appropriate to enter 
such agreements, and if so under what circumstances. The Guidelines begin by 
summarising the provisions of Article 65 of the Rome statute and recognising that it is 
a compromise between the traditional common law and civil law approaches to 
admission of guilt. Thereafter, Article 65 is recognised as the legal basis for discussions 
                                            
863 See discussion of the Al Mahdi case in detail in part 2.4.2 of this thesis. 
864 ‘ Guidelines for Agreements Regarding Admission of Guilt  <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20201009-Guidelines-for-agreement-regarding-admission-of-guilt-eng.pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2020 (the Guidelines). 
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between the accused person and the Prosecutor leading to admission of guilt. Further, 
the use of guilty pleas at the ad hoc tribunals as well as the existence of the provisions 
relating to guilty pleas in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, is recognised. 865  
In the Guidelines, the OTP recognises the advantages of admission of guilt by accused 
persons for example: it leads to efficiency, expediency and finality of trials; provides 
closure and recognition for victims; it can assist in producing evidence which might be 
relevant for investigations and prosecutions; it eliminates the need for victims and 
witnesses to travel to The Hague to testify which can be a traumatic experience and 
which may put their lives and well-being at risk; it may help in establishment of truth 
which cannot be denied by current or future generations.866 More importantly, 
agreements on admission of guilt are recognised as a tool which may assist the OTP 
in achieving its mandate which is to combat impunity through the prosecution of 
individuals most responsible for international crimes. These advantages have also 
been recognised in this thesis particularly in part 6.2 above and form the basis of the 
thesis’ conclusion that a policy of plea negotiation should be developed at the ICC. 
However, the Guidelines also recognise the possible limitations of such agreements 
for example: while admission of guilt shorten trials, it may lead to less than fully 
developed case record. To remedy this shortcoming, the Guidelines require the OTP 
to ensure that “all agreements contain a detailed and thorough statement of the facts 
underlying the admission of guilt. Such facts should address all the essential facts 
required for a conviction.”867  
Although the term “plea negotiation” is not utilised in the Guidelines, they concern the 
agreements between the Prosecutor and the accused person leading to admission of 
guilt by the accused while the Prosecutor agrees to amend changes or recommend an 
appropriate sentence to the Chamber. This process has been termed as plea-
negotiation in this thesis, therefore the Guidelines are proof that the practice fits into 
                                            
865 The Guidelines (n 864) paras 1-4. 
866 The Guidelines (n 864) paras 12, 19, 21, 25. 
867 The Guidelines (n 864) para 23. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za




the legal framework at the ICC and has many practical advantages, highlighted in the 
preceding paragraph, from which the Court can benefit. 
6.4. The proposed amendments to the Rome Statute and the RPE 
Although plea negotiation fits into the ICC framework, this thesis argues that the Rome 
Statute and the RPE need to be amended to include comprehensive provisions which 
deal directly with the practice. This is for two reasons: the first is the uniqueness of the 
procedural law at the ICC; and the second is that the current provisions, Article 65 and 
Rule 139 are sparse.  
First, on the issue of uniqueness of ICC procedure, an analysis of the procedural law 
at the ICC, and how this applies at different stages from the investigations through to 
pre-trial, trial, judgment, sentencing, appeal, enforcement of sentences and 
reparations; revealed that there has been a development of a new sui generis 
international criminal procedure at the ICC.868 Besides, there is a victim participation 
and reparation regime which is unique to the ICC. This uniqueness is further evident 
from a comparison of the procedural law of the ICC, on one hand, and that of the ICTY 
and the ICTR, as well as that of selected and representative national jurisdictions, on 
the other hand. This comparative study also revealed that there has been a 
development of a new sui generis international criminal procedure at the ICC, which is 
different from that of preceding tribunals, and national jurisdictions. This procedural law 
is continuously being developed through jurisprudence as well as through the 
formulation of policy documents to deal with pertinent issues unique to the ICC.869 Plea 
negotiation has been implemented in national jurisdictions with either common law or 
civil law practices. It has also been applied to the ICTY and ICTR, which dealt with 
crimes of equal magnitude as the ICC, but whose procedural law was borrowed largely 
from common law practices. The unique nature of the proceedings at the ICC could 
give rise to further complexities which have not been experienced either at the ad hoc 
tribunals or in domestic courts. This gives rise to the need to amend Article 65 to 
adequately cater to plea negotiation under this unique procedure for the avoidance of 
doubt. 
                                            
868 See part 2.4 of this dissertation.   
869 See part 2.4 of this dissertation.   
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Secondly, the provisions relating to admission of guilt namely Article 65 of the Rome 
Statute and Rule 139 of the RPE, do not adequately cover all the intricacies of the 
practice. This challenge was faced at the ICTY and ICTR where a policy of plea 
negotiation was introduced but the procedural law did not adequately provide for it. 
The challenges faced at the ICTY in the Erdemović case and at the ICTR in the 
Kambanda case gave rise to the need to amend both ICTY and ICTR Statutes and 
RPEs to resolve controversies and to cover outstanding issues.870 Adequate provision 
is necessary as plea negotiation can be a controversial practice and there can be a lot 
of inconsistencies in the practice of the Court if the law and regulations are not 
sufficiently clear.  
This thesis recommends amendments to the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, which provide sufficient safeguards to cushion the ICC from 
experiencing the challenges experienced by the ad hoc tribunals in case the ICC 
decides to adopt a policy of plea negotiation. This thesis envisions the inclusion of 
Article 65 bis of the Rome Statute and Rule 139 bis of the RPE, to amend the existing 
provisions on admission of guilt in Article 65 and Rule 139, respectively.  The proposed 
amendments would provide specifically for plea negotiation at the ICC, and the 
procedure thereof, for the avoidance of doubt. The proposed provisions are presented 
in full in Appendices A and B of this thesis. This part highlights some of the salient 
features of these proposed provisions and explains their justification.  
To begin with, the proposed Article 65 bis (1) would provide inter alia that:  
“At any time after the confirmation of charges by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor and defence may commence negotiation with the aim of concluding 
an agreement according to which, upon the accused making an admission of 
guilt, the Prosecutor shall take one or more of the following actions…” 
(emphasis added). 
It is noteworthy that the proposed amendments envisage plea negotiation at the ICC 
occurring after the confirmation of charges by the Pre-Trial Chamber; which makes it 
part of the mandate of the Trial Chamber. This allows the Pre-Trial Chamber, which 
                                            
870 See part 5.4 of this dissertation.   
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was a sui generis addition of the ICC,871 to carry out its mandate before plea 
negotiation can commence. This mandate includes supervision of the investigative 
powers of the Prosecutor, the protection of the rights of suspects and the issuance of 
arrest warrants and the confirmation of charges. To confirm charges the Pre-Trial 
Chamber conducts a hearing in order to “determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged.”872 In the Court’s jurisprudence, these are known as the “gate keeping 
functions” of the Pre-Trial Chamber. In this regard it has been held that: 
“The fundamental function of the control exercised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
through the confirmation decision is not only to filter out weak cases, but also 
(and, critically, every time a confirmation does occur) to set the factual 
boundaries of the trial by declining to confirm those charges which are not 
supported by ‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds’ as set out in 
Article 60(5) and (7), consistently with the ‘gatekeeper function of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber according to which […] only those cases proceed to trial for which the 
Prosecutor has presented sufficiently compelling evidence going beyond mere 
theory or suspicion.’”873 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the author proposes that the process of plea negotiation 
should only commence after the conclusion of the pre-trial stage of the proceedings 
which is essentially after the Pre-Trial Chamber has carried out this vital gatekeeping 
function. This would ensure that accused persons can only admit guilt to charges which 
are backed to a degree by the evidence in the prosecution’s custody to the satisfaction 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber. An admission of guilt given at this stage, if it leads to a 
                                            
871 See part 2.3.1 of this dissertation. 
872 Article 61 (7) of the RS. 
873 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona (Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s 
Request to Amend Charges pursuant to Article 61(9) and for Correction of the Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, and Notice of Intention to Add Additional Charges’) ICC-01/14-01/18-517 (14 
May 2020) para 23. See also The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (Decision adjourning the hearing on 
the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute) ICC-02/11-01/11-432 (3 
June 2013); The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona (Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for Notice to be given pursuant to Regulation 55(2) on Mr Yekatom’s Individual 
Criminal Responsibility) ICC-01/14-01/18-542 (2 June 2020) para 15.  
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conviction, would save the Court a considerable amount of time as it would cut short 
the trial stage of the proceedings.874  
 
The proposed Article 65 bis further provides that “the Prosecutor and defence may 
commence negotiation with the aim of concluding an agreement according to which, 
upon the accused making an admission of guilt…” (emphasis added). Here it is 
noteworthy that the phrase “admission of guilt” is preferred as opposed to the term 
“plea of guilty” used at the ad hoc tribunals.875 This is to signify the unique nature of an 
admission of guilt at the ICC which does not automatically lead to a conviction,876 
instead upon admission of guilt the Chamber has to be satisfied that: the accused 
understands the nature and consequences of admission of guilt; that the admission of 
guilt is made voluntarily; and that the admission of guilt is supported by the facts and 
circumstances of the case. After the Chamber is satisfied of these three facts, it then 
considers the admission of guilt “together with any additional evidence presented, as 
establishing all the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the 
admission of guilt relates.”877 After fulfilling this elaborate criteria, the Trial Chamber 
may convict the accused person of the crime. Because of this unique procedural 
requirement, plea negotiation at the ICC would differ from that of the domestic 
jurisdictions and that of the ICTY and ICTR878; therefore, the language of the proposed 
Article 65 bis is adapted to specifically cater to this difference. 
 
In addition to the above, proposed Article 65 bis (1) (a), (b) and (c), bis provides that if 
an accused agrees to admit guilt pursuant to a discussion with the Prosecutor, the 
latter shall take one or more of the following actions: request the Trial Chamber to 
amend the charges accordingly; recommend to the Trial Chamber a specific sentence 
                                            
874 See discussions in part 6.3.1 below on how plea negotiation can help reduce the lengthy proceedings 
at the ICC. 
875 See Rules 62 and 62 bis of both the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE.  
876 For a comparison of the practice at the ICC on the one hand, and with that of the ICTY and the ICTR 
as well as selected domestic jurisdictions, on the other hand, see Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis 
respectively. 
877 Article 65 (2) of the RS. 
878 See discussion of plea negotiation in Select national jurisdictions and at the ICTY and ICTR in 
chapters four and five of this thesis, respectively. 
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or sentencing range; and, undertake not to oppose a request by the accused for a 
particular sentence or sentencing range. First, it is acknowledged that the proposed 
Article 65 bis (1) (a), regarding the amendment of charges, may result into some 
complication considering the already complex nature of the definition, scope of charges 
and amendment of charges at the ICC.879 During the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, 
the Prosecutor may amend charges with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
However, after the charges are confirmed, which is the period during which plea 
negotiation is proposed in this thesis, the Prosecutor is not authorised to amend 
charges; and technically neither is the Trial Chamber. The amendment of charges is 
not one of the mandates of Trial Chambers enumerated by Article 64 of the Rome 
Statute. However, there is a narrow, and controversial,880 allowance under Regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court which permits the Trial Chamber to amend the legal 
characterisation of the facts. Therefore, for the proposed Article 65 bis (1) (a) to fit 
properly within the legal framework of the Court, there would be need to amend Article 
61 of the Rome Statute to directly authorise the Trial Chamber to amend charges, if it 
accepts a plea agreement between the Prosecutor and the Defence. The resolution of 
this issue requires further in-depth research and analysis on amendment of charges at 
the ICC which is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 
Secondly, reference is made to the proposed Article 65 bis (1) (b) and (c), which require 
the Prosecutor, pursuant to a plea negotiation with the defence, to recommend to the 
Trial Chamber a specific sentence or sentencing range, and, undertake not to oppose 
a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range. These 
provisions are based on the recognition that sentencing powers are only and entirely 
vested in the Trial Chamber. Upon conviction, the Trial Chamber is mandated to 
consider the appropriate sentence taking into consideration the evidence presented in 
the case and the submissions of the participants. For that reason, the proposed 
amendments provide that the Prosecutor may merely recommend a sentence or agree 
not to oppose the sentence recommendation of the defence. This provision is 
augmented by the proposed amendment to Rule 139 bis (7) which provides as follows: 
                                            
879 See discussion of this in part 3.2.1 of this dissertation. 
880 See discussion on complexity of Regulation 55 and the inconsistent jurisprudence of the Court on 
the same in part 3.2.1 of this dissertation. 
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 (7) Upon conviction in accordance with sub-rule 6, the Trial Chamber 
shall then consider the sentence recommended in the agreement taking into 
account the views and concerns of the victims. 
 
(a) If the Chamber is satisfied that the recommended sentence is just, the 
Chamber may impose a sentence within the recommended range. 
 
(b) If the Chamber is of the opinion that the sentence is unjust or inappropriate 
for any other reason, the Chamber shall inform the Prosecutor, the Defence 
and the Legal Representative of Victims of the sentence which it considers 
just or appropriate and shall invite submissions from the participants. 
 
(c) Having considered submissions from participants, the Chamber shall 
impose the sentence it considers just or appropriate and the matter shall be 
subject to appeal under Article 81 paragraph 2. 
The above proposed provision has three aims: first, to retain the discretion of the Trial 
Chamber in matters sentencing; second, to authorise participants to make submissions 
on sentencing if the Chamber is not satisfied with the recommendation made pursuant 
to an agreement. Third, it authorises the parties to appeal the Trial Chamber’s 
sentencing decision arising from a plea negotiation. This is important to ensure 
procedural fairness and the rights of the accused enshrined under Article 64 (3) of the 
Rome Statute.881 
 
On a related note, the proposed Article 65 bis (2) provides that the Trial Chamber shall 
not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph 1 above. Which gives the 
Chamber the general supervisory powers of the acts of the Prosecutor and defence in 
relation to plea negotiation. Therefore, after the Prosecutor and the defence enter an 
agreement, the Chamber can decide on whether to accept it or not. To aid the Chamber 
                                            
881 Article 64 (3) of the RS provides that:  
“The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full 
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 
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in making this decision the proposed Rule 139 bis of the RPE provides some formal 
requirements which must be fulfilled for an agreement entered into between the 
Prosecutor and the defence in relation to admission of guilt (the agreement) to be 
considered valid. The proposed Rule 139 bis (1) provides that the agreement shall be 
in writing and shall indicate that the accused person was assisted by counsel of their 
own choosing during negotiation and has been informed of their fair trial rights. The 
proposed amendment provides for three fundamental rights that the accused must be 
informed of as a bare minimum and that is the right: to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; not to be compelled to testify or to confess 
guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence; and to a public and fair hearing conducted 
impartially and in accordance with the minimum guarantees stipulated in Article 67. 
 
Furthermore, it is proposed that the agreement would state that during negotiation the 
charges were explained to the accused and that the accused fully understands the 
nature and the consequences of an admission of guilt and state that the admission is 
made voluntarily after the accused person has had sufficient consultation with counsel. 
This is important for example because in Kambanda, the accused attempted to revoke 
a guilty plea inter alia on the ground that he had not properly understood the 
consequences of pleading guilty and had not been availed the opportunity to 
sufficiently consult with counsel.882 The agreement would also state fully the charges 
brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the accused, the factual basis of the 
admission of guilt and all other facts relevant to the agreement including the sentence 
recommendation. Lastly in this regard, it is proposed that the agreement be signed by 
both the Prosecutor, the accused person, and counsel for the accused person, and, if 
the agreement was entered into with the help of an interpreter, an inclusion of a 
certificate by the interpreter to the effect that they interpreted accurately. 
Proposed Article 65 bis (3) provides that: If an agreement has been reached by the 
parties, the Trial Chamber shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open 
session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at the time the accused 
enters an admission of guilt. This is to preserve the principle of publicity of proceedings 
                                            
882 See discussion of this case in part 5.3.2 of this thesis. 
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as enshrined in Article 65 (1) and to avoid the secrecy and lack of transparency that is 
sometimes associated with plea negotiation.883 
 
Finally, Article 65 bis of the proposed amendment provides that in determining whether 
to accept an agreement concluded under paragraph 1, the Trial Chamber shall take 
into consideration the views and concerns of the victims. This provision is important 
because the victim participation regime at the ICC is the first one of its kind in 
international criminal tribunals, and despite the many challenges it faces, it is still 
considered as a step in the right direction.884 Therefore, the thesis proposes that the 
Trial Chamber considers the views and concerns of victims before accepting a plea 
agreement.  
 
The proposed Article 65 bis and Rule 139 bis, presented in full in Appendix A and B, 
contain detailed legal and procedural provisions to guide the Chamber in ensuring that 
an admission of guilt is valid and in deciding whether to accept a plea agreement or a 
recommended sentence. It also provides for the procedure to be followed in case the 
Trial Chamber rejects the admission of guilt altogether. This is to ensure that plea 
negotiation, is practised at the ICC in a manner which protects the rights of the accused 
and ensures the fairness of the proceedings. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to respond to the main question of this dissertation that is whether 
the ICC should implement a plea negotiation policy to mitigate some of the challenges 
it faces. This dissertation concludes that the ICC should implement a plea negotiation 
policy because: plea negotiation fits in the sui generis ICC’s substantive and 
procedural framework; plea negotiation can be a useful tool to deal with some of the 
challenges facing the ICC; and the ICC has the advantage of being able to benefit from 
the wealth of law, policy and jurisprudence and lessons from national jurisdictions and 
ad hoc tribunals, some of which are discussed in this dissertation. It was however 
acknowledged that the current legal and procedural framework does not adequately 
                                            
883 See part 4.5 on the critique of plea negotiation. 
884 See part 3.4 of this dissertation for a discussion on challenges relating to the victim participation and 
reparation regime at the ICC. 
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provide for plea negotiation, therefore, amendments have been proposed in 
Appendices A and B, the salient features of which were discussed in this chapter. The 
next chapter, Chapter Seven, concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The ICC was established with the consensus of a significant part of the international 
community and given the mandate of trying persons responsible for the most serious 
international crimes which shock the human conscience. The crimes prosecuted at the 
ICC (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression) are grave, and 
affect numerous victims both directly and indirectly. In addition to its retributive function, 
the Rome Statute system also has a reparative and transformative function and is also 
part of the broader corpus of transitional justice.885 It is in this spirit that public 
proceedings at the ICC not only serve to hold accountable persons deemed to have 
the highest responsibility for international crimes, but also serve other purposes such 
as establishing a historical record of atrocities. Ideally, persons most responsible for 
these types of crimes ought to undergo public trials, get convicted and receive 
proportionate sentences, without any form of negotiation, bargains or concessions. 
Viewed through this lens, plea negotiation is a flawed practice because it involves 
concessions, which means that persons who are, by their own admission, guilty of 
international crimes do not always receive the punishment they deserve. The criticisms 
against plea negotiation both at the national and at the international level, discussed 
in the previous chapters, are legitimate. Similarly, the initial fears of the ICTY judges 
that the crimes at the ad hoc tribunals were too serious to be bargained with also had 
merit. Indeed, plea negotiation ought not to be part of an ideal international criminal 
justice system.  
However, the ICC is facing legal, procedural and political challenges, some of which 
are similar to those which were faced by the ad hoc tribunals and which necessitated 
the introduction of a policy of plea negotiation. A similar trend can also be seen in 
national jurisdictions, for example, jurisdictions which were traditionally opposed to 
negotiated criminal justice solutions, like Germany, are increasingly introducing it in 
their criminal justice systems for its practical benefits. The ICC should therefore borrow 
from this practice and implement a policy of plea negotiation to mitigate some of the 
challenges facing the Court. As seen at the ad hoc tribunals, and national jurisdictions, 
plea negotiation can be a useful tool in increasing judicial economy, ensuring shorter 
and less expensive trials and increasing the conviction rates.  
                                            
885 Owiso (n 840) 505; Oyugi and Owiso (n 862) 249. 
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Admittedly, a conviction is not the only acceptable result of a criminal trial and 
acquittals are also proof of a fair and transparent criminal justice system. However, it 
is noteworthy that the two main modes of criminal liability at the ICC, individual criminal 
responsibility and command responsibility, are complex and difficult to establish as 
illustrated, for example, by the Bemba case. Mr Bemba was the president of the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the commander in chief of its armed 
wing. He was charged with crimes perpetrated by the MLC forces in Central African 
Republic (CAR) in 2002-2003. The Trial Chamber held that he was criminally liable for 
these crimes, as a commander of the MLC, convicted him and sentenced him to 18 
years’ imprisonment. However, the Appeals Chamber, citing a number of legal and 
factual errors, reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber and held that Mr Bemba 
could not be held criminally liable for the crimes committed by the said troops and 
subsequently acquitted him.886 
It is an uncontentious fact that crimes were committed in CAR during the MLC 
operation in 2002-2003 and that the victims suffered violence and cruelty; indeed both 
the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber recognized this fact.887 The decision of 
the Appeals Chamber, acquitting Mr Bemba, may be understood by legal experts who 
are familiar with the concept of superior responsibility of commanders under Article 28 
of the Rome Statute, but it is understandably a source of pain, disappointment and 
disillusionment to the victims who participated in the trial.888 It is acknowledged that the 
role of an international tribunal is not to convict an accused at all costs, and an Appeals 
Chamber ought to reverse a conviction if there are legal and/or factual errors to justify 
such reversal. However, without convictions the ICC does not appear to be delivering 
on its mandate to prosecute and punish international criminals and to deter crime. It is 
common knowledge that crimes were committed in CAR by MLC soldiers, the Appeals 
                                            
886 The Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”)   ICC-01/05-01/08-
3636-Red (8 June 2018) [194]. 
887 See for example The Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo (Separate opinion Judge Christine 
Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison) ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2 (8 June 2018) [57]. 
888 See for example the LRV submission on the opinions of the victims in The Prosecutor v Jean Pierre 
Bemba Gombo (Legal Representatives of Victims’ joint submissions on the consequences of the 
Appeals Chamber’s Judgment dated 8 June 2018 on the reparations proceedings) ICC-01/05-01/08-
3649 (12 July 2018) [2]. 
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Chamber has held that Mr Bemba was not criminally liable for said crimes, therefore 
the question remains who is liable? That person ought to have been prosecuted in 
order to deliver justice to the victims. 
In instances like these, plea negotiation could be a necessary tool to help in gathering 
evidence and ensuring the conviction of persons responsible for such crimes while 
saving the Court’s resources. If the ICC implements a plea negotiation policy the 
Prosecutor could, for example, charge officials of lower ranks in addition to those of 
higher ranks and if the former agree to plead guilty, they could give evidence against 
the latter. For example, in the CAR situation, the Prosecutor may have charged a 
combination of lower and high cadre MLC officials, and if the former agreed to plead 
guilty through plea negotiation, they could then give evidence against higher ranking 
MLC officials. In the Mali situation, for example, Mr Al Mahdi who pleaded guilty of war 
crimes as a result of a plea agreement is set to give evidence in the Al Hassan case 
which deals with war crimes arising from the same situation.889 If this way of doing 
things is developed as a matter of policy, the ICC could better deliver on its mandate 
to try persons most responsible for international crimes by relying on the evidence of 
convicted persons.  
Admittedly, even with a plea negotiation policy, it would be difficult for the ICC to 
determine which accused person would plead guilty, especially since the crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, by their very nature, are committed in a political context and 
often backed by ideological beliefs.890 Besides, it would also be unethical for the Court 
to encourage defendants to plead guilty. Nevertheless, it can be argued that if the ICC 
puts in place a plea negotiation policy it would most likely lead to a rise in guilty pleas 
and thereby convictions as occurred at the ICTY.  
The ICC must not wait to be forced by circumstances to implement a policy of plea 
negotiations like happened at the ad hoc tribunals. The ICC needs to take the initiative 
to consider all tools which might mitigate the challenges facing the Court and this thesis 
argues that plea negotiation is one such tool. In this regard, the ICC already has the 
                                            
889 ‘ICC: Last Chance to de-Quarantine Justice for Mali’ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/justiceinfo-
comment-and-debate/opinion/45752-icc-last-chance-to-de-quarantine-justice-for-mali.html> accessed 
26 October 2020. 
890 See discussion in part 5.5.2 above. 
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necessary statutory framework, by virtue of Article 65, which foresees agreements 
between the prosecution and defence to guilty pleas, amendment of charges and 
sentence agreements. Similarly, the ICC has successfully dealt with the Al Mahdi case 
where the Prosecutor and the defence entered into a plea agreement, the accused 
person admitted to crimes committed and the parties agreed on a sentence range to 
propose to the Chamber; the Chamber sentenced the accused within the proposed 
range and the case was wrapped up without much controversy. In addition, this thesis 
presents proposed amendments to the Rome Statute and the RPE which could make 
the legal framework of the ICC more adaptable to a policy of plea negotiation.891 The 
ICC should, therefore, implement a plea negotiation policy because its pragmatic 





                                            
891 See part 6.3.4 as well as Appendices A and B of this thesis. 
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Text of draft provision on plea negotiation to be included in the Rome Statute 
Article 65 bis  
 
Plea Negotiation  
 
1. At any time after the confirmation of charges by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor and defence may commence negotiation with the aim of concluding 
an agreement according to which, upon the accused making an admission of 
guilt, the Prosecutor shall take one or more of the following actions: 
  
a) request the Trial Chamber to amend the charges accordingly;  
 
b) recommend to the Trial Chamber a specific sentence or sentencing range;  
 
c) undertake not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or 
sentencing range.  
 
2. The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph 
1 above.  
 
3. If an agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall 
require the disclosure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of 
good cause, in closed session, at the time the accused enters an admission of 
guilt in accordance with Article 65 paragraph 1. 
 
4. In determining whether to accept an agreement concluded under paragraph 1 
the Trial Chamber shall be guided by Rule 139 bis and shall take into 









Text of draft Rule on Plea Negotiation to be included in the RPE 
Rule 139 bis 
Agreements under Article 65 bis paragraph 1 
(1) An agreement contemplated in Article 65 bis shall be in writing and shall at 
least: 
 
(a) State that the accused, before entering into the agreement, was represented 
by counsel of the accused’s choosing and has been informed of their rights: 
 
(i) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt; 
(ii) not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, 
without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or 
innocence; and 
(iii) to a public and fair hearing conducted impartially and in accordance with 
the minimum guarantees stipulated in Article 67. 
 
 
(b) State that the charges have been explained to the accused in a language 
the accused fully understands and the accused understands the nature of 
the charges and consequences of the admission of guilt; 
 
(c) State that the admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient 
consultation with defence counsel; 
 
 
(d) State fully the charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the 
accused, the factual basis of the admission of guilt and all other facts 
relevant to the agreement including the sentence recommendation. 
 
(e) Be signed by the Prosecutor, the accused and their legal representative; and 
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(f) If the accused has negotiated with the Prosecutor through an interpreter, 
contain a certificate by the interpreter to the effect that they interpreted 
accurately during the negotiations and in respect of the contents of the 
agreement. 
 
(2) (a) As soon as an agreement is entered in conformity with sub-rule 1, the 
Prosecutor shall inform the Trial Chamber that such an agreement has been 
entered into and the Trial Chamber shall then- 
 
(i) require the defence to confirm that such an agreement has been entered 
into; and 
(ii) satisfy itself that the requirements of sub-rule 1 have been complied with. 
 
(b) If the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the agreement complies with the 
requirements of sub-rule 1 the Trial Chamber shall- 
 
(i) inform the Prosecutor and the defence of the reasons for non-compliance; 
and 
(ii) afford the Prosecutor and the defence the opportunity to comply with the 
requirements concerned. 
 
(3) If the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the agreement complies with the 
requirements of sub-rule 1, the Trial Chamber shall order the disclosure of the 
agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, 
at the time the accused enters an admission of guilt. 
 
(4) (a) After the contents of the agreement have been disclosed, the Trial 
Chamber shall question the accused to ascertain whether: 
 
(i) they confirm the terms of the agreement and the admissions made by them 
in the agreement; 
(ii) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, they admit the allegations in 
the charge to which they have admitted guilt; 
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(iii) the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in their sound 
and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced; and 
(iv) they fully understand the nature of the charges and consequences of the 
admission of guilt 
 
(b) After an inquiry has been conducted in terms of sub-rule 4, the Trial Chamber 
shall record a plea of not guilty and inform the Prosecutor and the defence of 
the reasons therefore if: 
 
(i) the Chamber is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence in respect 
of which the agreement was entered into; or 
(ii) it appears to the Chamber that the accused does not admit an allegation in 
the charge or that the accused has incorrectly admitted any such allegation or 
that the accused has a valid defence to the charge; or 
(iii)for any other reason, the Chamber is of the opinion that the admission of guilt 
by the accused should not stand. 
(c) If the Chamber has recorded a plea of not guilty, it shall consider the 
admission of guilt as not having been made, in which case it shall order that the 
trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures in accordance with Article 
65 paragraph 3 and may remit the case to another Trial Chamber.  
 
(5) If in the interest of justice and in the interest of the victims the Trial Chamber 
is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is 
required the Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to present additional 
evidence, or order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures 
in accordance with Article 65 paragraph 4, in which case it shall consider the 
admission of guilt as not having been made and may remit the case to another 
Trial Chamber. 
 
(6) (a) If the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations 
in the charge, it shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional 
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evidence presented, as establishing all the essential facts that are required to 
prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and may convict the 
accused of that crime. 
 
(7) Upon conviction in accordance with sub-rule 6, the Trial Chamber shall then 
consider the sentence recommended in the agreement taking into account the 
views and concerns of the victims. 
 
(d) If the Chamber is satisfied that the recommended sentence is just, the 
Chamber may impose a sentence within the recommended range. 
 
(e) If the Chamber is of the opinion that the sentence is unjust or inappropriate 
for any reason, the Chamber shall inform the Prosecutor, the defence and 
the Legal Representative of victims of the sentence which it considers just 
or appropriate and shall invite submissions from the participants. 
 
(f) Having considered submissions from participants, the Chamber shall 
impose the sentence it considers just or appropriate and the matter shall be 
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